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Government teams from around the world—from Colombia to South  Africa, 
from Mexico to Indonesia, from Minas Gerais to Yucatan, from Karnataka 
to Antioquia—are confronting many of the challenges and making progress 
in various dimensions of setting up and improving systems to monitor and 
evaluate performance. Take the example of Minas Gerais. The State for Re-
sults team has been working in recent years on the design and implementa-
tion of a system for monitoring social indi cators that will make it possible to 
better track changes in socioeconomic conditions at a disaggregated level. It 
is working on instruments to facilitate the quality assurance of government 
interventions, such as spot surveys that indicate how and how well money 
was spent. And it has an ambitious agenda to evaluate the impact of key 
programs. 
This book is useful to anyone who cares about the quality of public poli-
cies and who wants to learn and understand how public policies and pro-
grams can be shaped with the objective of improving people’s welfare. You 
might be interested in setting development goals and speciﬁ c targets for de-
velopment outcomes for a country, province, city, or sectoral entity, and in 
the techniques that are available for doing that (as well as how these tech-
niques might interact with the usual political pressures). Or you might want 
to understand the institutional and technical constraints to setting up an 
evaluation system that assesses the impact of diff erent interventions and 
provides a sense of whether the interventions are indeed eff ective in achiev-
ing development targets (that is, a system that allows you to know if you are 
doing the right things). Or you might want to know the characteristics of a 
monitoring system that provides real-time information on whether goods 
and services are being delivered as planned and whether output targets 
are being reached (that is, a system that indicates whether you are doing 
things right). 
FOREWORD
This book discusses many of the institutional and technical challenges 
governments confront in building monitoring and evaluation (M&E) sys-
tems, and how to embed such systems in the decision-making process in all 
sectors, at all times, thereby ensuring that high-quality information eff ec-
tively feeds policy design and policy decision-making.
Basing policy on evidence at all stages of the policy cycle is hard. Policy 
decisions should always result from a combination of political consider-
ations along with information and evidence about the impacts and eff ective-
ness of the policy. But (too) many times, information and evidence are not 
part of the equation. For instance, countries and governments have to deﬁ ne 
what is important for people’s welfare. Is it reducing infant mortality? Im-
proving citizen security? Reducing children’s malnourishment? Increasing 
youth employment opportunities? Once a country knows the key areas of 
intervention, the looming question is, how much is the country capable of 
improving? What is realistic? What is attainable? The deﬁ nition of numeric 
targets is a complicated endeavor, and frequently targets are set based only 
on political considerations. Saying, “our objective is to reduce poverty” is 
not the same as saying “we will reduce poverty by 10 points in the next 5 
years.” Setting targets, and setting them scientiﬁ cally, is a complex task, and 
there is a long way to go in reﬂ ecting this complexity in the way that deci-
sions are made.
Even with targets, and the corresponding indicators needed to monitor 
progress toward those targets, the challenge remains of mapping the policies 
and programs that are related to the targets. This mapping is easier said than 
done; many programs do not have clear objectives, or the causal links be-
tween a program (say, of school feeding) and the outcomes (say, child under-
nourishment)  are not well established. In many cases, the production func-
tions behind outcomes are not well known. Or the links are clear but the 
magnitude of the intervention needed is not well known. Process evalua-
tions are now used to verify that projects have clearly stated objectives (too 
frequently, objectives are lacking) and that they are accomplishing what they 
are supposed to accomplish. And impact evaluations are being used to assess 
whether projects are truly eff ective in reaching the desired outcomes. But 
using evaluations is not the norm, and neither is it the norm to use the infor-
mation generated by evaluations to improve program design or to decide 
whether a program should be eliminated.
The policy discussion has shifted in recent decades. There is much more 
consensus about the need for macro stability, low inﬂ ation, ﬁ scal responsi-
bility, market integration, and openness to trade. The discussion lies more on 
how to achieve higher quality public interventions, greater effi  cacy and effi  -
ciency in spending, and increased accountability to citizens in the use of 
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public resources. The role of government is as important as ever. We are in a 
world of good performance at low levels. That is, changes are headed in the 
right direction, but we are far from doing well. Take monetary poverty. It has 
fallen dramatically and the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a 
day fell 20 points since 1990. But as of 2008, 1.29 billion people were still liv-
ing on that amount or less. And 2.47 billion people live on less than US$2 a 
day. Moreover, improvement has been dramatically heterogeneous across 
and within countries. Living standards have improved for many but have 
barely changed for many others. So income inequality is still high, and to a 
great extent it is a reﬂ ection of the inequality of opportunity across popula-
tion groups, inequality in access to basic nutrition among infants, inequality 
in access to basic quality education among youth, and inequality in access to 
high productivity jobs among adults. Closing those opportunity gaps re-
quires a state that is more effi  cient in providing or assuring the provision of 
services to all. That requires a state that knows what works and what doesn’t, 
and can adjust accordingly. An M&E system that is embedded in the policy 
decision-making process is the tool that allows governments to learn, decide, 
and allocate resources.  
There is no template for a good M&E system that can be replicated from 
one country to the other. Models are not possible, feasible, or appropriate. 
There is a lot of interest in learning from Mexico, Chile, the Republic of 
Korea, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Australia, and the United States, all 
countries that have made good progress in diff erent aspects of M&E systems. 
These countries are the basis of examples provided in this book. But in no 
case can one country adopt another country’s model; the institutional envi-
ronments of each country deﬁ ne the right structure. Countries have to slowly 
build internal capacity, and little by little, step by step, can deﬁ ne what the 
best system is for them. This book is an excellent resource in that process. 
Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi
Director
Poverty Reduction and Equity
The World Bank
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 3
Introduction
Philipp Krause, Keith Mackay, and Gladys Lopez-Acevedo
CHAPTER 1
The Motivation for This Book
Governments around the world face ongoing pressures from citizens to pro-
vide more and better services, and to do this under a tight ﬁ scal environ-
ment. This provides the context for government eff orts to ensure their poli-
cies and programs are as eff ective, and as effi  cient, as possible. An emphasis 
on government performance has led a number of governments to create for-
mal systems for monitoring and evaluating their performance—on a regular, 
planned, and systematic basis—with the objective of improving it. The focus 
of this book is on these government monitoring and evaluation (M&E) sys-
tems: what they comprise, how they are built and managed, and how they 
can be used to improve government performance. 
M&E systems focus on measuring the results produced by government—
its outputs, outcomes, and impacts. The M&E system may exist at the level of 
an individual agency, entire sector, or the government as a whole. M&E can 
provide unique information about the performance of government policies, 
programs, and projects—at the national, sector, and sub-national levels. It 
can identify what works, what does not, and the reasons why. M&E also pro-
vides information about the performance of a government, of individual 
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ministries and agencies, and of managers and their staff . Highlighting ex-
amples of good practice and poor practice can help improve performance.
Perhaps the best way to understand the potential contribution of M&E to 
sound government is to view it at diff erent parts of the policy cycle. The early 
stages of the policy process—analyzing and developing government policy 
and planning priorities and strategies—all beneﬁ t from evidence of what has 
or has not worked in the past; in other words, evidence-based policy making. 
Information on the performance of existing government programs and on 
the expected performance of new programs is important for the next stage 
of the policy cycle: the allocation of resources in the budget. M&E informa-
tion, especially evaluation ﬁ ndings that explain past performance, helps to 
guide government decisions so that the most cost-eff ective collection of poli-
cies and programs can be adopted in the annual budget. 
At the next stage in the policy cycle—the implementation and manage-
ment of activities funded by the budget—M&E helps managers to monitor 
their activities, including government service delivery and staff  manage-
ment, so that they learn quickly what is working and what is not. Evaluations 
or reviews can identify the reasons for this good or bad performance. This is 
the learning function of M&E, often referred to as results-based manage-
ment. The ﬁ nal stages of the policy cycle include accountability relation-
ships. M&E reveals the extent to which the government has achieved its ob-
jectives and thus provides the evidence needed to ensure strong government 
accountability to outside actors such as the parliament and civil society, and 
within government between sector ministries and central ministries, among 
agencies and their sector ministry, and among ministers, managers, and staff . 
Strong accountability can provide the incentives necessary to improve 
performance. 
There is an increasing body of literature on the experience of countries in 
building and strengthening their M&E systems,1 and on the M&E tools 
and techniques2 that they use. As it is diffi  cult for non-experts to come to 
grips with these issues, a main purpose of this book is to synthesize exist-
ing knowledge about M&E systems and to provide it in a highly succinct, 
 readily-understandable, and credible manner. This book is not designed to 
be a manual, however, guidance concerning further reading is also provided.
Another objective is to document new knowledge on M&E systems, such 
as on issues that may not be well understood so far, for example on how best 
to use diff erent types of evaluations. The book comprises a collection of 
 individually-authored papers, prepared by leading exponents of M&E and 
M&E systems. The papers reﬂ ect some diff erences in emphasis and perspec-
tive; and there are even some contradictions—typically minor—between 
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some of the papers. Generally speaking, there exists substantial consensus 
on most of the issues relating to M&E systems. 
This book endeavors to expand the frontiers of issues that have been re-
searched and analyzed. However, there are still a number of issues that are 
still not understood well enough. These include, for example, the extent of 
utilization of diff erent types of M&E systems, and the ways in which system 
design helps to determine utilization. Related issues are the cost and the 
cost-eff ectiveness of diff erent M&E systems. These and other frontier issues 
are discussed brieﬂ y at the end of this chapter.
The target audiences for this book are busy people who have limited time 
to come to grips with the nuts and bolts of M&E systems. They include se-
nior decision makers and policy advisers, such as civil servants, members of 
congress or parliament, academics, and others who might not be familiar 
with M&E systems but are aware of their potential importance for improv-
ing government performance. Another target audience is World Bank and 
other donor staff  working to support client governments to strengthen their 
M&E systems.
The chapters in this book were originally published as separate brief-
ing papers, available via a World Bank Web site: http://go.worldbank.org/
CC5UP7ABN0. Additional papers will be prepared after the publication of 
this book, and these will be added to the Web site. 
Two themes that emerge from this book merit particular notice. First, we 
highlight the importance of M&E utilization. No M&E system matters with-
out being utilized over a sustained period of time. Second, we highlight the 
institutional dimension of M&E systems. The current literature has at times 
been overly focused on the instruments of M&E, neglecting the important 
institutional choices that determine how exactly an M&E  system is run, and 
for what purpose. We will explore these two themes in a bit more detail be-
low. The remainder of this introduction will then brieﬂ y outline the three 
main sections of this book.
What Is a Successful M&E System: 
Sustainability and Utilization
Most would agree that a successful M&E system is one where good-quality 
performance information and evaluation ﬁ ndings are produced and are 
used intensively at one or more stages of the policy cycle—this is what de-
ﬁ nes a well-utilized M&E system (see Chapter 2). For this situation to occur, 
both the supply and the demand of M&E information must be suffi  cient. The 
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supply side includes attributes such as the quality and reliability of monitor-
ing data, the number and coverage of performance indicators, the types of 
evaluations conducted and the issues addressed, and the reliability and time-
liness of the evaluations. The demand side includes the range of potential 
users of M&E information—such as ministers, senior offi  cials, policy ana-
lysts, program managers, congress or parliament, and civil society—and the 
extent of their use of this information in the policy cycle. 
An important misunderstanding concerning M&E systems is that a 
 supply-driven approach is suffi  cient: some evaluation advocates appear to 
believe that if high-quality, rigorous evaluations are conducted their ﬁ ndings 
and recommendations will almost automatically be used because of their self-
evident value. Anyone who has worked at a senior level in government will 
recognize the fallacy in this belief. In the real world, there are many deter-
minants of government decision making; evaluation ﬁ ndings relating to the 
eff ectiveness of policies and programs are only one input to these decisions. 
That said, there are many ways to make monitoring information and 
 evaluation ﬁ ndings as useful as possible (see IEG 2004, Chapter 2). Thus for 
budget decision making, it is helpful to ensure that evaluations have been 
conducted in a timely manner on a broad range of major spending programs, 
particularly those with uncertain performance. For decisions about initiat-
ing, scaling up, or eliminating programs, credible information about results 
can be crucial. For ongoing program management, it helps if evaluations 
have drawn on detailed program information and have focused on important 
operational issues, with the evaluation input and ownership of the program 
managers. And for accountability purposes, it helps when M&E information 
is available for the entire range of government spending, and when it allows 
simple comparisons over time and between diff erent sectors and programs. 
Diff erent potential users of M&E information have diff erent needs, and it is 
diffi  cult for an M&E system to satisfy all of them. 
Experience with a broad range of types of public sector reform empha-
sizes the key role played by incentives (World Bank 1997).3 Similarly, experi-
ence with M&E systems shows that powerful incentives are important on 
the demand side for achieving a high level of utilization of the information 
they provide. These include “carrots” (rewards), “sticks” (deterrents), and 
“sermons” (statements of support). Carrots might include positive encour-
agement and rewards for using M&E; sticks might include, for example, ﬁ -
nancial penalties for ministries that fail to implement evaluation recommen-
dations; and sermons might include high-level, ministerial statements of 
support for M&E (see Mackay 2007, Chapter 11). 
This book presents case studies on several countries that have succeeded 
in achieving high levels of utilization of M&E information, including Austra-
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lia, Canada, Chile, and Mexico. There is also some discussion of other coun-
tries that utilize M&E information heavily, such as Colombia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Each of these countries has its own, some-
what unique M&E system, and this reﬂ ects diff erent historical factors, insti-
tutional contexts, key champions of M&E, and the manner in which the 
M&E system was developed. These country cases yield many insights into 
success factors that have determined the extent of utilization, as well as into 
the obstacles facing high levels of utilization. There is a range of evidence 
concerning the extent of utilization of M&E in these countries. A common 
feature is that the M&E system has been regarded as highly cost-eff ective in 
each country. 
Another dimension of a fully “successful” M&E system is its sustainabil-
ity—its ability to survive changes in government and to endure as a continu-
ing feature of a government’s approach to public sector management. Most 
of the countries that have built an M&E system whose outputs are highly 
utilized have spent a number of years in progressively improving the system. 
It takes time to create or strengthen data systems; to train or recruit qualiﬁ ed 
staff ; to plan, manage, and conduct evaluations; and to train offi  cials to use 
M&E information in their day-to-day work. Australia and Chile were able to 
create well-functioning M&E systems within four or ﬁ ve years, but Colom-
bia has taken more than a decade. 
An M&E system that achieves high levels of utilization but that proves not 
to be sustainable cannot be regarded as fully successful. Nevertheless, such 
systems provide valuable lessons for other countries. A good example here is 
Australia (see Chapter 14). Its M&E system lasted for a decade (1987 to 1997) 
and was generally considered to be one of the most successful in the world at 
that time, achieving a high level of utilization of the M&E information that 
the system produced. But a new government elected in 1996 was hostile to 
the civil service and it wanted to cut what it regarded as “non-core” govern-
ment activities; it decided to signiﬁ cantly reduce the central role and func-
tions of the powerful ﬁ nance ministry that managed not just the M&E sys-
tem but the entire budget process. This led to the dismantling of the M&E 
system; that said, a later government elected in 2007 is taking a number of 
steps to reinvigorate monitoring and evaluation.
Some outside observers have expressed surprise that a successful M&E 
system might be abolished, arguing that once evidence-based decision mak-
ing and management have been established within a government, they will 
have demonstrated their value and will thus survive indeﬁ nitely. However, 
while it takes time and considerable eff ort to build an M&E system, that suc-
cess can be undermined quickly. This has occurred when a new government 
does not place the same premium on having M&E information available to 
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assist its decision making—such as in Australia or the United States after 
2008—or where the government wished to reduce the power and inﬂ uence 
of a key ministry that managed the M&E system—a risk factor that, arguably, 
the powerful ﬁ nance ministry in Chile has faced in recent years. The even-
tual departure of inﬂ uential M&E champions is another risk factor for M&E 
systems. 
It might also be hoped that, once an M&E system has been in place for a 
lengthy period, a measurement-oriented “performance culture” might be-
come established in government ministries, and that this would also persist 
even if the M&E system itself were to decline or even be abolished. The lim-
ited evidence on this does not give grounds for optimism, however. Minis-
tries in Australia devoted considerable attention to M&E and made exten-
sive use of this information during the life of the M&E system. However, 
after the system ended most ministries ended any substantive involvement 
in M&E; interestingly, some good-practice ministry “islands” of M&E per-
sisted in later years (Mackay 2011).
One reason that has been suggested to explain this decline in a perfor-
mance culture is the substantial cuts in the civil service which made it much 
more diffi  cult to fund what might be regarded as “discretionary,” long-term 
activities such as evaluation and research. Another possible reason is that 
the heads of ministries, and their ministers, might be disinclined to conduct 
evaluation: while positive evaluation ﬁ ndings that reveal good performance 
are always welcome, adverse ﬁ ndings can pose signiﬁ cant political and repu-
tational risks. That said, the persistence of some M&E islands demonstrates 
that not all ministry heads hold such views. 
The Institutional Dimension of M&E 
There is a confusing degree of institutional variety to M&E systems, with 
many countries using diff erent terminologies. In addition, the institutional 
settings fundamentally diff er in terms of the overall leadership and central-
ization of the system, as well as its day-to-day operation. Commonalities and 
patterns between countries do exist, even among the unique characteristics 
of any one country. It is important to be able to assess how institutional in-
centives shape M&E systems.
Even in cases where most of the day-to-day work of managing evaluations 
is decentralized through ministries and programs, there is usually one cen-
tral steering agency in charge of the overall framework of the system. In-
deed, a common feature of successful M&E systems is having a capable min-
istry in charge—a ministry that can design, develop, and manage the system 
Introduction  9
(Chapter 2). In countries where evaluation systems are well utilized and 
survive for extended periods of time, this leadership is usually provided by 
the main users of evaluation information, as they are also the actors with the 
biggest stake in the success of the evaluation system. The principal stake-
holders of this “evaluation agency” provide the steering of the system either 
directly or they delegate it to a special-purpose agency (a good example is 
the case of Mexico, see Chapter 12).
Direct steering is most common in countries with uniﬁ ed governments, 
and where the evaluation system is closely tied to the budget. Here the min-
istry of ﬁ nance leads directly, and this delegation of authority via the ﬁ nance 
minister is made possible by a strong mandate in budgetary matters, where 
evaluations are a natural extension of already existing budget systems. The 
most cited case for such a system is that of Chile (see Chapter 13), where the 
budget offi  ce (DIPRES) within the Ministry of Finance is directly in charge 
of all key aspects of the evaluation system, including the conduct of evalua-
tions, and the follow-up of decisions on whether to implement evaluation 
recommendations. In this case, the following key activities are managed in-
ternally: (i) the selection and scheduling of evaluations; (ii) the process of 
identifying appropriate methods and evaluators; (iii) the supervision of the 
conduct of evaluations; and (iv) their eventual receipt and the follow-up of 
recommendations and their implementation. For evaluation systems that 
operate with a government-wide or at least an inter-ministerial mandate, 
this is an exceptional arrangement. While it allows a very high degree of 
control over all details of the evaluation work, it also retains a high cost bur-
den at the center. Furthermore, it reduces signiﬁ cantly the potential for sec-
tor ministries and other spending units to develop a stake in the system, and 
thus might endanger its long-term viability. 
In Chile, the budget process provides a natural structure to run the evalu-
ation schedule, and gives strong incentives—be it through carrots or sticks—
to other actors to provide necessary performance information concerning 
program operations and performance. The major leadership elements are all 
set up in-house within the budget offi  ce, building on an already very strong 
mandate that delegates virtually unlimited (by international standards) bud-
getary authority to the minister of ﬁ nance. 
It is far more common for evaluation agencies to decentralize the imple-
mentation of the system. In a decentralized system such as Canada (Chap-
ter 15), the evaluation agency often retains control over the procedural 
framework and the methodological toolkit, as well as the quality control of 
the evaluation work. The day-to-day work of carrying out the evaluations 
themselves is then done by ministries and agencies in coordination with the 
evaluation agency. Such an arrangement makes it much easier for ministries 
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to develop an interest in the evaluation work and to start utilizing the out-
puts for their own purposes, as opposed to seeing the evaluations as an ex-
ternally imposed burden upon their work. Sharing the burden of implemen-
tation can also ease the setting up of evaluation systems by distributing the 
workload more evenly, thereby reducing the need for any one actor to devote 
large numbers of specialized staff . 
Even in cases where a powerful ﬁ nance ministry is in charge of steering 
the evaluations, they often ﬁ nd it expedient to involve spending ministries in 
the implementation, most often because it helps to gain support, but also 
because it reduces the workload at the central budget offi  ce. In Australia 
between 1987 and 1997 (see Chapter 14), the Department of Finance obliged 
spending ministries to develop multiannual evaluation plans, endeavored to 
persuade ministries to evaluate “problem” programs, and used the results of 
the evaluations as inputs into the budget process. However, the spending 
ministries were responsible for the conduct of each evaluation; the ﬁ nance 
department would off er to help oversee them, although ministries might 
view this as intrusive. 
Indirect steering is a model adopted in countries where either the separa-
tion of powers is strong or the evaluation system has multiple strong stake-
holders with an interest in the evaluation system’s outputs. In this case coun-
tries such as Mexico (Chapter 12) have found it useful to delegate the steering 
of the system to a specially designated technical agency in charge. This al-
lows the evaluation system to function with a higher degree of technical in-
dependence and avoid the political conﬂ ict that may arise from having the 
evaluation very closely linked to one particular actor. 
The Australian experience following the end of the M&E system—where 
most ministries conducted few evaluations and where monitoring infor-
mation was generally of low quality (see Chapter 14)—suggests that a 
wholly devolutionary approach to M&E is unlikely to be suffi  cient, both to 
support evidence-based decision making and even for purposes of internal 
management. This suggests that some sort of centrally-driven approach is 
necessary. 
Some M&E systems are clearly geared toward a single user and its infor-
mation needs, while others serve a broader group of stakeholders. Single-
user systems are most common where the ﬁ nance ministry is clearly in 
charge and the main purpose is to inform budgetary decisions. In these cases 
it is relatively easy to develop a formal approach to ensure the implementa-
tion of evaluation recommendations, because the budget process provides a 
natural structure into which the evaluation system can be embedded. The 
budget calendar is already formalized, often in law, and the institutional 
roles are clearly deﬁ ned (see Chapter 6). 
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The implementation of evaluation recommendations, if so desired by the 
designers of the system, can be organized by linking it to the budget. In Chile, 
the budget offi  ce maintains a record of all recommendations made in evalu-
ations and follows them up annually in the budget negotiations for each pro-
gram. This, however, is an exceptionally top-down system and far from com-
mon elsewhere. Many evaluation systems do not produce formalized sets of 
recommendations, and often the policy implications from a particular evalu-
ation are far from clear. It is very common even for countries with advanced 
M&E systems to have a budget process where M&E information is not rigor-
ously linked to budgetary decisions. The most common follow-up arrange-
ment is therefore to make it mandatory for evaluation results to be consid-
ered at important decision points in the budget cycle, such as the annual or 
multiannual negotiations between ﬁ nance and spending ministries, in bud-
get deliberations in the legislature, and in policy discussions over the adop-
tion of new programs.
The discussion so far has focused on the evaluation side of M&E systems. 
The monitoring side is also very important. Monitoring data for government 
programs provides useful “headline” information concerning their perfor-
mance (see Chapter 8). In addition, such information is usually needed to 
conduct evaluations; if such information does not exist, or it is not reliable, 
then it will be necessary to undertake special data collections, and this can 
be an expensive undertaking. An advantage of monitoring information is 
that it can provide a broad coverage of government performance, across all 
ministries and sectors. A disadvantage, however, is that it provides little un-
derstanding of the reasons for good or bad performance. Evaluations can 
provide such understanding, if used in the proper context. An isolated im-
pact evaluation might only say whether an intervention works or not, but 
not necessarily why. If evaluations of diff erent types and regular monitoring 
are used in conjunction, it increases the ability of key decision makers to 
disentangle the diffi  cult causal relationships that underpin government 
performance.
Government M&E systems typically rely largely or wholly on sector 
 ministries to provide the necessary monitoring information. However, the 
ministries themselves usually rely on a number of separate, uncoordinated 
monitoring systems to provide this information. Problems with data har-
monization and especially data quality are common. Another common 
weakness with monitoring systems is an excessive number of performance 
indicators. The lesson here is that “less is more”: it is better to have a small 
number of reliable and highly used performance indicators than large col-
lections of doubtful quality that—partly as a result of this quality—are seri-
ously underutilized. 
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It has become a truism of institutional development that reforms must 
take the context of existing institutions into account. Naturally, systems that 
ﬁ t under the broad umbrella of “M&E” look quite diff erent in diff erent 
places. Although patterns clearly exist, in each individual country a multi-
tude of formal and informal factors inﬂ uences whether an M&E function is 
successfully and sustainably established. Ultimately, M&E as a function of 
government evolves because important actors ﬁ nd the outputs of M&E in-
struments useful for the purpose of governing. Sustained demand drives in-
stitutionalization, and systematic M&E can sustain such demand. These two 
elements are mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent. However, if a 
demand for M&E exists among central government actors, a technically ill-
ﬁ tted  system design might still derail implementation. Similarly, just because 
an M&E system has been built to resemble a successful model in a superﬁ -
cially similar country, success is not automatic. Hard-to-observe character-
istics, such as a lack of sustained demand, can just as easily cause M&E sys-
tems to fail. Success and sustainability depend on both the right ﬁ t and the 
right demand.
In this book, we use country examples and case studies as references to 
illustrate common patterns that are relevant beyond the individual country 
case. Faced with the complexity of M&E-related reforms, readers will ﬁ nd it 
easier to access the appropriate information for the challenge at hand by be-
ing able to see M&E systems in context. Readers can then pick and choose 
what they ﬁ nd most appropriate, without necessarily having to read through 
large amounts of possibly unsuitable material. This volume tries to capture 
the key ingredients to both in three sections: The framework of M&E; the 
tools of M&E; and ﬁ nally M&E systems in context. 
Framework and Principles of M&E Systems
The ﬁ rst seven chapters introduce the core set of cross-cutting concepts, 
deﬁ nitions, and ﬁ rst steps. This framework of M&E comprises the impor-
tance of utilization of M&E instruments when designing and implementing 
an M&E system (Chapter 2), a typology of diff erent M&E systems (Chap-
ter 3), common implementation challenges, and how to deal with them, es-
pecially from a sectoral perspective (Chapter 4), approaches toward con-
ducting M&E diagnoses (Chapter 5), the challenges arising from the links 
between M&E and budgeting (Chapter 6), and the use of information tech-
nology and social accountability tools (Chapter 7). 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 by Keith Mackay outlines the 
main ways in which M&E ﬁ ndings can be used throughout the policy cycle 
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to improve the performance of government decision making and of govern-
ment services and programs, including the use of M&E for evidence-based 
policy making, budgeting, management, and accountability. There are many 
diff erent types of M&E tools and approaches, each with advantages and 
 limitations. This chapter presents four examples of successful government 
systems for M&E—in both developed and developing countries—and dis-
cusses some of their hard-earned lessons for building M&E systems. These 
lessons are evidence of what works and what does not in the development 
and sustainment of successful M&E systems.
Bertha Briceño in Chapter 3 characterizes various types of M&E systems, 
including examples from three government-based systems in Latin America: 
Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. The characterization outlined here ranges from 
completely independent outside bodies, to strongly centralized government 
systems, to highly decentralized systems. Each type of system has diff erent 
advantages that result from the interplay of demand and supply forces: on the 
supply side, actors produce M&E information for a variety of intended pur-
poses; the demand side responds with actual utilization,  revealing the real 
incentives of the system’s clients. In addition, strategies are presented to miti-
gate potential disadvantages of the diff erent types of systems.
M&E systems are frequently designed and implemented based on an ini-
tial diagnostic study. Geoff rey Shepherd in Chapter 4 discusses the core is-
sues of how to think about such a diagnosis. There is no one blueprint for 
preparing an M&E diagnosis: content and presentation depend on the 
 speciﬁ c context. The chapter illustrates the range of contexts by discussing 
a number of issues that help explain the diff erences and illuminates these 
issues, where possible, by referring to various country studies that have 
 appeared in recent years. They cover six Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) countries—mostly studies that draw 
“good practice” lessons—and two African and four Latin American coun-
tries—a mix of diagnostic and “lessons-of-experience” studies.
Implementing M&E systems is a challenging process. Harry Hatry in 
Chapter 5 identiﬁ es the key steps in designing and implementing an M&E 
system for ministries and individual government agencies that provide ser-
vices. These suggestions are intended to apply irrespective of sector. The 
system might have been ordered or requested by the president or prime min-
ister’s offi  ce, by a minister, or by any agency head. The design of an M&E 
system should focus on creating a process that will yield regular outcome 
data, in addition to data on the organization’s outputs that can be used by the 
designing agency and upper-level offi  cials.
Philipp Krause in Chapter 6 introduces the main issues surrounding 
M&E as a tool for budgeting—a system usually referred to as performance 
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budgeting. OECD countries that adopt performance budgeting tend to de-
velop a performance-informed budget process, where M&E instruments 
serve as analytical tools. In this model, performance indicators are inte-
grated into the budget and regular evaluations are scheduled into the budget 
cycle. Performance indicators and evaluations are institutionally considered 
during budget formulation. This process can take various forms. Inevitably, 
the right setup will depend on the speciﬁ c administrative context. The main 
design challenge is how to tailor the system to the likely users of M&E infor-
mation and their position within the budgeting framework. This is a univer-
sal concern, irrespective of a country’s stage of development.
Rajiv Sharma addresses in Chapter 7 the basic concepts relating to the use 
of social accountability and information technology to monitor and evaluate 
public services and other governance processes that aff ect citizens. With the 
help of simple though practical examples that use these concepts, Sharma 
explains how to bring a qualitative change in monitoring and evaluation by 
making the whole process more citizen centered and outcome oriented. In 
turn, these practices can help improve the quality of service delivery. The 
chapter’s arguments are illustrated by several examples from India. 
Components and Tools of M&E Systems
The second section of the book introduces the most important tools com-
monly used in M&E, with a focus on practical applications in context. The 
section covers deﬁ ning and monitoring results indicators (Chapter 8), diff er-
ent types of evaluations (Chapter 9), how to reconstruct baseline data for 
ongoing programs (Chapter 10), as well as the importance of mixed-method 
approaches (Chapter 11). Policy makers and program managers are faced 
 every day with major decisions resulting from insuffi  cient funding, ongoing 
complaints about service delivery, unmet needs among diff erent population 
groups, and limited results on the ground. 
Developing eff ective M&E systems requires well-deﬁ ned formulation 
and implementation strategies for performance indicators. These strategies 
vary depending on a country’s priority for measuring results and on the 
scope and pace of its performance management reform objectives, argues 
Manuel Fernando Castro (Chapter 8). Castro’s chapter directly links to the 
discussion in Chapter 5 of key steps for setting up sectoral monitoring sys-
tems and how offi  cials can go about deﬁ ning good indicators. The extensive 
literature on performance management indicators contains relatively few 
references to practical elements of successful government implementation 
of performance indicator systems. Castro’s chapter encapsulates some of 
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the main elements for senior offi  cials to realistically and practically con-
sider when introducing performance indicator and target systems in govern-
ment to ensure sustainability. 
Gloria Rubio in Chapter 9 outlines the menu of evaluation types imple-
mented by developing and OECD countries to tackle a wide range of policy 
and program management issues. The suitability of each type of evaluation 
depends on the available time and resources, and on capacity constraints. 
The chapter emphasizes the importance of a gradual approach when intro-
ducing evaluation tools into country-level M&E systems. Diff erent paths 
may work better for diff erent countries depending on the main purpose of 
their M&E system, existing institutional capacity, the availability of funds, 
and external technical assistance.
Every type of evaluation requires the collection of baseline data before 
the project or program begins. Once the project or program has been under-
way for some time, an evaluation can compare its performance with the 
baseline data—using advanced statistical techniques—to provide an estimate 
of its outcomes and impacts. However, as Michael Bamberger points out in 
Chapter 10, it is often the case that a baseline study is not conducted, seri-
ously limiting the possibility of producing a rigorous assessment of project 
outcomes and impacts. This chapter discusses the reasons why baseline 
studies are often not conducted, even when they are included in the project 
design and funds have been approved. It also describes strategies that can be 
used to “reconstruct” baseline data at a later stage in the project or program 
cycle.
Despite signiﬁ cant methodological advances, the value of monitoring 
data and of many evaluations is reduced because of an over-reliance on 
quantitative methods alone, argues Michelle Adato in Chapter 11. The addi-
tion of qualitative methods to the M&E toolkit can also inform survey design, 
identify social and institutional drivers and impacts that are hard to quantify, 
uncover unanticipated issues, and trace impact pathways. When used to-
gether, quantitative and qualitative approaches provide more coherent, reli-
able, and useful conclusions than do each on their own. Adato’s chapter 
identiﬁ es key elements of good mixed-method design and provides exam-
ples of these principles applied in several countries.
M&E Systems in Context 
The ﬁ nal section of this book illustrates the central themes in a set of country 
brieﬁ ngs. These show how the diff erent parts of an M&E system interact in 
a dynamic and challenging environment. The cases were selected to show 
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the diversity in terms of country contexts and regions. Mexico and Chile are 
both presidential democracies in Latin America, while Australia and Canada 
are Westminster-style parliamentary systems. In each of these contexts, rel-
atively successful M&E systems evolved and were maintained over extended 
periods of time. 
The cases also show how seemingly quite similar countries sometimes 
develop very diff erent systems. Although Chile and Mexico have some insti-
tutional characteristics in common, they are also diff erent in many ways. 
Chile has a highly centralized budget process with stable legislative majori-
ties, while Mexico’s central government is much more fragmented and the 
Congress is quite powerful. These diff erences illustrate that Mexico’s and 
Chile’s M&E systems serve diff erent principals, are operated diff erently, and 
yet serve their purpose in their respective contexts. These kinds of patterns 
can be found elsewhere, and understanding them can provide important 
clues to how best to design an M&E system in any one place. 
Fifteen years ago, Mexico, like most countries, had undertaken a few 
 scattered evaluations, but no systematic performance measurement, argues 
 Gloria Rubio in Chapter 12. Political changes in the late 1990s generated an 
increased demand for transparency and accountability. This led to new leg-
islation and institutions aimed at strengthening independent government 
oversight through several channels. The development of an M&E system in 
Mexico can be divided in two stages. The ﬁ rst phase from 2000 to 2006 was 
characterized by good intentions, but unrealistic expectations and lack of 
vision concerning the institutional capacity-building required for the new 
evaluation eff orts. After 2007, an increased concern with ﬁ scal matters by 
the ﬁ nance ministry, along with the spread of knowledge led by several inﬂ u-
ential evaluations, led to the emergence of a national evaluation system, 
which links a dedicated evaluation agency with the ministry of ﬁ nance, line 
ministries, and other actors. 
According to Mauricio Dussauge Laguna in Chapter 13, the Chilean man-
agement control and evaluation system is internationally regarded as a 
strong example of how M&E can be successfully put into practice. The main 
M&E tools are centrally coordinated by the Ministry of Finance’s Budget 
 Offi  ce and promote the use of M&E information in government decision-
making processes, particularly those related to the budget. The Chilean ex-
perience, covering the period of 1994–2010, provides a highly relevant ex-
ample of the strengths, beneﬁ ts, and limitations of M&E design and 
implementation in a centralized public sector. In many respects the Chilean 
“model” is highly impressive—in terms of the system’s design, evolution, uti-
lization, cost-eff ectiveness, and discipline. The individual monitoring and 
evaluation instruments used by the Chilean government tend to be of high 
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quality. Several authors in this volume use examples from Chile to illustrate 
their points and even hold them up as models of how a particular tool ought 
to work. For this reason, many other countries in Latin America and other 
regions look to Chile as providing a model to aspire to or even to emulate. 
However, Dussauge Laguna discusses various reasons why it could be diffi  -
cult to attempt to transfer the Chilean model to other countries with diff er-
ent institutional contexts. Even though the technical quality of the Chilean 
system is very high, as always there are tradeoff s and institutional constraints 
that reﬂ ect the peculiarities of a country’s context and legacy. 
Countries from all over the world have shown an interest in Australia’s 
experience in creating an M&E system that supports evidence-based deci-
sion making and performance-based budgeting, ﬁ nds Keith Mackay in 
Chapter 14. The Australian M&E system in existence from 1987 to 1997 was 
 generally considered to be one of the most successful and was driven by 
the federal Department of Finance. This chapter discusses the genesis, char-
acteristics, and success of this particular system and brieﬂ y considers the 
Australian government’s approach to M&E after the system was abolished. 
The contrast between these two periods provides many valuable insights 
into success factors and challenges facing successful M&E systems, and into 
implementing evidence-based decision making more broadly.
Robert Lahey explains in Chapter 15 how performance measurement, 
monitoring, and evaluation have long been a part of the infrastructure within 
the federal government in Canada. With over 30 years of formalized evalua-
tion experience in most large federal departments and agencies, many les-
sons can be gained from this experience, not the least of which is the recog-
nition that the M&E system itself is not static. The Canadian government has 
a formalized evaluation policy, standards, and guidelines and these have 
been signiﬁ cantly modiﬁ ed on three occasions over the past three decades. 
Changes have usually come about due to a public sector reform initiative, 
such as the introduction of a results orientation to government management, 
a political issue that may have generated a demand for greater accountability 
and transparency in government, or a change in emphasis on where and how 
M&E information should be used in government. This illustrates the man-
ner in which even mature M&E systems need to continue to evolve. 
The issues addressed in this book are faced by the growing number of 
developing countries that are working to improve their performance by 
creat ing systems to measure and help them understand their performance. 
This trend is inﬂ uenced by OECD countries, most of which give a high prior-
ity to four main uses of M&E information at diff erent stages of the policy 
cycle: to support policy development based on evidence, budgeting, ongoing 
program and project management, and accountability. Developing countries 
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are also looking to their peers—countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Mex-
ico—that have created reasonably well-performing M&E systems where the 
monitoring information and evaluation ﬁ ndings that are produced are used 
intensively.
Frontier Issues
As noted earlier, there are a number of issues that are still not suffi  ciently 
well researched and understood. The evidence on utilization of the informa-
tion produced by M&E systems can best be described as patchy. This is partly 
because of the number and complexity of the diff erent ways in which moni-
toring information and evaluation ﬁ ndings can be used at diff erent stages of 
the policy cycle. The lead M&E agencies in some countries—most notably 
Chile, but also others such as Australia and the United States at diff erent 
times—have devoted some eff ort into tracking the use made of the system’s 
M&E information. Other countries, such as Canada and Colombia, have not 
done this to any considerable extent, or at least not on a systematic basis. 
Much more is known about the use made of particular evaluations, particu-
larly of high-proﬁ le programs such as the large conditional cash transfer 
programs in many Latin American countries.
The knowledge gap concerning system utilization is unfortunate, as it re-
duces the insights that can be gained from the experience of diff erent coun-
tries. Such information should be sought keenly by the managers of an M&E 
system—it is important for them to understand what aspects of the system 
are eff ective, which are not, and the reasons why. It is hoped that a later pa-
per in this World Bank series will investigate further the issue of utilization.
Another frontier issue that has not received much attention is the cost of 
M&E systems. This would seem to be a fundamental issue, not least because 
it goes to the heart of the cost-eff ectiveness of an M&E system; its omission 
is hard to understand. Chile, again, is at the forefront in being able to provide 
average costs for the various types of evaluation instrument that it uses, and 
the total cost of the system4 has been estimated at about US$0.75 million per 
annum—a very modest amount compared with the total government budget 
of some US$20 billion per annum. Most government M&E systems cost 
much more than this amount; indeed, a single, large impact evaluation can 
cost over US$1 million, although most cost much less than this.
Other issues that merit further research include the timescales for build-
ing diff erent kinds of M&E systems. Well-functioning M&E systems were 
created in Australia and Chile in four or ﬁ ve years, but it has taken over a 
decade to build such a system in Colombia. The U.S. M&E system—based on 
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the program assessment rating tool—was up and running in only a few years, 
but this was able to draw on the experience and considerable M&E eff orts 
inherited from earlier government administrations (see Mackay 2007).
One ﬁ nal frontier issue ﬂ agged here is the extent to which it is realistic to 
create an M&E system in fragile states. One view—which is unlikely to be 
shared by everyone—is that M&E systems are suffi  ciently complex that they 
should usually only be contemplated by middle income or high income 
countries; from this perspective, countries with M&E systems such as Tan-
zania and Uganda would be considered “the exceptions that prove the rule.” 
Another, less restrictive, view is that even low income countries and fragile 
states can still put in place the basics of a workable monitoring system, often 
centered on the national statistical institution, and with heavy donor sup-
port. The World Bank will soon publish a meta-analysis on M&E in fragile 
and post-conﬂ ict states. 
It is hoped that this book will help senior offi  cials and others working to 
strengthen their government’s monitoring and evaluation system. Like other 
types of public sector management, a considerable amount of time and eff ort 
is required to build an M&E system that produces reliable information that is 
utilized intensively. The growing number of success story countries attest to 
the value of such eff ort—they demonstrate that government M&E systems 
can be highly cost-eff ective. The chapters in this book and the further  reading 
they suggest will help readers to come to grips with the issues faced in such 
eff orts. We believe that this wealth of experience should prove invaluable.
Notes
1. See for instance: Ospina et al. 2004, May et al. 2006, Mackay 2007, and Lopez-
Acevedo et al. 2010. See also www.worldbank.org/lacmonitoringandevaluation 
and the collection of country case studies at www.worldbank.org/ieg/ecd.
2. A useful overview of M&E tools and techniques is provided by IEG 2004a, 
Busjeet 2010, and at http://go.worldbank.org/GSD78LQBV0.
3. See World Bank (1997).
4. This ﬁ gure relates only to the spending of the ﬁ nance ministry; it excludes the 
cost to sector ministries of providing monitoring information. See Mackay 2007.
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Conceptual Framework for 
Monitoring and Evaluation
Keith Mackay
CHAPTER 2
A growing number of governments in developing countries around the 
world are working to improve their performance by creating systems to 
measure and help them understand the performance of their services 
and programs. This trend is inﬂ uenced by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, most of which place a 
high priority on the four main uses of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
ﬁ ndings: 
1. Policy development 
2. Evidence-based policy making and budgeting 
3. Management performance 
4. Accountability 
The priority for measuring and better managing government perfor-
mance in middle- and low-income countries is intensiﬁ ed by continuing ﬁ s-
cal and macroeconomic pressures aff ecting all countries, and by ever-rising 
This chapter has beneﬁ ted from comments by Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, Nidhi Khattri, Jaime 
Saavedra, and Helena Hwang. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author.
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expectations from ordinary citizens. It is also inﬂ uenced by the need for citi-
zens, governments, and the international community to make state actions 
more eff ective in increasing welfare, reducing poverty, and improving op-
portunities for all. An additional impetus to focus on performance is the 
strong expectations of international donors. 
This chapter outlines the main ways in which M&E ﬁ ndings can be used 
throughout the policy cycle to improve the performance of government de-
cision making and of government services and programs, including the use 
of M&E for evidence-based policy making, budgeting, management, and ac-
countability. Many diff erent types of M&E tools and approaches exist, each 
with advantages and limitations. This chapter presents four examples of 
successful government systems for M&E in both developed and developing 
countries, and discusses some of their hard-earned lessons for building and 
sustaining successful M&E systems. 
Why M&E Systems Improve 
Government Performance 
Government M&E systems focus on measuring the results produced by 
 government—its outputs, outcomes, and impacts. The M&E system may ex-
ist at the level of an individual agency, entire sector, or the government as a 
whole. M&E can provide unique information about the performance of gov-
ernment policies, programs, and projects—at the national, sector, and sub-
national levels. It can identify what works, what does not, and the reasons 
why. M&E also provides information about the performance of a govern-
ment, of individual ministries and agencies, and of managers and their staff . 
Highlighting examples of good practice and poor practice can help improve 
performance.
Three deﬁ ning characteristics of successful M&E systems are: 
1. Intensive utilization of the M&E information in one or more stages of the 
policy cycle
2. Information that meets standards for data quality and evaluation 
reliability
3. Sustainability, by which the system will survive a change in administra-
tion, government ministers, or top offi  cials
Perhaps the best way to understand the potential contribution of M&E to 
sound government is to view it at diff erent parts of the policy cycle (Figure 
2.1). The early stages of the policy process—analyzing and developing gov-
ernment policy and planning priorities and strategies—all beneﬁ t from 
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 evidence of what has or has not worked in the past; in other words, evidence-
based policy making. It is an important discipline for governments to con-
sider carefully what they are trying to achieve from their policies, and to plan 
for them accordingly. Thus it helps to clarify, for each possible program, 
what success would look like and how the government will know if it has (or 
has not) been achieved. It also helps to clarify the potential poverty and dis-
tributional eff ects of policies and programs. Setting performance targets and 
measuring progress toward achieving them is thus an important part of gov-
ernment planning and policy review. 
Information on the performance of existing government programs and on 
the expected performance of new programs is important for the next stage 
of the policy cycle: the allocation of resources in the budget. M&E informa-
tion, especially evaluation ﬁ ndings that explain past performance, helps to 
guide government decisions so that the most cost-eff ective collection of poli-
cies and programs can be adopted in the annual budget. 
At the next stage in the policy cycle—the implementation and manage-
ment of activities funded by the budget—M&E helps managers to monitor 
their activities, including government service delivery and staff  manage-
FIGURE 2.1 The Policy Cycle: Linking Policy, Planning, Budgeting, 
Management, and M&E
Source: Adapted from World Bank 1998.
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ment, so that they learn quickly what is working and what is not in terms of 
expected outputs, expected outcomes, or even higher level objectives such 
as increasing welfare. Performance indicators can be used to make cost and 
performance comparisons among diff erent administrative units, regions, 
and districts. Ongoing monitoring of these activities—including spending, 
processes, outputs, outcomes, and impacts—is particularly important. Com-
parisons made over time can help identify good, bad, and promising prac-
tices. Evaluations or reviews can identify the reasons for this good or bad 
performance. This is the learning function of M&E, often referred to as 
 results-based management. 
The ﬁ nal stages of the policy cycle include accountability relationships. 
M&E reveals the extent to which the government has achieved its objectives 
and thus provides the evidence needed to ensure strong government ac-
countability to the legislature, to civil society, and to donors. M&E also sup-
ports accountability relationships within government between sector minis-
tries and central ministries, among agencies and their sector ministry, and 
among ministers, managers, and staff . Strong accountability can provide the 
incentives necessary to improve performance. M&E can also play a role in 
anticorruption eff orts. It can help identify “leakages” in government funding 
as well as some of the possible manifestations of corruption, such as when 
government spending is not reﬂ ected in the physical quality of infrastruc-
ture or in the volume and quality of government services provided. 
What Does a Government M&E System 
Look Like? 
Most governments have data systems for measuring their spending, pro-
cesses, and outputs. But this is not the same as a system to monitor and eval-
uate the performance of all of its programs. A much smaller number of gov-
ernments possess such systems. These systems involve the regular, systematic 
collection and use of M&E information at the level of an individual agency, 
an entire sector, or for the government as a whole. The focus of these systems 
is on measuring the results produced by government—its outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts.
A number of governments have devoted the eff ort necessary to build 
high-performing M&E systems. Examples of four countries with well-
documented and analyzed M&E systems that are highlighted below are Aus-
tralia, Chile, Colombia, and the United States (Box 2.1). Canada is another 
example of a successful government M&E system (Chapter 15); note that 
while Mexico (Chapter 12) provides a very promising case study, its M&E 
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system has not been in existence long enough to demonstrate its extent of 
success—in terms of the quality of M&E information, the extent of its utiliza-
tion, and its sustainability (see below). 
Each of the four governments utilizes its M&E information intensively. 
Common features include a powerful central ministry with a leading role 
in the M&E system (such as the ﬁ nance or planning ministry), and—as a 
consequence—an emphasis on using M&E information to support the bud-
get process. What is less well known and documented, however, is how ef-
Australia: The government evaluation system 
was managed by the Department of Finance 
(DoF), and it required ministries to evaluate every 
program every three to fi ve years. The line minis-
tries themselves conducted the evaluations, but 
they were overviewed by the DoF and other cen-
tral departments. By 1994, almost 80 percent of 
new spending proposals in the budget process 
relied on evaluation fi ndings, usually to a signifi -
cant degree. About two-thirds of savings options 
also relied on evaluation fi ndings. DoF offi cials, 
who attended the Cabinet meetings that consid-
ered these budget proposals, judged that this in-
formation was highly infl uential on the Cabinet’s 
budget decision making. The Australian National 
Audit Offi ce found that line departments also 
used this information intensively, particularly to 
help improve their operational effi ciency. 
Chile: The Ministry of Finance (MoF) commis-
sions evaluations externally to academics and 
consulting fi rms, and it uses standardized terms 
of reference and methodologies for each type 
of evaluation. MoF offi cials use the M&E fi nd-
ings intensively in their budget analysis of the 
performance of each ministry and agency. The 
ministry also uses the information to set perfor-
mance targets for each agency and to impose 
management improvements on both ministries 
and agencies. The MoF carefully oversees the 
extent to which each ministry implements 
these management improvements. 
Colombia: The National Planning Department 
manages the government’s M&E system, 
SINERGIA. The system includes information for 
500 performance indicators, as well as a num-
ber of rapid and impact evaluations. The presi-
dent has used the information provided by 
SINERGIA intensively in his monthly manage-
ment control meetings with each minister and 
in his weekly town hall meetings in municipali-
ties around the country. 
United States: In 2002, the government cre-
ated the Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART), building on earlier efforts to measure 
government performance. The performance of 
all 1,000 government programs have been rated 
using the PART methodology, and PART ratings 
are required to be used by departments in their 
annual budget funding requests to the Offi ce of 
Management and Budget (OMB). The requests 
must highlight the PART ratings, the recommen-
dations for improvements in program perfor-
mance, and performance targets. OMB, in turn, 
also uses the PART ratings when it prepares 
the administration’s funding requests to the 
Congress, and to impose performance improve-
ment requirements on departments. 
BOX 2.1
Four Examples of Successful Government M&E Systems
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fective these systems have been in supporting the use of M&E information 
for ongoing program management. Diff erent countries emphasize diff erent 
M&E tools and techniques. Some place a heavy reliance on monitoring data, 
others on evaluations and reviews of various kinds. Some countries have 
extensive (and expensive) M&E systems; others have more streamlined, 
low-cost systems. 
What does a good M&E system look like? The answer to this question 
depends on country-speciﬁ c factors, such as government demand for M&E 
information, the uses to which the information will be put, the availability 
and quality of existing government data, the abilities of offi  cials and consul-
tants to evaluate and analyze M&E information, and the amount the govern-
ment is prepared to spend on M&E. 
The Three Defi ning Characteristics of 
Successful M&E Systems
A “successful” M&E system has three deﬁ ning characteristics. The ﬁ rst is 
intensive utilization of the M&E information provided by the system in one 
or more of the stages of the policy cycle. It may seem trite to argue that M&E 
information should only be collected if it is going to be used, but most evalu-
ators in governments (and in donor agencies) have a surprisingly poor un-
derstanding of the extent to which the M&E information they produce is 
actually used by others. If M&E information is not being used, then it is im-
portant to discover the reasons why. Is it because the M&E information is 
regarded as being of poor quality, or not timely, or because evaluations have 
not addressed the most relevant questions concerning program perfor-
mance? Or is it because the intended users within the government—such as 
the ﬁ nance or planning ministries—have neither the skills nor interest in us-
ing this information in their work? 
Reliable, quality information is another feature of successful M&E sys-
tems. Various standards deﬁ ne what constitutes quality monitoring data and 
evaluations, and these standards can be used to assess the reliability of the 
information that any M&E system produces. Most government evaluation 
offi  ces have some sort of quality control mechanism in place. Most, however, 
do not appear to conduct or commission formal reviews of the quality of 
their work. Three of the four countries highlighted in Box 2.1 have con-
ducted such reviews: Australia, Chile, and Colombia. 
The third characteristic of a successful M&E system is sustainability. This 
relates to the likelihood that the M&E system will survive a change in ad-
ministration, government ministers, or top offi  cials. When the utilization of 
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M&E information is ﬁ rmly embedded in core government processes, such 
as the budget cycle, it is likely to be sustained over time. Conversely, when 
M&E has only a handful of key supporters or is little used, or if it is largely 
funded by donors rather than by the government itself, then sustainability is 
less likely. 
One question that is often asked is how many countries have successful 
M&E systems. A related question is how many countries have M&E systems, 
however successful or not they might be. These are diffi  cult questions to an-
swer. Almost every country in the world possesses ministry systems that 
produce monitoring information on government spending, processes, and 
outputs with some degree of regularity. Most countries also have national 
statistical collections that provide information on country health and educa-
tion outcomes, among others.1 Most low-income countries have poverty re-
duction strategies that require sets of government and country performance 
indicators; these constitute a form of M&E system. Many countries also con-
duct evaluations of some sort; these may be government funded or, for low- 
and middle-income countries, donor funded, and they are often conducted 
on an ad hoc basis. 
While it is a judgment call as to when these M&E arrangements can rea-
sonably be termed an M&E “system,” it is likely that there are dozens of 
countries that possess some kind of whole-of-government M&E system. 
Among these, the countries that could be judged to be fully or partially suc-
cessful would probably number in the tens or at most the twenties—includ-
ing a number of OECD and middle-income countries, with the latter espe-
cially in Latin America, and a small number of low-income countries such as 
Uganda and Tanzania. More precise estimates would require strict and mea-
surable criteria for “success,” as well as detailed reviews or diagnoses of each 
country against these criteria. The country case studies highlighted in this 
volume provide a sample of M&E systems, and these illustrate a range of is-
sues relating to system architecture, capacity-building eff orts, quality, and 
utilization, among others. 
Building a Government M&E System—
What to Do and What Not to Do 
Many developed and developing countries have accumulated substantial ex-
perience in building M&E systems. As with any form of capacity building, a 
number of hard-earned lessons about what works best and what does not 
can be drawn from these experiences (discussed more fully in Mackay 2007). 
Eight key lessons are discussed below. 
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Lesson 1. First and foremost is the need for substantive government de-
mand for M&E information. Such demand is necessary if a serious eff ort to 
build an M&E system is to be started and sustained. A signiﬁ cant eff ort is 
required to build an M&E system, including: creating or upgrading data 
systems, choosing evaluation tools and techniques and adapting them to 
local circumstances and priorities, training evaluators and developing na-
tional evaluation consultants, creating M&E offi  ces inside a lead ministry 
and probably in some or all sector ministries, training the users of M&E 
information—mid-level analysts, senior offi  cials in central and sector minis-
tries, and possibly their ministers—and creating a bureaucratic infrastruc-
ture to decide which government programs should be evaluated and what 
issues should be addressed in each evaluation. Frankly, this eff ort is not 
worthwhile unless the resulting M&E information is likely to be used 
intensively. 
Lesson 2. Incentives are a key part of the demand side. Strong incentives 
are needed for M&E to be conducted, and for the information to be used. 
M&E experts often make a basic mistake by asserting that M&E information 
is intrinsically “a good thing” and that if the information is made available, 
then it will automatically be used. This technocratic view that M&E has in-
herent merit is naïve; M&E information has value only if it is reliable and if it 
is used intensively. 
Intensive, ongoing utilization does not happen by chance. Incentives are 
needed for M&E information to be used by program managers in their day-
to-day work, by budget and planning offi  cials responsible for advising on 
policy options, or by a legislature responsible for accountability oversight. 
Incentives come in three types: carrots, sticks, and sermons.2 An example 
of a carrot is the provision of greater autonomy to managers who can dem-
onstrate (through reliable M&E information) that their programs are per-
forming well. An example of a stick is to set challenging (but realistic) per-
formance targets that each ministry and program manager is required to 
meet. An example of a sermon is a high-level statement of support for M&E, 
such as from a president or inﬂ uential minister. Many of these incentives 
have been applied successfully in building M&E systems in developed and 
developing countries. 
Lesson 3. It helps to start with a diagnosis of what M&E functions already 
exist in the country—in the government, academia, and the consulting com-
munity. A diagnosis should identify the strengths and weaknesses of what 
exists on both the demand and supply sides. This is really a type of evalua-
tion, and the very process of conducting it provides an opportunity for key 
stakeholders within the government to become more familiar with M&E 
and its potential beneﬁ ts. A diagnosis naturally leads to an action plan to 
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strengthen M&E, which can facilitate a coalition of support from interested 
sector ministries and the donor community. 
Lesson 4. Another dimension of the demand side is the need for a power-
ful champion, an inﬂ uential minister or senior offi  cial who is able to lead the 
push to institutionalize M&E, to persuade colleagues about its importance, 
and to allocate signiﬁ cant resources to creating a government-wide M&E 
system. Government champions have played pivotal roles in some of the 
most successful M&E systems. 
Reliance on a law, decree, or cabinet decision has much less success insti-
tutionalizing M&E systems. Such an approach can help to legitimize an 
M&E system, particularly in countries where the presence of a legal instru-
ment is viewed as necessary for any government reform to be perceived as 
worthwhile and to be taken seriously. But a law or decree on its own does not 
ensure that the considerable eff orts required to build an M&E system will be 
undertaken and maintained. 
Lesson 5. Another common feature of successful M&E systems is stew-
ardship by a capable ministry that can design, develop, and manage the sys-
tem. Thus it helps to have the institutional lead of the M&E system close to 
the center of a government, such as in the president’s offi  ce or in the ﬁ nance 
or planning ministries. 
One role of this institutional leader is to continually review progress in 
developing the M&E system and to make any necessary adjustments to its 
action plan. Diffi  culties and roadblocks are inevitable, so it is important to 
identify what is working, what is not, and why. Regular progress reviews 
provide the opportunity to analyze both the demand and supply sides of the 
M&E system. In fact, most countries with well-performing M&E systems 
have not actually developed them in a linear manner—that is, starting with a 
clear understanding of what the system would look like once fully mature 
and then progressively achieving this vision. Rather, M&E systems are more 
commonly developed incrementally and even in a piecemeal and opportu-
nistic manner, with some false starts and blind alleys along the way.3
Lesson 6. A common mistake once M&E has been embraced enthusiasti-
cally is to over-engineer the M&E system. This is often evident in the large 
number of performance indicators that are collected. Over-engineering can 
also result in the proliferation of ministry data systems. These are often un-
coordinated even within each ministry. The problem is multiplied if there 
are several government-wide data systems, which may be managed by dif-
ferent central ministries and may well require related (but diff erent) infor-
mation to be provided by sector ministries and agencies. In Mexico, for ex-
ample, the social development agency SEDESOL had eight diff erent, 
uncoordinated management information systems. In Uganda in recent 
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years, the government had to try to coordinate as many as 16 separate sector 
and subsector systems. 
That said, there is real value in building reliable ministry data systems: 
these provide the raw data on which a government-wide M&E system de-
pends. An audit of data systems and a diagnosis of data capacities can be 
helpful in this situation because they could provide a basis for rationalizing 
existing data collections and improving their quality. 
Lesson 7. Unsurprisingly, building an M&E system usually includes train-
ing for a range of M&E tools, methods, approaches, and concepts. Well-
trained offi  cials or consultants who are highly skilled in M&E are needed. 
Training should provide more than competencies in M&E, however. Senior 
offi  cials need to understand the strengths and limitations—the relative cost-
eff ectiveness—of various types of M&E tools and techniques. Introductory 
training can also raise awareness of and demand for M&E information. 
Training should extend to the use of M&E ﬁ ndings. Budget analysts, poverty 
analysts, and program managers need to be able to interpret monitoring data 
to understand trends, data deﬁ nitions, breaks in data time series, and so 
forth. They also need to be discriminating consumers—they must be able to 
tell when an evaluation is reliable or when its methodology or ﬁ ndings are 
questionable. 
Lesson 8. Building an eff ective M&E system requires a long-term eff ort, 
with patience and determination. It takes time to create or strengthen data 
systems, to recruit and train qualiﬁ ed staff , to plan, conduct, and manage 
evaluations, and to train staff  to use M&E in their day-to-day work, whether 
that involves program operations or policy analysis and advice. Australia and 
Chile were able to create well-functioning M&E systems—in terms of the 
quality, number, and utilization of evaluations—within four or ﬁ ve years, but 
in Colombia’s case, it has taken more than a decade. 
Conclusions
A growing number of developing countries are successfully building govern-
ment M&E systems. They look to the examples of developed countries—es-
pecially members of the OECD—but increasingly they are also looking to 
their peers: countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. These countries 
have created well-performing M&E systems the ﬁ ndings of which are used 
intensively. These countries have demonstrated not only that it is feasible to 
build a government M&E system, but that the systems are valued highly by 
the governments. 
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Hopefully, this introductory chapter and later chapters in this volume 
will engage the interest of senior offi  cials in developing countries and prompt 
them to fully investigate whether their government should devote the time 
and eff ort to building such a system. The donor community—including the 
World Bank—stands ready to support them in this work. 
Notes
1. The link between government outputs and country outcomes can be very hard to 
demonstrate in the absence of evaluation ﬁ ndings. This gap has been termed the 
“missing middle.”
2. An extensive list of M&E incentives is provided by Mackay (2007, Chapter 11).
3. Reasons for this are discussed more fully by Mackay (2007).
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Deﬁ ning the Type of M&E 
System: Clients, Intended Uses, 
and Utilization
Bertha Briceño
CHAPTER 3
This chapter characterizes various types of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
systems, including examples from three government-based systems in Latin 
America: Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. The systems outlined here range 
from completely external independent bodies, to strongly centralized govern-
ment systems, to highly decentralized systems. Each type of system has diff er-
ent advantages that result from the interplay of demand and supply forces on 
the supply side, actors produce M&E information for a variety of intended 
purposes, while the demand responds with actual utilization, revealing the 
incentives of system clients. In addition, strategies are presented to mitigate 
potential disadvantages of the diff erent types of systems. As countries are in-
This chapter draws extensively upon previous work conducted for the International Initiative 
for Impact Evaluation (3ie) and the Department for International Development of the United 
Kingdom (Briceño and Gaarder 2009). The author acknowledges their generous support. For 
their comments, the author thanks Keith Mackay (Consultant, Poverty Reduction and Equity 
Unit [PRMPR]), as well as Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior Economist, PRMPR) and Jaime Saa-
vedra (Director, PRMPR). The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author.
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creasingly expressing a need for M&E support, this analysis should help 
champions and task team leaders identify suitable opportunities for their par-
ticular context, identify and understand the forces that drive the creation of 
new M&E units and bodies, and better understand the trade-off s involved.
Who Produces M&E Information and Why
A good starting point is to ask who conducts M&E activities and for what 
purpose, in order to later draw lessons relevant for the design of new M&E 
units. Development banks, bilateral aid agencies, independent organiza-
tions, academia, and above all governments are closely involved in monitor-
ing and evaluating development programs. Development banks and bilat-
eral aid agencies often use M&E to measure development eff ectiveness, be 
accountable to donors and stakeholders, and to demonstrate transparency. 
Academics—typically through centers affi  liated with economics and public 
policy faculties—conduct rigorous studies with a knowledge-generation 
focus in the ﬁ eld of development economics. 
In general, governments carry out M&E activities as a way to increase 
program eff ectiveness and improve resource allocation. Government-based 
systems typically serve internal clients from the executive branch such as 
planning and budget offi  ces, central units within ministries or agencies in 
charge of planning and budget, and in some cases special evaluation units. 
All of these government units commonly use the M&E system as a tool to 
improve the effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of resource allocation, with a cen-
tralized control approach. 
Internal clients also include executing or implementing agencies in gov-
ernments and task team leaders in development banks. They are generally 
more interested in revising processes, changing and improving practices 
with a results orientation, generating visibility for projects, and responding 
to constituencies and managers with concrete information. Effi  ciency and 
eff ectiveness of resource allocation are also main focuses of internal clients 
from bilateral aid agencies and development banks, such as boards of donors 
and directors, internal evaluation units, and sector/regional managers. 
In terms of external clients of government-related M&E systems, there is 
potential for use by legislatures and civil society, which are interested in fos-
tering transparency, accountability, and social oversight.1 On the other hand, 
M&E activities that development banks and donors carry out have policy 
makers, client governments, legislative bodies, and constituencies in general 
as external clients. Table 3.1 presents a simple classiﬁ cation of main clients 
and their corresponding usage focus.
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TABLE 3.1 Hosts of M&E Activities, Clients, and Uses
Governments Internal 
clients
• Executive: planning/ 
budget/presidential 
ministries
• Internal central units in 
agencies/ministries
(planning/budget units)
• Control/improve effi ciency and effective-
ness of resource allocation
• Control implementation of national policies
• Feedback into policy/budget decision 
making 
• Feedback into planning
• Managers in implementing 
agencies/ministries
• Revising processes
• Improving managerial practices with a 
results orientation
• Program management and staff or 
institutional management
• Respond to constituencies with concrete 
information
External 
clients
• Multilaterals/donors
• Legislature
• Civil society
• Focus on transparency and accountability
Development 
banks, aid 
agencies, special 
evaluation bodies
Internal 
clients
• Managers
• Task team leaders
• Control implementation 
• Exposure of innovative programs
• Visibility of projects with a focus on 
results
• Revising processes
• Improving portfolio programming
• Improving design of programs
• Testing innovations 
• Internal evaluation offi ces
• Governing bodies (board of 
directors, board of donors)
• Control/improve effi ciency and effective-
ness of resource allocation
• Revising processes
• Focus on transparency and accountability
• Respond to constituencies with concrete 
information
External 
clients
• Civil society
• Policy makers
• Governments
• Legislature
• Focus on transparency and accountability
• Control implementation of national policies
Academia Internal 
clients
• Academia and scientifi c 
communities
• Knowledge generation in economic 
development
External 
clients
• Policy makers, 
non-governmental 
organizations, donors, 
international organizations
• Diffusion of knowledge and advocacy for 
effective interventions
Source: Author.
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Types of M&E Systems and Intended Uses 
The majority of the M&E bodies for development programs strive for inde-
pendence, transparency, autonomy, credibility, usefulness, and ownership, 
among other qualities.2 In theory, an ideal M&E system should be indepen-
dent enough to be externally credible and socially legitimate, but not so in-
dependent to lose its relevance. The M&E system should be able to inﬂ u-
ence policy making by ensuring adoption of recommendations informed by 
lessons learned, and it should be sustainable over time and through govern-
ment transitions by responding to the needs of clients and remaining useful 
to its main stakeholders. 
The M&E bodies are diff erent in their nature and predominant incen-
tives. Institutional arrangements range from independent external bodies, to 
strongly centralized government systems under budget authorities, to highly 
decentralized government systems. Three government-based systems in 
Latin America conforming to these three types of institutional arrangements 
include CONEVAL from Mexico, SINERGIA from Colombia, and DIPRES 
from Chile (Box 3.1). 
Independent, external body: transparency and social 
oversight emphasis
When transparency, social oversight, and accountability are the main drivers 
of M&E activities and there is a strong emphasis on independence, creation 
of external independent bodies is appealing. Location outside the govern-
ment and independent ﬁ nancing provide for the possibility of freely making 
assessments and limit improper inﬂ uence. This high degree of independence 
ultimately reinforces external credibility. 
Examples of these types of M&E bodies include donor and civil society 
initiatives, independent oversight institutions, and think tanks. Some exam-
ples of bodies that fund or carry out M&E activities on their own are Trans-
parency International, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
(3ie), the Center for Global Development, and the Bogotá Cómo Vamos ini-
tiative in Colombia. 
The disadvantage of an external body is that it may lack adequate access 
to information, insight, and contextual knowledge. These bodies often rely 
on building a strong reputation of independence and non-partisanship to in-
ﬂ uence policy making. Transparency and accountability might be easier for 
an independent M&E body, but inﬂ uencing policy remains a signiﬁ cant 
challenge. 
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Mexico: The National Council for the 
Evaluation of Social Development Policies 
(Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la 
Política de Desarrollo Social, CONEVAL)
CONEVAL was created in 2004 as part of the 
Social Development Law and fi nanced through 
a direct budget line in the national budget. 
 CONEVAL was established with a double mis-
sion: to measure poverty and to evaluate all so-
cial development policies and programs at the 
federal level. CONEVAL is headed by an execu-
tive director and belongs to the executive 
branch through the social sector, but has techni-
cal and managerial autonomy. It is governed by 
an executive board of six independent academ-
ics, the Minister of Social Development, and its 
own executive director. 
In a decentralized setting, CONEVAL sets 
standards and guidelines for the evaluations of 
federal government programs that the federal 
agencies commission themselves. There are 
approximately 130 federal programs under the 
mandate of CONEVAL, all of which are required 
to carry out logframe-type evaluations. In addi-
tion, CONEVAL directly oversees about 15 eval-
uations per year under the Annual Evaluation 
Plan (Programa Anual de Evaluación [PAE]). The 
PAE is defi ned jointly by CONEVAL, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the Public Comptroller’s Offi ce. 
Colombia: The National System for 
Evaluation of Public Sector Performance 
(SINERGIA)
A mandatory government development plan 
should guide every new administration in Colom-
bia. In this context, Law 152 of 1994 explicitly 
assigned to the National Planning Department 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP]) the 
mandate to plan, design, and organize a system 
for evaluation and monitoring of results- based 
management in the public sector. DNP is a long-
standing administrative department organized in 
technical units or directorates. Within DNP, the Di-
rectorate for Evaluation of Public Policies (DEPP) 
assumed the promotion of the national M&E 
system, which became known as SINERGIA 
(Sistema Nacional de Evaluación y Resultados de 
la Gestión Pública). DEPP is one out of ten techni-
cal directorates in DNP and is headed by a tech-
nical director, reporting directly to DNP’s deputy 
director and general director, who have the status 
of minister and vice minister, respectively. 
DEPP’s main activities involve administration 
of the governmental system of goals (Sigob), 
which includes goals for every sector and minis-
try, and management and commissioning of 
evaluations of major governmental programs. 
Currently the system includes approximately 
600 goal indicators across sectors, and more 
than 30 evaluations have been completed. 
Chile: The Management Control Division 
(DIPRES)
In Chile, DIPRES is in the budget department of 
the Ministry of Finance. Within DIPRES, a spe-
cial unit, the Management Control Division, 
leads the system for evaluation and manage-
ment control. Since the early 1990s, the evolu-
tion of the management control system has 
been a longstanding effort of the Chilean gov-
ernment under the strong leadership of succes-
sive budget directors. 
BOX 3.1
Main Features of Three Government M&E Systems: CONEVAL, 
SINERGIA, and DIPRES 
(continued)
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The overall goal of the unit is to contribute to 
the effi ciency of allocation and utilization of 
public spending, contributing to better perfor-
mance, transparency, and accountability. The 
Management Control Division is one of the four 
divisions and two subdirectorates that consti-
tute DIPRES.
The head of the Management Control Divi-
sion reports directly to the budget director un-
der the Minister of Finance. The Budget Direc-
torate is accountable to the Congress. Four 
areas of work have been developed and rein-
forced since the early 1990s: evaluation of pro-
grams and institutions, instruments for monitor-
ing and supervision, institutional salary incentive 
mechanisms, and the public management mod-
ernization fund.
For the 2010 budget, 150 governmental in-
stitutions adopted approximately 1,200 per-
formance indicators, and there are 28 ongoing 
evaluations of institutions and programs. 
BOX 3.1 continued
Centralized government-owned M&E system: management or 
control tool 
When the M&E system is housed in the government’s center (budget, cen-
tral authority, planning, presidency, or internal control offi  ce), it usually 
serves as a tool for management or for budget control. Under central budget 
authorities, M&E is often used to control effi  ciency and/or effi  cacy of re-
source use, and as such the M&E body usually enjoys considerable power to 
enforce the recommendations resulting from M&E assessments. In the ex-
treme enforcement version, the M&E body has direct power over the evalu-
ation agenda and enjoys a prominent position and support from the legisla-
ture. This is the case of DIPRES in Chile. Location under the budget authority 
also provides better integration of M&E into the budgeting and executing 
stages of the public policy cycle.
On the other hand, when M&E activities are mainly intended to serve as 
managerial tools, a central coordinating body can be placed outside of direct 
budget authorities to avoid a “force-fed” approach. The body seeks manage-
rial buy-in and ownership and expects voluntary adoption of recommenda-
tions. For this, the M&E body makes signiﬁ cant investments in consultations, 
in demonstrating the beneﬁ ts of evaluation as a managerial tool, in capacity-
building activities, and in establishing a favorable cultural climate for M&E. 
Both Colombia’s SINERGIA and Mexico’s CONEVAL regularly carry out 
capacity-building and dissemination activities to promote a results-oriented 
management culture. 
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Some of the advantages of a centralized M&E agency include:
• More authority to prioritize key programs to be monitored and evaluated 
when resources are limited
• Ability to pursue recommendations that aff ect multiple agencies or the 
whole government
• Ability to pursue standard practices, best practices, and quality 
methodologies
• Maintaining specialized technical staff  for support (which individual 
agencies may not be able to aff ord, especially in the beginning when the 
volume of M&E activities is low)
• More opportunities for generating learning synergies and economies of 
scale in data collection
• Reducing duplication
• Maintaining an institutional memory of M&E practices
Decentralized government-owned M&E system: 
full ownership by agencies 
In the extreme decentralized version, the agency that runs the program also 
conducts M&E activities to improve its own performance, rather than re-
porting to a central entity or authority. The advantages are in-depth con-
textual knowledge and better access to data and disclosure. Since M&E ac-
tivities are largely dependent on the quality and availability of internal 
information produced by the programs and on their willingness and capacity 
to generate primary data or recover information on beneﬁ ciaries, the agency 
has many incentives to produce and use the best information and use the 
results internally. 
Some disadvantages of the completely decentralized arrangement are less 
standardization in methodologies and practices leading to more heteroge-
neous quality and rigor in M&E products, limited coordination across sectors, 
fewer opportunities for best practice sharing, and the need for maintaining 
technical expertise. Some may argue that the separation between evaluator 
and executor is less clear, which may increase the potential for undue inter-
ference, but in theory this should not be the case if the use is mainly internal 
and the true motivation is improving self-performance rather than reporting. 
Supporting strategies 
Some of the potential risks to diff erent types of M&E systems can be miti-
gated through various supporting strategies or complementary institutions: 
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Key alliances. Support from the legislature, ﬂ uid communication, and pro-
motion of alliances with government central authorities are common strate-
gies used to overcome weak enforcement powers and to promote adoption 
of recommendations in reluctant sectors. Examples of these alliances in-
clude CONEVAL with the Ministry of Finance and SINERGIA with the 
presidency. In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries such as Canada, Australia, the United States, and the Netherlands, 
support provided by the national audit offi  ces has been considerable: they 
have helped by reviewing (via effi  ciency audits) the planning, conduct, and 
use of M&E in the executive branch, publishing good practice guides, ana-
lyzing the quality of department/agency data and data systems, and using 
their inﬂ uential and prominent position to advocate the merits of M&E. Al-
liances with national statistical offi  ces, although not pursued so far, could 
become important as well.
Financial independence. The ability of the coordinating agency to inﬂ u-
ence policy, have recommendations adopted, and set an evaluation agenda 
can be enhanced with strong legal support (CONEVAL), a permanent bud-
get line, or by using the agency’s own ﬁ nancial resources to carry out M&E 
activities (DIPRES). In contrast, when resources for M&E activities come 
out of the program’s budget, have to be earmarked in loans, and in general, 
depend highly on buy-in and voluntary adoption, then the agency could end 
up neglecting precisely the programs and sectors most in need of M&E. 
External contracting. Contracting out M&E systems to consultants, ﬁ rms, 
or research centers and using competitive, open procurement processes in-
creases legitimacy and independence and reduces potential conﬂ ict of inter-
est between evaluators and managers. DIPRES in Chile and SINERGIA in 
Colombia are good examples of systems using external contracting.
Hybrid governance. One example of a highly independent M&E body that 
still belongs to the government is CONEVAL. Although it pertains to the ex-
ecutive branch through the social sector, it enjoys technical and managerial 
autonomy greatly supported by a particular governance structure: an execu-
tive board of six independent academics, the Minister of Social Develop-
ment, and its own executive director.
Quality control mechanisms. The higher the buy-in of M&E by the agen-
cies, the better the insight, quality, and completeness of information pro-
vided by the programs for M&E. In centralized settings, the M&E body can 
seek higher quality and more reliable input information from the executing 
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agencies by establishing control mechanisms, such as external veriﬁ cation, 
audits, or alliances with internal control offi  ces as well as with national au-
diting and statistics offi  ces. 
Public disclosure. The principle of openness refers to making the evalua-
tion process as transparent as possible and the results widely available. Far-
reaching laws regarding public information access have been recently intro-
duced in various countries, which indirectly supports the M&E system 
disclosure ability (such as Chile and Mexico). The risk of lack of autonomy to 
disclose M&E information when the system is located under an executive 
authority can be mitigated with other provisions such as a long-standing tra-
dition of public disclosure. SINERGIA’s evaluations exemplify limited public 
disclosure, as well as the absence of a broader public information law.
Academic rigor. Evaluations conducted externally by researchers and aca-
demics often undergo additional quality ﬁ lters established by the academic 
community. They can also easily support capacity-building activities. Peer 
reviewing, screening in seminars, and the process of publication all contrib-
ute to increased rigor and quality in ﬁ ndings (for example, SINERGIA and 
CONEVAL). These important advantages may come at the cost of immediate 
usefulness if dissemination in accessible, non-technical language is ne-
glected. In the extreme, evaluation blends into pure research, and although 
the generation and use of research has been extensively and formally stud-
ied, the essence and rationale behind the two are very diff erent. 
Capacity building and standardization. Capacity building and standard-
ization are always important, but become even more so under highly decen-
tralized settings, when a considerable volume of M&E activities is reached 
or has been mandated, and when agencies devote signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial and 
human resources to M&E (CONEVAL). 
Revealed Demand: Actual Utilization of M&E 
Information 
The usual yardstick of success for the M&E system is the degree of utiliza-
tion of the information produced. Utilization can also be thought of as one 
major determinant of sustainability. The Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) principles for evaluations state: “for evaluations to be useful, they 
must be used” (OECD-DAC 1991). Utilization is a prerequisite for ﬁ nancial 
sustainability: why fund costly M&E tools or evaluations if they are not used? 
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Deﬁ ning measures of successful use is not easy.3 Two dimensions of suc-
cess are commonly employed (Table 3.2). The ﬁ rst is coverage—the extent of 
evaluation in relation to a reference value or universe. This is usually the 
proportion of the budget evaluated, which can in turn be measured as the 
value of the programs that have been evaluated to the total budget amount, or 
the number of programs evaluated in relation to a multiyear agenda, or the 
number of programs in a programmatic classiﬁ cation of the budget. The sec-
ond dimension is consensus on the need to follow up on recommendations, 
commitments, and action plans derived from M&E activities. This can in-
clude simple measures such as the number of alerts derived from monitoring 
or number of recommendations from evaluations that are actually adopted to 
more demanding measures such as the proportion of the recommendations 
implemented over the total number of recommendations formulated. 
No indicators have been clearly established to measure the ﬁ nal goals of 
M&E systems, namely improvements in the quality and effi  ciency of public 
TABLE 3.2 Tracking Utilization of M&E Information
Coverage • Proportion of budget evaluated/
monitored
• Budget of evaluated or monitored programs over total 
budget amount
• Number of programs evaluated or monitored over 
multiyear agenda
• Number of programs evaluated or monitored over 
number of programs in programmatic classifi cation of 
budget
Utilization • Follow-up of recommendations, 
commitments, and action plans 
derived from M&E information
• Number of changes derived from evaluations
• Number of alerts generated from monitoring
• Number and list of recommendations adopted
• Recommendations prioritized and adopted
• Recommendations implemented/total number of 
recommendations formulated
• Transparency/accountability • No measures associating transparency or accountabil-
ity with information from M&E systems
• Improving quality and effi  ciency 
of public expenditure and 
infl uencing budget allocations
• No applications
• Changes in budget/resource allocations resulting from 
utilization of M&E fi ndings by legislature
• Correlation with changes in budget or other resource 
allocation
• Public good/ applied research 
(for most rigorous studies)
• Scientifi c production (number of citations and 
publications)
• Use of public datasets (citations, derived academic 
and policy research)
Source: Author.
Defi ning the Type of M&E System: Clients, Intended Uses, and Utilization  43
expenditure that can be attributed to the results of the M&E system. How-
ever, a small number of reviews of individual evaluations examine the ex-
tent of M&E utilization and measure their cost-eff ectiveness. Such reviews 
could be conducted on a more systematic basis to help measure an M&E 
system’s overall cost-eff ectiveness, although cost and the typical delays be-
tween conducting an evaluation and measuring its impact would make this 
problematical. 
Measures on other dimensions, such as transparency and perception of 
accountability by citizens resulting from well-performing M&E systems, 
have not been explored. If the system is intended to inﬂ uence budget alloca-
tions, further utilization measures could include the change in allocations as 
a result of utilization by budget offi  ces and the legislature, or more indirectly, 
correlation measures with changes in resource allocation. The Republic of 
Korea utilizes a mechanism whereby budget allocations of programs that fail 
to reach their performance targets by a speciﬁ c margin are automatically cut. 
Some attempts to use this measure examine the correlation between evalua-
tion results and the budget of evaluated programs (Kim and Park 2007; 
Park 2008). For the most rigorous evaluations, usage could also be measured 
in terms of the standards for scientiﬁ c production (that is, citations and 
publications). 
One of the strengths of the Chilean system is that it maintains very spe-
ciﬁ c information regarding program changes and it monitors the extent of 
recommendations derived from evaluations. Since the standardized terms of 
reference provide for the production of speciﬁ c recommendations, these 
recommendations serve as a basis for establishing institutional commit-
ments that are later closely monitored by DIPRES. 
The 2008 report by DIPRES is a good example of the use of M&E infor-
mation: between 2000 and 2008, 174 programs were evaluated. The classiﬁ -
cation of changes derived from recommendations in ﬁ ve categories is pre-
sented in Figure 3.1. Between 1999 and 2007 more than 3,500 commitments 
were derived from recommendations, around 500 annually in the early years 
and less since 2006. Out of these, 82 percent were fulﬁ lled, 11 percent were 
partially fulﬁ lled, and 6 percent have not been fulﬁ lled. 
It is generally accepted that DIPRES’s M&E information is extensively uti-
lized in budget analysis and decision making, in imposing program adjust-
ments, and for reporting to the legislature and civil society. However, mana-
gerial usage or ownership from the head of programs has been limited, given 
the centrally-driven nature of the system and the perceived absence of incen-
tives for the agencies to engage in their own evaluations (Mackay 2007, 29).
In Mexico, CONEVAL issued in late 2008 a policy to establish general 
procedures for tracking aspects of improvement derived from the desk re-
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view evaluations (evaluaciones de consistencia). Aspects to improve are clas-
siﬁ ed according to involvement of diff erent parties: some aspects are under 
direct control of the program, while others involve various units within an 
agency, various agencies, or diff erent government levels. In addition, sector 
agencies themselves classify those aspects as high, medium, or low priority 
according to their contribution to the program’s goal. For the 2008 budget, 
101 programs with rapid evaluations were included in the tracking system, 
with 930 aspects to improve. Out of these, 70 percent were considered to be 
under direct control of the program (CONEVAL 2008a, 2008b, 2010).
SINERGIA’s utilization focus has been on the operations and manage-
ment of programs, since evaluations are typically conducted with voluntary 
involvement of sector ministries/agencies, in contrast to the Chilean model. 
President Álvaro Uribe was a powerful champion of M&E information in 
Colombia. He demanded intensive use of goals and indicators, especially 
during his ﬁ rst administration (OECD-DAC 2008). The downside is the lim-
ited use by budget authorities and Congress. Recently, the system has also 
tracked commitments from recommendations derived from each evaluation. 
In sum, M&E system utilization assessments have so far included proxies 
of coverage, client satisfaction surveys (the World Bank’s Independent Eval-
uation Group annual surveys of key stakeholders), evidence on adoption of 
recommendations and commitments (CONEVAL and DIPRES), and some 
FIGURE 3.1 Classifi cation of Changes in Programs 2000–08, DIPRES
Source: DIPRES 2008.
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anecdotal evidence (SINERGIA). Although more work remains to be done, 
M&E systems utilization is beginning to be addressed more systematically.
Conclusions
M&E capacity building deals with the development of successful M&E sys-
tems that are suffi  ciently independent to be externally credible and socially 
legitimate, that inﬂ uence policy making and are sustainable over time, and 
that respond to the needs of clients and main stakeholders. As more coun-
tries consider establishing M&E systems, lessons from other countries’ ex-
periences can be extremely useful. Speciﬁ c circumstances shape the evolu-
tion and focus of each system, and no recipe should be exported in a naïve 
manner to other countries. However, an explicit strategy to support the de-
velopment of new M&E systems should start by identifying country prefer-
ences, clearly deﬁ ning the clients and main role for the M&E body, and de-
termining how to track performance of the M&E system. 
Notes
1. In the Colombian institutional context, social oversight refers to the use of 
constitutional participatory mechanisms that enable oversight of the state, trust, 
and effi  cacy of the entities designed to oversee the state—Congress, Fiscalia, or 
the media—and the accountability mechanisms of those elected in offi  ce 
(Sudarsky 2008).
2. Some examples of principles are the OECD-DAC Quality Standards (2010), the 
principles of Spain’s Evaluation Agency (Ministerio de la Presidencia de España 
2010), and the principles of the World Bank–IEG (2010).
3. The World Bank and the Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el 
Desarrollo (CLAD) have contributed to the assessment of the systems by actively 
promoting diagnoses and reviews of system performances in 12 countries (CLAD 
and World Bank 2008).
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Conducting Diagnoses of 
M&E Systems and Capacities
Geoffrey Shepherd
CHAPTER 4
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are one of the important build-
ing blocks of a performance-oriented policy cycle in which policy goals are 
decided on in the public interest and policies are designed and implemented 
as far as possible in ways that will make them eff ective, effi  cient, and consis-
tent. The more that the activities of the policy cycle are based on empirical 
evidence and analysis (of what has or has not worked elsewhere or is or is 
not working here), the more likely that policies will be effi  cient, eff ective, 
and in the public interest. As this chapter will argue, the demand for M&E 
depends on the presence of at least some elements of a performance- 
oriented policy cycle. 
An M&E diagnosis is an analysis of what is and is not working in a coun-
try’s (or a sector’s, or a region’s) M&E activities, with recommendations for 
improving activities and systems. The diagnosis aims to identify needs and to 
For their comments, the author thanks Nick Manning (Adviser, Poverty Reduction and Equity, 
Public Sector Governance Unit), Philipp Krause (Consultant, Poverty Reduction and Equity 
Unit [PRMPR]), Keith Mackay (Consultant, PRMPR) as well as Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior 
Economist, PRMPR), and Jaime Saavedra (Director, PRMPR). The views expressed in this 
chapter are those of the author.
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ﬁ nd the combination of institutional arrangement and technical capacities 
that can address these needs. 
• The diagnosis emphasizes an institutional analysis of the factors that drive 
demand for and supply of M&E. Institutions are the formal and informal 
rules that shape the behavior of individuals and organizations in society. 
Where there is little or no demand for better public sector performance, an 
M&E diagnosis will probably make little sense. But in countries (or sectors 
or sub-national governments) where there is some demand for better per-
formance, an M&E diagnosis can pave the way. A good M&E diagnosis pro-
vides a useful entry point into broader issues of performance management. 
• The diagnosis emphasizes technical capacity because without reliable 
data, good analytical instruments, and solid technical capacity M&E 
 systems will not get results, even where institutions and organizational 
capacity might favor good M&E practice. 
Although the broad questions that an analyst might want to ask for any 
M&E diagnosis might be similar, country situations diff er so much because 
of varying levels of development and local situations, that the topics 
 addressed, the way the diagnosis is presented, and conclusions and recom-
mendations may look very diff erent. Mexico, for instance, has established 
important elements of a centralized M&E system and one of the main issues 
in improving this system is to ensure that the nascent performance-informed 
budgeting system develops properly (Castro et al. 2009). In Uganda and 
South Africa, the issue is more one of creating greater coherence among sep-
arate systems (Hauge 2003; Engela and Ajam 2010). In the United Kingdom, 
evaluation is underdeveloped compared to monitoring and the two are rela-
tively unconnected (Talbot 2010). 
There is no one blueprint for preparing an M&E diagnosis: content and 
presentation depend on the speciﬁ c context. This chapter seeks to illustrate 
the range of contexts by discussing a number of issues that help explain the 
diff erences in context. The chapter illuminates these issues, where possible, 
by referring to various country studies that have appeared in recent years 
(see Further Reading below). They cover six OECD countries—mostly stud-
ies that draw “good practice” lessons—and two African and four Latin Amer-
ican countries—a mix of diagnostic and “lessons-of-experience” studies. 
A Checklist of Topics for a Diagnosis
We start by proposing a checklist of topics to be considered in preparing an 
M&E diagnosis (Table 4.1). This checklist is broadly based on a number of 
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M&E country diagnoses and several diagnostic how-to guides that have ap-
peared in the last decade. These diagnoses by no means follow the same out-
line, but they do tend to cover similar sets of topics. The checklist is designed 
for a diagnosis at a national level, although adapting a diagnosis to a particu-
lar agency or sub-national government would not require any fundamental 
alteration of the checklist. The chapter then discusses at greater length some 
of the issues that arise with each topic. This chapter is not intended as a 
how-to guide so much as a tool to help better understand the issues. 
TABLE 4.1 A Checklist of Topics to Consider in Preparing an M&E Diagnosis
Block A. The national environment for M&E
Topic A1 The national policy and institutional framework: How are policies made? What role do donors 
play? Is political power wielded in the public interest? Do policies create a demand for M&E? 
How decentralized is the country? How has the relevant policy environment evolved over 
time?
Block B. M&E systems
If the study covers multiple M&E systems (government-wide, cross-sector, or within ministries, agencies, 
audit institutions, or donor projects) then Block B applies separately to each system.
Topic B1 Historical development: How and why did the system develop? Who championed it and who 
opposed it? What kind of implementation strategy was adopted?
Topic B2 Objectives (announced, implicit, or revealed): These can include budget support, support to 
policy making and/or program improvement, or accountability.
Topic B3 Processes, tools, and products: What is produced (indicators and evaluations by type and 
numbers, and so on)? What are the selection criteria? What is the production cycle? How is 
the information used (dissemination, reward, sanction, or correction)? How is the quality of the 
information controlled? What are the tools used to collect, manage, and analyze information 
and are they appropriate?
Topic B4 Relationship with other systems: How are systems interconnected, if at all? Monitoring with 
evaluation? M&E with the budget? Ministry or sub-national monitoring systems with national 
systems? Monitoring with information systems? M&E with quality-management systems?
Topic B5 Institutional architecture: How do the system’s components fi t together? How is cooperation 
(exchange of information, willingness to act on results) achieved within the system? How 
centralized is the system?
Topic B6 The organizational characteristics of public agencies that are part of the system: What is the 
historical reform/policy-change process? The tasks of the agency? Its resources (budget, 
incentives, expertise, training, donor support, etc.)? Its sources of authority (the legal frame-
work, roles of stakeholders)? The obstacles it faces (information, coordination problems)?
Topic B7 Results: What are the quality, credibility, and accessibility of the products of M&E? What is the 
impact of these products? Where there are multiple objectives, are there multiple impacts?
Block C. Findings
Topic C1 Conclusions and recommendations: What is working and not working, and why? What reforms 
are underway? How can things be improved?
Source: Author 
50 Building Better Policies
Diagnostic Issues
Topic A1. The national policy and institutional framework
Placing M&E within the public policy cycle. Perhaps the single most im-
portant point to be made about an M&E system is that it must be embedded 
within a broader policy framework that is conducive to M&E. This policy 
framework must in some sense be performance-oriented—that is, setting 
performance expectations, monitoring progress, measuring results, and ap-
praising, rewarding, or correcting performance. M&E cannot be considered 
independently of a performance-oriented policy cycle, where future actions 
are evidence-based and strategically planned, implementation is monitored, 
and results are evaluated and then fed back into the planning process. Lack 
of clarity in objectives and unpredictability in future resources undermine 
the possibility of such a policy cycle and hence the demand for eff ective 
M&E. In short, where elements of performance management are absent, it is 
hardly likely that M&E can ﬂ ourish. Thus any M&E diagnosis has to investi-
gate those broader elements of the policy framework that drive, or could 
drive, investment in M&E.
Recent M&E diagnoses make it clear that performance orientation is cen-
tral to the successful development of M&E systems. Castro et al. (2009) de-
scribe how Mexico’s evaluation agency, CONEVAL, sits at the apex of a com-
prehensive (if not yet fully institutionalized) M&E system that is part of a 
performance budgeting system. Somewhat similarly, a centralized evalua-
tion system in Chile is integrated within a broader performance manage-
ment regime (Rojas et al. 2006). By contrast, Matsuda et al. (2006) argue that 
the poor performance of Brazil’s centralized M&E system has to be under-
stood in the context of the problems of that country’s planning and budget-
ing processes. A comparative diagnosis of M&E systems in Australia, Can-
ada, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Lahey 2005) argues that in 
all four countries public sector reforms involved the devolution of manage-
rial discretion to individual government departments and agencies, as well 
as a desire to link evaluation and performance information to budget deci-
sion making and high-level policy debate. More recent studies for Canada 
(Lahey 2010), the United Kingdom (Talbot 2010), and Australia (Mackay 
2011) tell a similar story of M&E systems embedded within performance-
management regimes. In Australia, a new government elected in 1996 and 
favoring less government partially abandoned an eff ective evaluation system 
that had been built up over the previous decade.
In Uganda, the “performance” driver behind M&E reforms was the pov-
erty reduction agenda (Hauge 2003). In Ireland and Spain, the evaluation re-
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quirements that accompanied structural aid from the European Union were 
one of the principal drivers of M&E, but not the only one (Boyle 2005, and 
Feinstein and Zapico-Goñi 2010). Foreign donors have also been important as 
initiators of evaluation activities, but these eff orts have largely concentrated 
on donors’ own projects. In Uganda, for instance, there has been considerable 
donor investment in M&E. As a result, Uganda’s problem is not the quantity 
of M&E, but poor quality, poor coordination, and substantial duplication. 
M&E in a federal system. M&E diagnoses have mostly covered central 
 governments. But particularly for federal countries, the role of M&E in link-
ing central and sub-national governments is also an important if under-
discussed issue. When activities are devolved to sub-national governments, 
it is usual for federal authorities to retain substantial overall responsibility 
for policies and results. But this devolution means that the federal authori-
ties lose management control and have greater diffi  culty in getting infor-
mation. In other words, what were formerly outputs of the federal authori-
ties (i.e., results over which they had substantial control) become outcomes 
(i.e., results to which they contribute, but over which they do not have sub-
stantial control). Thus the federal authorities need their own M&E systems 
to give them managerial control over the discretionary funds they transfer to 
lower-level governments and ﬁ duciary oversight over sub-national govern-
ments’ use of their own funds. Federal authorities can additionally promote 
the quality of local public spending (and national learning) by encouraging 
sub-national governments to carry out their own M&E.
Talbot (2010) mentions the use of a special-purpose agency in the United 
Kingdom, the Audit Commission, to provide oversight of local governments. 
Engela and Ajam (2010) and World Bank (2011) note the importance of M&E 
in the developing federal systems of South Africa and Brazil.
Topic B1. Historical development
History matters for at least two reasons. First, current events and decisions 
are “path dependent”—they are conditioned by past events and decisions. 
Thus national idiosyncrasies explain why M&E systems can look so diff erent 
from country to country. Second, governments do not institute perfect new 
management systems overnight; instead, they learn with experience and ad-
just systems over time. 
Thus, national M&E diagnoses put the development of M&E systems, as 
well as the broader policy framework in which they sit, within a historical 
narrative. One of the main history-related themes comes from studies of the 
United Kingdom and Canada (Talbot 2010, and Lahey 2010). Even in such 
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“mature” countries with supposedly advanced forms of performance- 
oriented management—and in Canada’s case, an exemplary, well-integrated 
M&E system—there is little sense that these countries are approaching a ﬁ -
nal, ideal M&E system. Instead, the story is of constant adjustments to im-
prove systems. Similarly, a learning process has been at work in the develop-
ment of M&E systems in Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa. 
But history can also tell a more cyclical story: in some advanced countries, 
evaluation lost traction in the 1990s because of budget cuts (Lahey 2005); 
Australia abandoned its evaluation system in 1997 because of changes in po-
litical ideology (Mackay 2011); the United Kingdom apparently abandoned 
its successful system of Public Service Agreements when a new government 
took offi  ce in 2010. 
Topic B2. Objectives
M&E instruments can address a multiplicity of diff erent, often incompatible 
objectives. It is important to understand these objectives—whether they are 
announced, implied, or revealed—because diff erent objectives can require 
diff erent objects of measurement and analyses. Table 4.2 lists ﬁ ve sets of ob-
jectives: solving problems in program implementation; accountability within 
the government; provision of public information (for accountability, legiti-
mation, or public choice); improving program design; and prioritizing (and 
possibly coordinating) across programs. The table also provides examples of 
national systems that have been functioning reasonably well.
In many cases, it is diffi  cult to use the same system to respond to diff erent 
objectives. A comparative study of evaluation systems in Latin America 
(Ospina, Cunill Grau, and Zaltsman 2004) diff erentiates between systems 
for designing better programs and policies (“planning models” in Colombia 
and Costa Rica) and systems for helping expenditure prioritization (“budget 
models” in Chile and Uruguay). Canada’s M&E system provides an example 
of a system able to answer eff ectively to more than one objective (Lahey 
2010). Brazil’s national M&E system failed, in part, because it took on too 
many objectives (Matsuda et al. 2006). Engela and Ajam (2010) discuss dif-
ferences in objectives—and resulting tensions—among diff erent government 
agencies in South Africa, contrasting a more “linear” program logic at the 
Treasury (which is concerned with budget prioritization) and a more com-
plex view of how programs work in the sectoral ministries. 
Topic B3. Processes, tools, and products
This topic encompasses the technical design of the M&E tools (to collect, 
manage, and analyze information) and the production system in which they 
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TABLE 4.2 M&E Objectives: A Taxonomy and Some Examples
1. Solving implementation problems: 
Monitoring program execution to detect and correct implementation problems. This is a managerial 
learning function and is usually incorporated within a management information system (MIS).
• Brazil: Monitoring the Growth Acceleration Program.
• United Kingdom: Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit.
2. Intra-government accountability:
M&E of program execution both within government and between levels of government to ensure that 
public agents are doing what they have undertaken to do. This is a managerial (internal) accountability 
function also usually incorporated within an MIS.
• Brazil: Compliance and process audits (also providing public information).
• Canada: Articulated M&E information used for internal accountability and management and for 
external accountability (reporting to the center of government and to Parliament).
• South Africa: Program of Action (MIS).
• United Kingdom: Public Service Agreements (also with elements of public accountability).
3. Providing public information: 
Providing information to the legislature and the public to: (i) render external accountability; (ii) provide 
information that legitimizes a public action; or (iii) provide information that facilitates public choice and voice.
• Brazil: Performance evaluation of government programs by the Federal Court of Audit. 
• Brazil: Program evaluation by Ministry of Social Development to legitimize new programs (also for 
learning related to program and policy design).
• Colombia: System of Programming and Management by Objectives and Results (SIGOB), a monitor-
ing system for legitimation (and also to inform the president of ministry performance).
• South Africa: Development Indicators (for accountability).
• United Kingdom: Education and health “score-cards” (for consumer choice).
4. Improving program design: 
M&E allows governments to learn about the effi ciency and effectiveness of individual programs to inform 
decisions to extend, improve, or eliminate them.
• Chile: Government program evaluations by the Budget Offi ce (also for budget decision making).
• Colombia: Evaluations of the National System for Evaluation of Public Sector Performance (SINERGIA) 
(also for policy prioritization). 
• Ireland: Evaluation for projects of EU structural funds (also for accountability).
• Mexico: Program evaluations of the CONEVAL.
• Spain: Evaluations of the Spanish Evaluation Agency (AEVAL).
5. Coordinating and prioritizing among programs (particularly in budgeting): 
M&E allows governments to learn about effi ciency and effectiveness across programs. This helps the center 
of government to: (i) coordinate among programs; and/or (ii) prioritize (cabinet, planning, and budget decisions).
• Australia: Evaluation system 1987–97 to help in policy and budget prioritization (but also to improve 
program performance and render internal accountability).
• Canada: Strategic Reviews (budget).
• Chile: Comprehensive Spending Reviews (budget).
• Ireland: Expenditure Review Initiative (budget). 
• United States: Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) (budget).
Source: Author
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sit, as well as the scale of the activity (for instance number of reports pro-
duced annually or number of indicators). The topic covers: 
• Monitoring: criteria for selecting indicators; appropriateness, periodicity, 
timeliness, reliability, and quality control of indicators; methods of col-
lecting, reporting, and disseminating data. 
• Evaluation: the evaluation cycle; criteria for selecting subjects for evalua-
tion; evaluation techniques (impact, rapid, process evaluations, etc.); 
training and use of evaluators; dissemination methods. 
Evaluation encompasses a broad range of tools, from the informal to the 
formal and from the impressionistic to the rigorous. There is a range of for-
mal evaluative tools (cost-beneﬁ t, cost-eff ectiveness, impact evaluation) and 
less formal tools (rapid evaluation, user surveys, and so on). Diff erent tools 
respond to diff erent needs and the diff ering availability of information. 
Needs diff er in at least three systematic ways:
• Diff erent types of problem: problems diff er from one policy area to an-
other. In infrastructure activities, for instance, outputs and outcomes are 
relatively well understood and measurable, but start-up costs (including 
choice of technique) can strongly aff ect effi  ciency. In social areas, start-up 
costs are more modest, but desired outcomes, though measurable, are 
harder to attain since human behavior is more diffi  cult to engineer than 
bridges. This helps explain why impact evaluation is the gold standard of 
policy analysis in the social sectors and cost-beneﬁ t analysis is the gold 
standard in infrastructure sectors.
• Diff erent costs of analysis: the technically best forms of analysis have costs 
as well as beneﬁ ts—they require more information (hence cost more) and 
they may produce results that come too late.
• Diff erent objectives: M&E activities cover a range of objectives, as dis-
cussed above. 
The diagnostic studies under review diff er in the amount of information 
they provide on production routines. Studies for Chile (Rojas et al. 2006) and 
Colombia (World Bank, IEG 2007) are examples of diagnoses that provide a 
reasonable amount of detail on evaluation tools and methodologies.
Topic B4. Relationship with other systems
The idea of M&E as a self-contained system (albeit within larger systems of 
performance management) is a slippery one. First, monitoring and evalua-
tion can be substantially separated from each other, even though the line 
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between them can be blurred. Talbot (2010) diff erentiates the United King-
dom’s monitoring regime from its evaluation regime. The former has attri-
butes of a fairly tight system driven by an effi  ciency-oriented philosophy and 
based on organizations rather than programs. Evaluation activities are quite 
separate—there are, for instance, two separate professional communities 
driven by somewhat diff erent considerations (substantive policy more than 
effi  ciency), and they are program-based, less developed, and less systemic. 
In Chile and Colombia, M&E are also largely unintegrated, even though they 
fall under one “system” and one organization. Canada, seemingly the excep-
tion, has been able to substantially integrate the two functions. 
Second, it can be diffi  cult to separate a speciﬁ c set of activities called 
M&E from other policy-oriented information collecting and analytical ac-
tivities systematically undertaken within the public administration. M&E, 
compliance and process auditing, quality management, policy analysis, and 
information management represent separate communities of practice that 
substantially overlap but are often poorly connected to each other. 
M&E crucially depends on good information and good analysis. The abil-
ity of governments to use modern technologies to harness the power of mod-
ern information and communications technologies is very important in de-
termining the sophistication of their M&E eff orts. For instance, crossing 
physical and ﬁ nancial data allows program implementation to be tracked 
with greater accuracy and irregularities to be more easily detected. A coun-
try’s public information infrastructure is inﬂ uenced by its resources (soft-
ware and systems development, data management, and statistical skills) and 
by public institutions (in particular statistics institutes, but also central min-
istries and line ministries). Knowledge management also requires analytical 
skills typically found in government think tanks and research institutes, and 
non-government bodies such as universities, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and consultancy ﬁ rms. 
Few M&E diagnoses have discussed national knowledge management 
 infrastructures. A diagnosis for Brazil (World Bank 2011) gives some exam-
ples of how innovative uses of information and communication technology 
have improved monitoring capabilities in some ministries. A diagnosis for 
South Africa (Engela and Ajam 2010) also discusses information and data 
constraints. As government has become larger and more complex in Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
specialized government and non-government agencies have come to play 
an increasingly important role in the analysis of public policies and pro-
grams. In eff ect, policy advice is becoming a more competitive business 
(World Bank 2010). 
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Topic B5. Institutional architecture
The key questions relate to the identiﬁ cation of the components of the sys-
tem (the participants and their roles) and the mechanisms for securing co-
operation between the components. This has been a central topic for most 
diagnoses. The main themes are the degree of centralization of systems and, 
associated with this, the incentives that induce players to part with informa-
tion or to act on the results of M&E. There are as many architectural variants 
as there are systems. 
To start with, the diagnoses describe a variety of systems that go from loose 
to taut. The M&E “system” characterized by Engela and Ajam (2010) for South 
Africa is in reality a government-wide policy to coordinate many existing and 
disparate M&E initiatives. At the other extreme, Rojas et al. (2006) describe 
a centralized and tightly controlled evaluation system in Chile. Canada, Co-
lombia, Mexico, and Spain also have tightly-deﬁ ned national M&E systems (in 
various stages of construction). The United Kingdom has a tightly-deﬁ ned, 
well-established system for performance monitoring, not evaluation. 
These systems have diff erent modes of coordination and degrees of 
centralization. 
• In Chile and Mexico a central agency carries out the evaluations. Mex-
ico’s CONEVAL also helps set the rules for M&E practices in the line 
secretariats. 
• In Canada (somewhat like Australia 1987–97), the center of government 
sets the rules and provides advice, while the line departments are required 
to carry out the evaluations, with some degree of liberty about how they 
organize them. South Africa aspires to a somewhat similar arrangement. 
• A peculiarity of the United Kingdom is that, in many sectors, it uses a 
number of specialized inspectorates, standing at arm’s length from their 
sponsoring departments, to carry out monitoring. 
• Finally, there is a growing involvement of supreme audit institutions 
(SAIs), usually attached to legislatures, in performance evaluation. Brazil 
and the United Kingdom are good examples: their SAIs have the authority 
to collect information and require program changes, and they have be-
come an important part of a broader national M&E system. 
Topic B6. Characteristics of organizations
Public agencies that are part of a particular M&E system—whether a central 
agency that runs the system or a line agency that participates in the system—
have particular organizational characteristics that determine their own 
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 incentives to supply information and to use M&E results. Diff erent agencies 
in the same government can have quite diff erent capabilities and face quite 
diff erent incentives. These diff erences are shaped by the history of the 
agency, what it does, the resources it can command, and the external factors 
and pressures that inﬂ uence its behavior (legal framework, stakeholders, 
and so on). This topic overlaps with the topics on the national policy and 
institutional framework and on institutional architecture because all three 
address diff erent aspects of incentives (see Box 4.1). 
The organizational framework is generally not treated in a systematic 
way in the diagnoses and studies under review, but there is a substantial, if 
episodic, treatment of related themes.
• Studies on Brazil (World Bank 2011) and South Africa (Engela and Ajam 
2010) discuss features that explain diff erences among ministries as regards 
their cooperation in M&E systems. Talbot (2010) notes the variability of 
departmental M&E capacities in the United Kingdom. 
• Castro et al. (2009) describe the organizational characteristics of political 
independence and technical capacity that have made CONEVAL a credi-
ble and inﬂ uential evaluator of social programs in Mexico.
• Lahey (2005) emphasizes the importance of formal, legislated polices in 
reinforcing the use of evaluation in individual government departments 
and agencies in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.
• The obstacles to coordination are discussed in several diagnoses. Cunill 
Grau (2010) suggests that poor information ﬂ ow and lack of cooperation 
among public agencies has forced a centralized approach to M&E sys-
tems in Latin America, in contrast to the more decentralized approach in 
OECD countries. Engela and Ajam (2010) describe the culture of infor-
mation hoarding in South Africa, as well as other diff erences among pub-
lic agencies that impede cooperation. 
Topic B7. Results
Clearly, there is not much point to an M&E system, however well-designed 
and functioning, if it does not get results in terms of goals fulﬁ lled, programs 
and policies improved, budgets rationalized, or a public better informed. Un-
fortunately, it is quite diffi  cult to measure such improvements and attribute 
them to speciﬁ c causes. 
Generally speaking, evidence on results is weak or missing from existing 
M&E diagnoses. The study on Chile (Rojas et al. 2006) was able, in broad 
terms, to trace the eff ect of evaluations on budget decisions. Some studies 
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cited individual examples of evaluations that were inﬂ uential. Other studies 
made judgments about the quality of evaluation reports as an implicit proxy 
for their expected impact. (Rojas et al. 2006 had experts judge the quality of 
a sample of program evaluations in Chile; Matsuda et al. 2006 compared the 
quality of evaluations of the same program independently carried out by the 
SAI and by ministries.) In the main, most studies had to be content with au-
thor inferences based, at best, on knowledge of the system and interviews 
and focus groups with participants. 
Incentives are the factors that motivate a particular course of action by individu-
als or organizations. At a macro level, incentives are woven into the institutions 
that determine governance—do the formal and informal rules impel public offi -
cials to act in the public interest or in private interests? At a micro level, incen-
tives take the form of sticks (sanctions for poor performance) or carrots (for in-
stance material rewards) that affect the effort that individuals and organizations 
make, at the margin, to perform better. 
Incentives fi gure prominently in three of the topics in our checklist. 
• The national policy and institutional framework: The public interest nature of 
national policies, the clarity and the binding nature of national policy direc-
tives, and the nature of national management rules (especially budget rules) 
determine the core incentives for countries to pursue M&E. It is thus vital 
for M&E diagnoses to identify these characteristics. But since they are 
largely driven by politics, it is often diffi cult to propose solutions in the con-
text of an M&E diagnosis. 
• M&E system: the institutional architecture: A specifi c architecture helps de-
termine a narrower set of incentives for agencies to cooperate (exchange 
information or take corrective actions based on M&E results) within a cir-
cumscribed system. Different systems make different trade-offs between 
the use of hierarchical authority (in centralized systems) and the appeal to 
the self-interest of agencies in pursuing M&E (in decentralized systems).
• M&E system: organizational characteristics: At the agency/sector level, sim-
ilar incentive issues arise as for the national policy and institutional frame-
work. At the agency level, politics can also be a driving force shaping incen-
tives, but so too are specifi c features of the sector, as well as the sticks and 
carrots of micro incentives. Agency-level incentives may thus be more mal-
leable than national incentives.
BOX 4.1
Looking at Incentives in an M&E Diagnosis
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Topic C1. Conclusions and recommendations
The conclusions should present the overall strengths and weaknesses of 
M&E systems and activities, as well as indicate current or planned reforms. 
Because they provide diff erent models and elucidate the topics we have been 
discussing, existing diagnoses can help frame these conclusions.
By the same token, existing diagnoses can also provide a useful guide to 
possible reform options. On the other hand, it follows from the large number 
of national variables—diff erent historical starting points and national insti-
tutional environments, the range of objectives and architectures, and diff er-
ences between public agencies—that no one model will ﬁ t all reform situa-
tions. Indeed, realistic recommendations must start from the local realities. 
Public sector reform is subject to bounded rationality—we do not have 
enough information to know how to get it all right the ﬁ rst time—and path 
dependence. Thus one has to build on what is in place and what, under local 
circumstances, is more likely to work. Guidelines, taxonomies, and check-
lists can only provide limited help. 
Organizing the diagnosis
In addition to the valuable information contained in several existing diagno-
ses, several guides provide useful advice about diagnostic issues, content, 
and organization (Box 4.2). 
This note makes a few ﬁ nal points about organizing an M&E diagnosis.
• An initial decision has to be made about whether an M&E diagnosis 
makes sense. In some countries, where there is no drive for performance, 
there will be no motivation for M&E. In such cases, a more basic examina-
tion of the institutional conditions for public-sector reform is required. 
• As with any diagnosis of public sector issues, it makes sense to involve the 
government as far as possible in the design and implementation of a study, 
both to ensure better access to information and to make it more likely that 
the study’s ﬁ ndings will be taken seriously (see Topic B5 above). 
• The scope of the study will need to be deﬁ ned. Will the study concentrate 
on a particular system or will it look at M&E activities more generally? 
Where local governments are important partners in implementing na-
tional priorities, it will be important for M&E diagnoses to link central 
and sub-national government M&E activities. 
• How large will the study be? Mackay (1998) (see reference in Box 4.2) 
makes the point that a feasible diagnosis can range from a small team 
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spending one or two weeks in the ﬁ eld to a large team undertaking—in 
eff ect, an impact evaluation. No single diagnosis is likely to cover, in any 
detail at least, all the topics described in this chapter. Thus, the smaller 
the study, the more that choices have to be made. 
• The better prepared an investigative team is by the time it sets foot in a 
country, the better the end product is likely to be. 
• Finding out about the results of M&E systems is likely to prove the hard-
est challenge in the ﬁ eld. Interviewing and focus groups must be designed 
to listen to multiple perspectives—producers and users of M&E, partici-
pants and observers, supporters and critics.
• There are diff erent ways to tell a story, and the material must dictate the 
particular way chosen for any diagnosis. A historical narrative has proven 
important in many diagnoses. On the other hand, where comparability is 
• Boyle, Richard, and D. Lemaire, eds. 1999. Building Effective Evaluation Ca-
pacity: Lessons from Practice. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
• Cunill Grau, Nuria, and Sonia Ospina Bozzi, eds. 2003. “Guide for Case 
Studies.” In Evaluación de resultados para una gestión pública moderna y 
democrática: experiencias latinoamericanas. Caracas: CLAD.
• Görgens, Marelize, and Jody Zall Kusek. 2009. Making Monitoring and Eval-
uation Systems Work: A Capacity Development Toolkit Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
• Kusek, Jody Zall, and Ray C. Rist. 2004. Ten Steps to a Results-Based Moni-
toring and Evaluation System. Washington, DC: World Bank.
• Mackay, Keith. 1998. “A Diagnostic Guide and Action Framework.” Evalua-
tion Capacity Development Working Paper Series 6, World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC.
• ———. 2007. “The Importance of Country Diagnosis.” In How to Build 
M&E Systems to Support Better Government . Independent Evaluation 
Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.
• World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group. 2007. “Annex C: Terms of Ref-
erence for an In-Depth Diagnosis of SINERGIA.” In “A Diagnosis of Colom-
bia’s National M&E System, SINERGIA.” Evaluation Capacity Development 
Working Paper Series 17, World Bank, Washington, DC.
BOX 4.2
Published Guides for M&E Country Diagnosis and 
Capacity Building
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required with other studies, a more instrumental approach might make 
more sense.
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Key Steps to Design and 
Implement M&E for Individual 
Country Service Agencies
Harry Hatry
CHAPTER 5
This chapter identiﬁ es key steps in designing and implementing a monitor-
ing and evaluation (M&E) system for ministries and individual government 
agencies that provide services. These suggestions are intended to apply 
whether the ministry or agency is in health, education, social welfare, envi-
ronmental protection, transportation, economic development, public safety, 
or any other sector. M&E development should focus on instilling a process 
that will yield regular outcome data that can be used by the designing agency 
and upper-level offi  cials for accountability and management, thereby help-
ing offi  cials improve services to their citizens.
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Prerequisites
At least four pre-conditions are vital to successful M&E implementation. 
First, strong, top-level supporting leaders are needed who are willing to 
 provide the time and resources to initiate the M&E process. Second, the 
presence of at least some staff  and suffi  cient capacity to undertake basic data 
collection and analysis is critical. Third, government offi  cials must be willing 
to use the M&E data to help make resource allocation decisions, and not 
merely to show that the agency is collecting performance data. Fourth, there 
should be enough ﬂ exibility for agency managers to make changes where the 
data indicate that changes are needed. If these conditions are absent, the 
M&E process may be a waste of time.
Basic Steps
A number of basic steps are required for designing and implementing the 
process, whether at the ministry or agency level. 
1. Establish a committee of key agency personnel to guide and over-
see the implementation eff ort. The committee should include individuals 
from within the organization as well as representatives from the offi  ces of 
the program, budget, planning, information technology, human resources, 
and an analytical offi  ce such as statistics, if one exists, whose work might be 
expected to relate to M&E. It is also likely to be helpful to include in the com-
mittee an “outside” person who can bring a broader perspective, such as 
someone from a higher-level budget or planning offi  ce. 
2. A talented leader should be selected, as well as a small cadre of 
support personnel who will be responsible for supporting the implementa-
tion of the various administrative and technical elements of the M&E system 
(under the guidance of the committee). 
3. Consider meeting in the early stages with members of the legisla-
ture to ﬁ nd out what information would be useful to them for annual budget 
deliberations or other policy or oversight purposes. Similar input should be 
sought from the national budget offi  ce. 
4. Develop a plan and schedule for implementation, keeping in mind 
it is likely to take three to ﬁ ve years for full implementation. However, some 
initial useful performance information can probably be expected to become 
available by the end of the ﬁ rst year. As part of this step, it is critical to iden-
tify who will be needed to undertake each step of implementation. The peo-
ple selected should be available and committed to providing the time neces-
sary to perform their assignments.
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5. Provide training and technical assistance to managers and key 
professional staff  in the basics of M&E. This applies to initial training and 
training new people as turnover occurs. The training for managers should 
provide a thorough understanding of what M&E entails and recommenda-
tions for using the information. The training for other staff  should focus 
more on the details of how M&E should be conducted so as to make the in-
formation obtained both valid and useful. Multilateral and bilateral funding 
organizations are potential sources of support for these activities.
6. Ask all program managers within the agency to identify a results-
focused mission statement for their programs. These statements will 
necessarily be general, but they should set the tone and direction for the 
M&E eff ort in each program. 
7. Ask each program within the agency to select a set of outcomes 
and outcome indicators1 that will enable the program to monitor progress 
in achieving the results identiﬁ ed in its mission statement. Programs could 
establish their own working groups of key personnel to help select appropri-
ate outcomes and outcome indicators.
The M&E working group might also seek input from representatives of 
the customers served by the program. For example, the program might spon-
sor meetings (focus groups) with small numbers of clients to help identify 
outcomes of importance to them. A public welfare agency, for example, 
might hold such sessions with its clients, a health agency might hold such 
sessions with patients in health clinics, and an economic development 
agency might hold such sessions with representatives from businesses.
Outcome indicators should be reviewed at a higher level to ensure that 
they contain the important performance information needed. For example, a 
ministry should review the indicators selected by each of its agencies and an 
agency should review the indicators proposed by each of its programs.
8. Inventory existing databases within the agency to identify the 
output and outcome information already available (or readily avail-
able) that can be used to monitor progress toward the agency’s mission. 
The sources might be inside or outside the agency, such as data already 
regularly collected by a central planning offi  ce. Many, if not most, countries 
and their agencies already regularly collect outcome data, such as incidence 
and prevalence of health problems (for example, malaria, tuberculosis, and 
HIV), road accident fatalities, drinking water and air quality, unemploy-
ment rates, school absenteeism and completion rates, or economic develop-
ment indicators.
9. For each performance indicator candidate, identify the source 
of the data, collection procedures, and how often the data will be col-
lected and reported. Some outcomes will require new data collection. An 
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indicator should not be considered ﬁ nal until a feasible data collection pro-
cedure has been identiﬁ ed. An agency and its programs should not limit it-
self to considering only outcome indicators for which it currently has data. 
Depending on the availability of resources, however, the agency may need to 
defer beginning new data collection procedures until later years. In addition 
to data obtainable through agency records, two other major data collection 
options to consider are customer surveys and trained observer ratings.
Surveys of citizens. Surveys are increasingly being used around the world 
to obtain feedback on outcomes, including the quality of government ser-
vices. The feedback can be from samples of households or of customers that 
have been assisted by the agency (such as patients, students, or businesses). 
These surveys can provide feedback on a variety of program outcomes, in-
cluding the surveyed person’s housing, employment, or health condition sta-
tus; ratings of various program quality characteristics such as timeliness, ac-
cessibility, fairness, and ease of obtaining information on services; frequency 
of use and reasons for nonuse of the service; and extent of having to make 
inappropriate payments to obtain service. Citizen surveys can also obtain 
information on the demographic characteristics of respondents, which helps 
identify the distributional eff ects of the program. 
Trained observer rating procedures. This option uses personnel to system-
atically rate physically observable conditions, such as the condition of roads, 
hospitals, health clinics, school buildings, or other public facilities; proxim-
ity of households to sources of drinking water; and the ability of persons 
with disabilities to undertake basic activities of daily living. Each of these 
conditions is rated by an observer trained in the use of a well-deﬁ ned rating 
scale. The raters visit all, or samples of, the units to be observed. The out-
come indicator would be the number and percent of those items rated as 
being in satisfactory condition. Ratings obtained at regular intervals enable 
the program to monitor changes in each condition. The procedure has a po-
tentially very useful side beneﬁ t of identifying where work is needed and the 
extent of that need so units with poor ratings can be prioritized for correc-
tion as soon as possible. 
10. Provide for basic analysis of the performance data. At the minis-
try or agency level, top-level offi  cials should assign an offi  ce to be responsi-
ble for examining the data collected, identifying unexpected ﬁ ndings, and 
reporting these ﬁ ndings to the appropriate offi  cials in time to allow the 
agency to act on them. The basic analysis for performance monitoring is 
typically comparisons, including comparing the current reporting period to 
previous reporting periods, current data to targets, outcomes among diff er-
ent customer groups, and to similar programs in other countries. While 
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more sophisticated statistical analysis would be desirable, this ﬁ rst-level, 
 basic analysis should be highly informative and make the monitoring consid-
erably more useful.
11. Top-level offi  cials in the agency need to emphasize the impor-
tance of outcome information, particularly by using the M&E informa-
tion in decision making. They also need to use information collected on 
outcomes to identify needed program improvements and training or techni-
cal assistance needs, and to draw attention to successful programs. Using 
M&E data at all levels of the agency, such as planning, budgeting, and pro-
gram review, highlights the importance of the M&E system.
12.  Review monitoring data and data collection procedures periodi-
cally. This review is an appropriate time to introduce improved measure-
ments to ensure the continued reliability and credibility of performance 
measurement. Performance measurement should always be considered to 
be a work in process. 
13. Use M&E information to lay the groundwork for positive incen-
tives to improve the eff ectiveness of public services. From the beginning, 
emphasize that achieving good results will be rewarded. Emphasize that a 
major purpose of M&E information is to help offi  cials and their staff  identify 
what works and what does not.
14. Emphasize the message that outcome information is very useful 
for benchmarking, but does not provide the background information 
that tells why. The M&E system should not be used as a blame game. M&E 
information is often perceived by managers as threatening because it has 
been used to blame managers for poor outcomes without considering why 
the outcomes occurred. Outcomes are often aff ected by factors over which 
managers have limited or no control. (See Boxes 5.1 and 5.2 for examples of 
country service agencies that have made considerable progress in most of 
these steps.) 
Making the M&E Process More Useful
Following are six key ways to maximize the usefulness of an M&E process 
within a service agency.
1. Link key characteristics of the “customers” the agency/program 
is serving to the outcomes for each customer. Then, report outcome data 
for each category of customer as well as for all customers. This information 
can be very useful both for interpreting the data and for identifying what ac-
tions are needed.
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For example, program managers in the education, employment, public 
welfare, housing, and health sectors will ﬁ nd it useful to be able to identify 
program outcomes by demographic characteristics, such as outcomes by age, 
gender, income, household size, race/ethnicity, and so forth. This may sug-
The United States National Park Service (NPS) 
is responsible for 392 park facilities throughout 
the United States. NPS, as well as all federal 
programs, is required to provide Congress with 
annual performance information. The United 
States Offi ce of Management and Budget left it 
to each federal program to implement its own 
performance measurement process. NPS fi rst 
identifi ed its mission: To preserve the natural 
and cultural (historical) resources for posterity 
and to provide those resources for the enjoy-
ment of U.S. citizens.
NPS decided to develop a performance 
measurement process that would: (1) help 
identify budget needs and provide justifi cation 
for funding both individual parks and the park 
system as a whole; (2) help individual park su-
perintendents manage; and (3) provide fair 
comparisons across parks.
NPS identifi ed six basic outcome areas to 
be measured on at least an annual basis: 
(1) con dition of natural resources; (2) condi-
tion of  cultural/historical sites; (3) park-user 
satisfaction; (4) condition of non-cultural facili-
ties; (5) safety of park users and employees; 
and (6) fi nancial management, including park 
effi ciency.
For each outcome area, NPS identifi ed out-
come indicators. Measurement of the indicator 
values has presented some diffi cult measure-
ment questions, especially given the diversity 
of the 392 facilities. NPS developed a “score-
card” containing about fi ve key outcome indica-
tors for each of the six outcome areas.
For park-user satisfaction, NPS contracted 
with a university to develop a process, adminis-
tered by each park, to annually survey random 
samples of park users and ask them to assess 
a number of key park characteristics. Most of 
the other outcome data for the other fi ve out-
come areas are provided by each park.
The scorecard process has evolved over a 
number of years and is still evolving as measure-
ment procedures have improved. Each park su-
perintendent is annually given its own scorecard 
results, along with a comparison to the average 
for all parks and the average of the other parks 
in its region. Each park can also compare itself 
to any other parks it believes are similar. 
Thus far, the annual process appears to have 
been more useful for accountability and budget-
ing than for park management, partly because 
of the lag time before the scorecard data be-
come available to the parks. However, much of 
the data can be used by individual parks to iden-
tify actions needed throughout the year. For ex-
ample, the data on safety (accidents, injuries, 
crimes), feedback from park users, and facility 
condition data (based on regular inspections) 
are routinely considered and used for allocating 
resources. The parks are encouraged to use the 
scorecard information as part of their justifi ca-
tion for funding requests as part of the annual 
NPS budget process.
The outcome indicators and process have 
been evolving over the years and will likely con-
tinue to be improved as new measurement pro-
cedures become available. 
BOX 5.1
United States National Park Service
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gest the need for program changes for groups that were not suffi  ciently 
helped. For programs that do not directly service individual recipients, such 
as road maintenance and environmental quality programs, breakouts by key 
characteristics are still very important. For example, data calculated on the 
number of traffi  c accidents will be considerably more useful if the outcome 
data are broken out by characteristics, such as cause of the accident, average 
daily traffi  c, and location.
A key problem for many countries, particularly poor countries, is that 
they may not have M&S systems capable of providing such information. 
Nevertheless, the programs in such countries should do whatever they can 
to try to obtain and calculate such breakout data, even if the calculations only 
can be done manually, and even if they can only focus on outcome breakouts 
for one or two categories.
2. Set targets for the coming year for each output and outcome indi-
cator. A good time to select targets is during the annual budget process. Set-
ting targets typically starts with the data on the previous years’ values for 
each indicator. These values then can be adjusted for any signiﬁ cant changes 
expected, such as in funding or personnel. Other considerations are external 
factors, such as the economy (changing export conditions or new businesses 
Mexico’s Ministry for Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social—
SEDESOL) found that the development of a results-based management sys-
tem takes time and is a work in progress. In 2007, after earlier piloting a results-
based M&E process in four programs, SEDESOL began implementing a more 
comprehensive process combining results-based monitoring, evaluation, and 
budgeting. The ministry early on established an offi ce with extensive evaluation 
capacity, providing a basis for the later results-based process, which included a 
combination of monthly, quarterly, and annual data reporting. 
As of 2009, SEDESOL had 500 indicators. Of these, 112 were linked to re-
sults, 170 measured the quantity, effi ciency, and quality of the services deliv-
ered by programs, and the remaining 218 measured the activities used to pro-
duce these products. However, 40 of these indicators were selected by the 
Ministry of Finance as priority indicators for use in the 2010 budget preparation 
and subsequent monitoring. The Offi ce of the President also monitors the indi-
cators and goals of sectoral programs such as SEDESOL.
Source: Mexico, Ministry of Finance, and World Bank 2010. 
BOX 5.2
Mexico’s Ministry for Social Development
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that can increase revenues or reduce unemployment), technology (that 
could improve service quality), and political changes expected to alter min-
istry or agency priorities.
Normally the program should propose the targets for its own perfor-
mance indicators. These targets, however, should be reviewed by upper-
level offi  cials to ensure that the targets are neither too easy to meet nor 
overly high. The danger with targets is that they can become primarily po-
litical in nature, making them either much too easy to achieve or unrealistic. 
Targets are more meaningful when based on previous performance and rea-
sonable expectations of the future.
3. Ask agencies and their programs to provide explanations for un-
expected results and indicate plans for correcting any problems noted 
in the explanations. The ministry or agency might set a threshold, such as 
requiring explanations for any performance indicator value that diff ers by 
more than, for example, 10 percent from the expected target value. 
Data on results do not tell what the cause of those results is, or what to do 
about them. Agencies and their programs should be encouraged to seek ex-
planations for unexpected results and develop plans to correct any problems 
that are identiﬁ ed. A side beneﬁ t of such a provision is that managers may 
welcome the opportunity to formally provide their explanations, fearing that 
otherwise they will be blamed unfairly for poor results. This may alleviate 
the “blame” problem noted earlier.
4. Provide for regular, timely performance reporting for review by 
ministry, agency, and program offi  cials. For budgeting purposes, only an-
nual performance reports may be needed. However, for managerial pur-
poses, this is too infrequent. Generally, reporting should be done at least 
quarterly. For some indicators, such as those relating to safety and health, 
reports are likely to be needed more frequently.
5. Make the report format as understandable, readable, attractive, 
and informative as possible. Too often performance reports are unclear, 
uninformative, or ﬁ lled with unfamiliar terminology. With today’s electronic 
capabilities, even poor countries have access to a variety of report-generat-
ing software.
6. Ministry offi  cials, agency offi  cials, and program managers should 
be encouraged to hold regular “How Are We Doing?” review sessions 
soon after the latest performance report has been issued. The ministry 
or agency head meets separately with each major agency program or divi-
sion to discuss the performance data, identify where the outcomes are going 
well and not well, and suggest ways to correct poor past results. In subse-
quent meetings, previous decisions should be followed up on to determine 
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the extent of progress that has been made in correcting previously identiﬁ ed 
problems. 
Incorporating Program Evaluations
The monitoring process described above provides regular measurement of 
program performance, but it does not tell why the program has been suc-
cessful or unsuccessful. The explanatory information suggested above pro-
vides ﬁ rst-order information on the “whys” and what might be done to 
improve performance. However, for programs that involve large expendi-
tures and/or are of major importance, more in-depth program evaluation 
is desirable. In general, program evaluations tend to be expensive and 
may require long periods of time, perhaps years before the ﬁ ndings are 
available.
Each year, it is important for the ministry and each agency to establish a 
schedule of which programs will receive an in-depth evaluation. The 
choice should depend on criteria such as major uncertainties and lack of 
information regarding program success, cost of evaluation, time required 
to complete the evaluation and therefore the timeliness of the ﬁ ndings, and 
the likelihood that the evaluation will provide useful information for later 
decisions. For some programs it may not be feasible to obtain the needed 
information. An initial step is to assess whether these programs are good 
candidates for evaluation. 
It is also critical to select what type of organization will conduct each 
evaluation. The organization conducting the evaluation should be reason-
ably independent, if for no other reason than to achieve external credibility 
for the ﬁ ndings. Few government agencies or ministries are likely to have 
the in-house capability for such program evaluations. Almost certainly the 
evaluations will need to be conducted by outside organizations such as 
universities or specialized,  private non-proﬁ t or for-proﬁ t organizations. 
Because of evaluation costs, the ministry or agency might seek funding 
from international multilateral or bilateral funding organizations, particu-
larly for evaluating programs for which the funding organization has pro-
vided support.
An important additional step is to ensure that the completed evalua-
tions are professionally reviewed to assess their quality. Most program 
evaluation reports should be made available to the public. This step itself 
can help encourage the program evaluators to ensure their work is of rea-
sonable quality.
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Uses of M&E Information
M&E information has many uses, including identifying shortfalls in out-
comes, thereby enabling service improvement. M&E data can also help to 
formulate ministry, agency, and program budgets and help to justify budget 
requests. Program outcome information, whether obtained through regular 
performance monitoring or from program evaluations, should be linked to 
program cost information as part of the budget process. The outcomes ex-
pected to be achieved by the budget requested should be a major factor in 
budget decisions. 
The information produced by M&E systems is also useful for helping to 
allocate and prioritize resources throughout the year, such as adjusting the 
assignment of work or staff  to diff erent locations or customer groups based 
on performance data. For example, outcome indicator data can identify ar-
eas most in need of road repairs, emerging health issues, types of housing 
shortages, traffi  c accident locations, and locations with the most water or air 
quality problems.
M&E systems can also develop incentives for agencies and programs 
based at least in part on success in achieving outcomes. Monetary incentives 
can be expensive and are not likely to be appropriate for many countries—at 
least not until considerable experience in M&E has been gained. However, 
non-monetary incentives can be considered once the M&E process is in 
place. For example, as noted earlier, recognition awards could be given to 
agencies or programs that have met or exceeded their targets. 
M&E information provides the basis for developing multi-year strategic 
plans for ministries and agencies. The latest values for key outcome indica-
tors can be used to establish the baselines and subsequent out-year targets. 
In later years, the annual M&E data on these key outcome indicators can be 
compared against the targets in the multi-year strategic plan. Such informa-
tion indicates whether actions are needed to stay on the plan, whether plan 
revisions are needed, or whether the plan is no longer feasible.
M&E information also helps to communicate with the legislature and 
citizens. Performance reports that provide data on the ministry’s or agency’s 
major outcome indicators are likely to be of considerable interest to legisla-
tors and citizens. Such transparency can be helpful in obtaining citizen sup-
port for the ministry’s and agency’s work. 
Ministries and their agencies may, understandably, fear that showing bad 
news (such as worsening outcomes) will only bring them grief from the leg-
islature and public. However, showing only outcomes that look good is likely 
to undermine credibility. Problems can be alleviated if the ministry or agency 
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provides explanations for poor outcomes and indicates what it plans to do to 
correct the problem.
Inter-governmental Concerns
Depending on the level of decentralization in the country, a considerable 
amount of the data may come from local or regional/provincial government 
bodies. For example, to the extent that education and health services are de-
centralized, these lower levels of government should be monitoring the out-
comes of these services. 
The ministry or agency will likely need to help lower-level governments 
develop their capacity to operate their own M&E systems. The central min-
istry or agency might need to provide guidance, guidelines, and ﬁ nancial 
support. The national agency will need to check the quality of performance 
data from lower level governments; this means providing training and tech-
nical assistance, but also periodically auditing at least a sample of the data 
and data collection procedures used by lower levels of government. 
Cost of M&E
The added cost will depend considerably on the extent to which each 
agency program is already collecting reasonably reliable performance data 
and if the ministry, agency, and program already have personnel that can 
assist in implementation. Many agency programs are likely to be already 
tracking a number of outcomes, which can be used as a starting point for the 
M&E system.
The largest added costs will likely be for any new personnel needed (such 
as for analysis); training (including start-up, continuing, and replacement 
training); and for any new data collection procedures (such as the cost of 
surveys). Household surveys, in particular, will probably need to be adminis-
tered by an outside business, university, or the national statistical offi  ce. 
Added costs could also be for a new computer system and technology to pro-
cess substantial amounts of data, as well as in-depth program evaluations 
usually conducted by an outside organization, such as a university or special-
ized private ﬁ rm.
The position of many governments in developed countries that are intro-
ducing M&E systems has been that monitoring is a basic management func-
tion. The cost of ongoing implementation should, therefore, be primarily 
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covered by the ministry, agency, and the program’s own budget. Initial start-
up costs are likely to be more of a problem for many ministries and agencies, 
however, and for these costs funding could be sought from the central gov-
ernment or from donor organizations.
Conclusions
Monitoring and evaluating the results of public services is both common 
sense and good management. However, performance data obtained from 
M&E systems do not replace the need for judgments by public offi  cials. M&E 
information can only serve as one input, albeit a major input, for decision 
making. Many other factors will also need to be considered.
Implementing M&E successfully and usefully in a ministry or agency re-
quires commitment and leadership from high-level offi  cials in these organi-
zations. And it takes time and special resources. If the organization’s climate 
will not likely permit meaningful use of M&E information, the eff ort will be 
a waste of money. However, if the climate is favorable, the ultimate gains 
should be considerable in improving the organization’s services to its 
citizens. 
Note
1. See also Castro’s discussion of performance indicators in Chapter 8.
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M&E Systems and the Budget
Philipp Krause
CHAPTER 6
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are means to multiple ends, such as to 
improve transparency and accountability or for managerial purposes to re-
ward performance inside ministries and agencies. But a crucial element of 
running an eff ective public sector would be missing if M&E were not used to 
inform the spending of public money. This chapter introduces the main is-
sues surrounding M&E as a tool for budgeting—a system usually referred to 
as performance budgeting1—to help policy makers make strategic decisions 
about their M&E systems by outlining diff erent design choices and their re-
spective advantages and pitfalls. 
Budgeting is said to have three aims: (1) ﬁ scal discipline, (2) allocative ef-
ﬁ ciency, and (3) operational effi  ciency. How can M&E help offi  cials involved 
in the budget process achieve those aims? A traditional ministry of ﬁ nance 
usually focuses on enforcing ﬁ scal discipline by tightly controlling spending 
at the line item level. The German budget, for instance, has around 6,000 line 
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items. This level of detail gives the ﬁ nance ministry many levers to keep min-
isterial spending in check. However, it has often been criticized as relatively 
inﬂ exible and ineffi  cient for budgetary decision making. Budget offi  cials 
have to spend signiﬁ cant time reviewing small items that have little bearing 
on important policy decisions, and the system does not facilitate consider-
ations of the results of public spending.
A well-designed M&E system has the potential to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of traditional budgeting. By deﬁ ning indicators for public 
spending outputs and outcomes, governments gain the ability to monitor 
non-ﬁ nancial performance. By carrying out evaluations that turn perfor-
mance information into implementable policy recommendations, govern-
ments can more effi  ciently allocate resources to programs with the greatest 
contribution to its policy priorities. In focusing the eff ort of public managers 
on performance, M&E can also contribute to better operational effi  ciency. 
Many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries have introduced some elements of M&E into their budget process 
over the last three decades. These performance budgeting reforms were often 
part of other eff orts to improve performance in the public sector and to make 
the budget process more ﬂ exible for diffi  cult ﬁ scal climates. Early adopters, 
such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, pursued their re-
forms most vigorously in times of ﬁ scal crisis. The main motivation was often 
not primarily to strengthen spending discipline, but rather to develop the 
tools that would allow the government to make better use of existing funds. 
Many middle-income countries have since taken up the ideas ﬁ rst seen in 
OECD countries and adapted them to their contexts. In many lower-income 
countries, the context for introducing M&E into the budget process is quite 
diff erent. The ﬁ ght against poverty and the joint push by governments and 
donors to make progress on the Millennium Development Goals provide a 
results orientation by default. For lower-income countries, developing a link 
between the poverty reduction goals in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper and the annual budget cycle is a key challenge. 
What Are the Different Tools, and How Do They 
Fit Existing Contexts?
It is very hard to imagine a budget process that does not monitor: even the 
most basic ﬁ nancial management system tracks the ﬂ ows of resources. A de-
tailed line item budget is an excellent tool to monitor inputs of money. When 
using the term M&E, however, “monitoring” means the regular measuring 
of the outputs of government programs and possibly their outcomes as well. 
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If M&E are used together for budgetary decisions, a form of performance 
budgeting emerges (Arizti et al. 2009; Curristine 2007; Shah and Shen 2007).
The most rigid form of M&E is directly linking funding to performance, 
most commonly outputs. The ministry of ﬁ nance essentially buys a certain 
level of performance from spending ministries and only funds what it buys. 
Formulaic performance budgeting can only be found in a few countries in 
certain sectors, such as health or education, where outputs can be rigidly 
standardized. No country has institutionalized such a system for its entire 
government, because it is both technically and politically almost impossible 
to automatically tie funding to predeﬁ ned levels of performance. There is also 
not much of a role for evaluations in such a system, which is problematic. 
Performance information cannot be used to automatically adjust spend-
ing—it needs to be interpreted. One might expect programs with negative 
evaluation results to receive funding cuts; however, politically important 
programs with negative results might just as well receive funding increases, 
because failure would be unacceptable and ﬁ xing failed programs costs 
money. Formulaic performance budgeting decreases the scope for informed 
decision making by public offi  cials.
On the other end of the spectrum, the M&E-budget link can be purely 
presentational. Sector ministries or the ministry of ﬁ nance can publish per-
formance data or submit data to the legislature as an appendix to the budget 
or in the form of performance reports during the budget year. Legislative or 
executive participants might use these reports in budget negotiations, but 
there is no requirement to formally consider them. 
Presentational performance budgeting can still raise important issues 
and make budgetary decision makers aware of problems that a traditional 
line item budget would not uncover. It can also be the result of a budget sys-
tem where either the ﬁ nance ministry or the legislature enjoys a large degree 
of discretion over how they reach their allocative decisions. In many cases, it 
may be a transitional state, where proper decision-making structures have 
not yet been set up, or an unintended system where information is produced 
somewhere in the system, but not used by key budgetary actors.
OECD countries that adopt performance budgeting tend to develop a 
performance-informed budget process, where M&E instruments serve as 
analytical tools. In this model, performance indicators are integrated into 
the budget and regular evaluations are scheduled into the budget cycle. Per-
formance indicators and evaluations are institutionally considered during 
budget formulation. 
This process can take various forms. In the United Kingdom, for instance, 
the ﬁ nance ministry uses three-year spending reviews to negotiate spending 
plans with ministries. The basis of planned expenditures is the “public ser-
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vice agreement,” which uses performance indicators to deﬁ ne targets the 
ministry is supposed to achieve with a given amount of funding over three 
years. These targets form the core of the interaction between the ﬁ nance 
ministry and spending ministries and are meant to capture what a ministry 
does and to set the agenda for its future achievements. The 1998 spending 
reviews contained a total of about 600 headline targets; this number was 
reduced to 110 by the 2004 budget exercise. Inside each ministry, these tar-
gets are broken down along results chains into lower-level targets for opera-
tional purposes. Ministries have a very high degree of discretion over the 
internal allocation of funds to achieve their targets. The result is a highly 
structured, top-down system where performance indicators are very promi-
nently used to inform budgetary decisions. 
Many other countries have developed less ambitious ways to use perfor-
mance indicators, such as by complementing the traditional line items in the 
budget document with data on ministerial performance. Performance indi-
cators are available as a source of information that can be used for budgetary 
decisions without laws or regulations prescribing exactly how legislators or 
budget offi  cials might use them. 
A single-minded focus on monitoring performance indicators can be crit-
icized for several reasons. First of all, if indicators are the main sources of 
information considered for crucial decisions, then incentives grow for public 
offi  cials to focus on delivering indicators but not necessarily improving the 
underlying performance. There are numerous examples of public offi  cials 
trying to “game” indicators to secure funding.2 Secondly, the supply of per-
formance data can easily outstrip demand. When ministries expect that 
their performance indicators will shape future funding, they have every rea-
son to develop as many indicators as possible to ensure that every aspect of 
their work is captured. The result is that much information is produced, but 
not necessarily used. 
In addition, performance indicators alone are not directly actionable. A 
performance increase of 2 percent can be a substantial success or a deep 
disappointment when compared to other countries. Numbers can be af-
fected by external factors and changes in funding can inﬂ uence outcomes 
with a lag of several years, or very disproportionately, or not at all. It often 
takes time and specialized policy knowledge to interpret performance infor-
mation, which are in short supply during the annual budget cycle.
The need to have actionable information is why the combination of moni-
toring and evaluation is crucial. An evaluation is a systematic review of a 
program or project that identiﬁ es strengths and weaknesses and recom-
mends actions that offi  cials can use for budget formulation. Many policy 
analysts ﬁ rst think of an evaluation as a rigorous impact analysis that is able 
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to identify the speciﬁ c contribution of a policy intervention by comparing 
beneﬁ ciaries and non-beneﬁ ciaries. Such impact evaluations are indeed 
used in budgetary decisions and can have a huge impact, particularly for the 
funding of new policies. The reputation of conditional cash transfer pro-
grams, for instance, was in no small part established by the impact evalua-
tions of Mexico’s Progresa program in the 1990s. These evaluation results 
allowed public offi  cials to judge the merit of this innovative policy interven-
tion against other programs with similar aims. However, impact evaluations 
are not appropriate for all budgetary evaluation needs. Most importantly, 
they are expensive and take time, usually more than one year. 
For a frequent and comprehensive evaluation system, quicker, desk-based 
evaluations are an important tool. Rather than carrying out original research, 
a rapid evaluation would rely on the available information that can be pro-
vided inexpensively from the evaluated program and other public sources. 
This can cut costs substantially and reduce research time to a few months—a 
crucial diff erence, because they can be made to ﬁ t into a single budget cycle. 
A rapid evaluation can be initiated during budget deliberations, commis-
sioned, and carried out the same year, with the results available to feed into 
the budget preparation the following year. 
For instance, Chile conducted more than 250 rapid evaluations between 
1997 and 2010. The evaluation schedule is decided in negotiations between 
the ﬁ nance ministry and Congress. Evaluation teams are chosen from a pool 
of expert consultants. All evaluation recommendations are monitored by the 
Chilean budget offi  ce and revisited annually during budget negotiations. 
While not comparable to impact evaluations in depth and academic rigor, 
desk-based evaluations focus on consistency and operational issues and can 
uncover signiﬁ cant issues relevant to budgetary decisions. 
Countries such as the United Kingdom also use comprehensive spending 
reviews to consider all available M&E data to evaluate spending in one pol-
icy area. The U.K. Treasury does not just consider its own M&E data, but also 
evaluation results commissioned by other government bodies, such as the 
National Audit Offi  ce. Spending reviews are carried out every two to three 
years.
A traditional line item budget is often criticized for its ineffi  ciency and 
inability to respond to new policy challenges. Budget offi  cials in the ﬁ nance 
ministry as well as legislators have limited time to consider the annual bud-
get. A budget consisting of thousands of individual items makes it possible to 
closely control where money is being spent. Change, however, is incremental 
and often limited to distributing the marginal increase from year to year. A 
combination of soundly measured and regularly monitored performance in-
dicators and accessible evaluations can, in theory, enable budget decision 
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makers to move beyond the limits of incremental budgeting and respond to 
larger ﬁ scal challenges. But “in theory” is a big caveat, because in practice, 
M&E only makes a diff erence if the demand is right. 
The Institutional Roles—Who Does What? 
M&E is about supply and demand. Unless actors in the budget process de-
mand and use the outputs of M&E, even the most sophisticated tools will 
have no eff ect. It is also critically important that budget processes are inher-
ently political in nature. Each phase of the budget process has its technical 
underpinnings, but ultimately it is about turning political priorities into ad-
ministrative reality. A country that successfully introduces M&E into the 
budget process does so because enough actors demand the information that 
M&E provides.
The ﬁ nance ministry is the main agency in charge of the budget process 
and often the appropriate ministry in which to anchor the M&E system. Chile 
is a good example; the Chilean budget process is possibly the most centralized 
among OECD countries. The budget director is a key adviser to the president, 
and the budget process is tightly managed by the budget offi  ce (DIPRES). 
The natural result of such a budget system is that the M&E system is also 
managed by the budget offi  ce. The technical mandate of DIPRES is solidly 
deﬁ ned in a legal framework that gives it considerable discretionary scope to 
change budgeting procedures without new legislation. The budget offi  ce con-
trols the schedule and the methodologies, ensures quality, and manages the 
ﬂ ow of information between agencies, ministries, itself, and Congress. 
Yet even in Chile, the budget offi  ce is mostly a compiler, not producer, of 
information. Evaluations are commissioned by the government, but their 
implementation relies on a network of universities and other researchers. 
The indicators that feed into the monitoring system are supplied by agencies 
and ministries themselves. The main role of the budget offi  ce is quality con-
trol. The budget offi  ce strongly supports the use of M&E information both 
throughout the executive bureaucracy and for legislative purposes. Yet in-
ternational studies point out that the budget offi  ce remains the principal 
user and supporter of M&E in Chile. This system has worked very well in 
Chile over the past 15 years, but it is not the only institutional setup that 
works. Very few other countries can rely on such a strongly centralized bud-
get process to underpin the introduction of M&E.
The main design challenge is how to tailor the system to the likely users 
of M&E information and their position within the budgeting framework. 
This is a universal concern, irrespective of a country’s stage of development 
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(Box 6.1). A growing body of literature on ﬁ scal institutions points out that 
the centralization of the budget process depends on macropolitical factors. 
The most important factors relate to electoral and party systems and the 
constitutional separation of powers between the legislature and the execu-
tive branch (Hallerberg 2004). They are thus largely beyond the control of 
technical policy makers. In countries where the right pre-conditions do not 
exist, other successful models can be viable alternatives to centralization, 
but only when they take the institutional balance into account. In other 
words, there is little reason to expect that a highly centralized M&E system 
will produce good results if the budget system itself is not centralized.
Centralization is most likely in parliamentary systems where either one 
or a few closely aligned parties form the government. In the United King-
dom, the party with a majority in parliament automatically heads the execu-
tive branch as well, which makes for relatively clear lines of accountability 
within government. If the government has resolved to employ M&E in the 
budget process and already delegates strong budgetary authority to the ﬁ -
nance ministry, then the budget offi  ce becomes the main consumer of M&E 
information. When legislators discuss the draft budget in parliament, their 
majority will be part of the governing coalition and their policy priorities 
should be broadly aligned with those of the ﬁ nance minister. 
Many ﬁ nance ministries make M&E information available to legislators 
to build legislative support for the M&E system in general and to support 
A very different challenge arises in the many countries that tried to implement 
poverty re duction strategies (PRSs) to align country and donor efforts toward 
reaching the Mil lennium Development Goals. PRSs are of ten drafted by plan-
ning ministries or special commissions without a central role in the regular bud-
get process. Critics noted that these strategies were geared toward donor audi-
ences and not properly implemented. The format and planning schedule of 
PRSs did not necessarily fi t well into the existing budget process. Countries like 
Uganda, which was quite successful at using the PRS for planning and budget-
ing, did so by putting the budget offi ce fi rmly in charge. The M&E systems that 
Uganda implemented to feed into the PRS were designed with the budget 
process in mind. 
Source: Wilhelm and Krause (2007).
BOX 6.1
Mind the Gaps between the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
and the Budget
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controversial budgetary decisions that might be based on M&E data. Legis-
lators have an incentive to consider M&E information, especially when bud-
getary decisions aff ect their own constituency. In fact, in many parliamen-
tary systems, the supreme audit offi  ce is closely tied to the legislature and 
often carries out its own evaluations independently of the executive branch. 
Nevertheless, the budgetary relationship between the budget committee in 
parliament and the ﬁ nance ministry is not adversarial.
In presidential countries, the constitutional balance between the legisla-
ture and the executive branch plays a crucial role. Chile is a fairly excep-
tional case in this regard, because the powers of Congress to amend the pres-
ident’s budget proposal are severely limited. On the other end of the 
continuum lies the United States, where the president’s budget can be fa-
mously “dead on arrival” if the Congress is controlled by the opposing party. 
Most presidential systems lie somewhere in between (Box 6.2). 
Irrespective of the constitutional or legal powers of the ﬁ nance ministry, 
many budget offi  ces ﬁ nd it useful to give agencies and ministries a substan-
tial role in the M&E system. In some countries, a tradition of collegiate cabi-
net government makes it diffi  cult for the ﬁ nance ministry to assume tasks 
without being seen as encroaching on the authority of other ministers to 
shape the policy in their respective sectors. To push ahead without properly 
involving sector ministries can imperil the sustainability of reforms, a prob-
lem even for successful reformers like Chile. 
Generally, ﬁ nance ministries make their own workload more manage-
able by delegating parts of M&E to ministries. If ministries operate perfor-
mance indicators and buy into evaluation results, they can forestall many 
potential conﬂ icts during budget negotiations with the ﬁ nance ministry and 
shape their budget proposals in a way more acceptable to both sides. A 
strong stake for ministries and agencies also makes it more likely that M&E 
results are used for operational and managerial purposes within ministries, 
something that ﬁ nance ministries might reasonably expect to beneﬁ t opera-
tional effi  ciency. 
When Australia introduced its evaluation system in 1987, ministries were 
obliged to develop their own evaluation plans and had to ensure that the 
entire ministerial portfolio would be evaluated every three to ﬁ ve years. The 
ﬁ nance ministry played a key role in quality assurance, but otherwise its 
main role in the evaluation system was to insist on the use of evaluation re-
sults during budget negotiations. Internal surveys carried out by the Austra-
lian government in the 1990s found evaluation results to be very inﬂ uential, 
particularly in deliberations over new policy initiatives (Mackay 2004). 
In weaker administrative environments, it might not be possible to dele-
gate the operation of M&E instruments because of lack of capacity, or be-
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In Mexico, congressional budget powers are considerable. Since 1998, three 
parties of roughly equal size have shared the legislature. By default, the presi-
dent’s party does not have a legisla tive majority and thus cannot pass the bud-
get alone. When Mexico moved toward developing M&E capacity in the public 
sector, it faced a potential impasse. On the one hand, the legislative power of 
the purse made Congress a legitimate and inevitable consumer of M&E data. 
The legal framework of budgeting also requires congressional approval for the 
necessary legal changes to the budget process. Yet if the M&E system was led 
by the legislature, there would be a strong incentive for the executive bureau-
cracy not to develop a stake in M&E for fear that the new tools would expose 
them politically. On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance could not fully 
central ize M&E authority either, because to do so might jeopardize the credibil-
ity of M&E information in Congress. This issue was resolved by vesting much 
technical expertise and authority over performance monitoring and the evalua-
tion program in an independent technical body called The National Council for 
the Evaluation of Social Development Policies (CONEVAL). This council main-
tains close working relations with both Congress and the Ministry of Finance. 
CONEVAL is in a position to develop a reputation as a producer of credible and 
useful information and thus ensure that the M&E outputs it supplies are actu-
ally used for budgetary decisions in both branches of government.
BOX 6.2
Not All Presidential Countries Are the Same: 
The Experience of Mexico
cause it might compromise their credibility. However, even if the public 
 administration is weak or fragmented, the ultimate measure of success for an 
M&E system is not the extent to which the ministry of ﬁ nance operates  every 
aspect of it: M&E is only eff ective when budget analysts, legislators, and 
 political leaders use the M&E data produced to formulate and negotiate the 
budget. 
Several key factors can severely inhibit the use of M&E for budgetary pur-
poses. A government needs reliable information systems, solid ﬁ nancial 
management systems, and at least the basic human capacity to generate and 
process evaluations. It does not, however, need a very systematic and planned 
M&E system to start with, especially not in countries with lower capacity. 
Uganda is an example of a country where the creation of a new budget direc-
torate, out of the 1992 merger of the planning and ﬁ nance ministries, created 
a big enough unit of professionals to conduct high-level analytical work even 
though much of the public sector was lagging far behind. Such islands of 
excellence can make use of performance information from many sources, 
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including from donors, and try to spread their results without relying on a 
demanding framework that systematically links performance data to the 
budget process (Kuteesa and others 2009).
How Best to Implement M&E-Budget Links
Institutional change rarely happens because the beneﬁ ts of change are self-
evident. In budgeting, large amounts of money and quite often political fu-
tures are at stake, and as long as the budget process works reasonably well, 
budgetary actors are understandably reluctant to change the institutional 
setup. Sources of potential resistance against M&E include the ﬁ nance min-
istry itself, particularly the budget offi  ce. In many ﬁ nance ministries, budget 
analysts are very skilled at challenging ministerial budget proposals and suc-
cessfully trimming down excessive spending. Especially when the introduc-
tion of performance information goes hand in hand with dismantling tradi-
tional line item controls to “let managers manage,” budget analysts might see 
more danger than gain in reform. 
In most OECD countries where ﬁ nance ministries did take the lead and 
successfully implemented M&E-oriented reforms, a few factors were usu-
ally present: 
• Top offi  cials in the ﬁ nance ministry were convinced that the existing bud-
getary toolkit was not suffi  cient for current or looming ﬁ scal challenges. 
Periods of ﬁ scal austerity, volatile revenues, or crises of conﬁ dence in the 
government’s ability to spend wisely often combined to create such a 
sense of urgency. 
• An individual or a group of institutional champions “sold” both the 
technical and the political beneﬁ ts of reform to diff erent groups of 
stakeholders. 
• The ﬁ rst two factors eventually combined to make it feasible for ministers 
and other political leaders to expend the political capital and attention 
necessary to overcome resistance and adopt the necessary decisions.
Prospective reformers do not have to wait for the next recession and a 
favorable political climate to attempt setting up an M&E system. In many 
countries, diff erent budgetary actors successfully experimented with diff er-
ent tools and instruments before the reform climate reached a tipping point 
and piecemeal change turned into comprehensive reform. In Mexico, the 
Ministry of Social Development had been working for years on performance 
indicators, logical frameworks, and evaluations before the ﬁ nance ministry 
started to champion reforms on a larger scale. In Chile, reforms accelerated 
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markedly after the country was hit by the eff ects of the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis. 
The success of today’s comprehensive system beneﬁ tted greatly from the 
experience of a ﬁ rst generation of reforms that some champions within the 
budget offi  ce had implemented. Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom are cases where changes in government prompted 
dramatic changes over very short periods of time, which were then often 
followed by many years of ﬁ ne-tuning. 
There does not seem to be a golden rule as to how exactly an M&E func-
tion should be anchored within the ﬁ nance ministry. In several cases, includ-
ing Mexico and Chile, ministers chose to set up a dedicated M&E unit within 
the budget offi  ce separate from budget analysts. Such a setup ensures that 
M&E has internal champions charged with promoting the new instruments, 
yet at the same time it also creates an institutional barrier between M&E and 
the offi  cials who are in charge of drafting the budget. At the U.K. Treasury 
and the U.S. Offi  ce of Management and Budget (OMB), on the other hand, 
budget analysts are directly in charge of managing and processing M&E in-
formation. OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool was managed by its in-
dividual budget examiners and has been linked closely to the preparation of 
the executive draft budget. In some cases, offi  cials have noted that such a 
setup slows down the ﬁ rst implementation of M&E, because budget analysts 
are so busy running the budget that they ﬁ nd little time to take charge of the 
new instruments. 
Inevitably, the right setup will depend on the speciﬁ c administrative con-
text. The available evidence, in particular from the United Kingdom, encour-
agingly suggests that the longer performance budgeting is in use, the more 
support there is among budget offi  cials. The support seems to grow not only 
because M&E turns out to be useful as a budgetary instrument, but also be-
cause budget analysts come to see M&E work as more policy-oriented and 
thus more relevant and attractive than the traditional handling of line items.
Key Lessons
Four key lessons emerge from the discussion in this chapter:
• No single M&E system model works in every country. Successful in-
troduction of M&E into the budget process has to account for the existing 
budgetary framework, and very diff erent models have been successful in 
diff erent countries.
• M&E is a demand-driven process. Even the most sophisticated M&E 
instruments are ultimately ineff ective unless public offi  cials actively use 
them for budgetary decisions.
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• Introducing M&E is a joint eff ort. When setting up an M&E system, 
offi  cials in the ﬁ nance ministry cannot work in isolation; they need sup-
port from ministries and agencies and interest from legislators.
• Bringing M&E into the budget is a politically sensitive reform. To use 
M&E properly for budgeting, established administrative practices need to 
change, which will require a sustained reform eff ort and long-term politi-
cal backing.
Notes
1. For current information on the World Bank’s ongoing work on performance 
budgeting, please refer to the Public Sector Governance Web site: http://go.
worldbank.org/SGO4LFRSS0.
2. Among other examples, Hood (2006) reports a U.K. experience: hospital patients 
waiting in lines of ambulances outside emergency rooms to meet a target for 
patients to be seen by a doctor within a certain time of admission.
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Use of Social Accountability 
Tools and Information 
Technologies in Monitoring 
and Evaluation
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CHAPTER 7
This chapter reviews the basic concepts relating to the use of social ac-
countability and information technology to monitor and evaluate public 
services and other governance processes that aff ect citizens. The chapter 
employs simple though practical examples to explain how to qualitatively 
change monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to make the process more citizen-
centered and outcome-oriented. In turn, these practices can help improve 
the quality of service delivery. The chapter also discusses a few country-
speciﬁ c initiatives from India and elsewhere to support the arguments.
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In a broad sense, social accountability is a process used to hold the gov-
ernment—through its public offi  cials—accountable to the citizenry. Account-
ability is promoted with a participatory approach that engages civil society, 
citizens, and diff erent stakeholders. Social accountability includes a “broad 
range of actions and mechanisms” that can be used to hold government of-
ﬁ cials accountable to the citizens (Malena, Forster, and Singh 2004).
Traditional M&E systems typically involve developing and monitoring 
certain key performance indicators. The service or process is then evaluated 
in terms of its intended outcome(s). A well-rounded M&E system would 
take into account the concerns of all stakeholders—those on the demand side 
as well as those on the supply side. The intense engagement of citizens and 
civil society improves the quality of monitoring and the accuracy of evalua-
tion by moving beyond a biased and one-sided approach to giving informa-
tion about various performance indicators.
This chapter does not capture all the critical factors that determine the 
success of each social accountability tool. It focuses instead on examples 
of the use of information and communication technology (ICT) tools in 
combination. Figure 7.1 presents a schematic description of an integrated 
strategy to use social accountability and ICT tools to improve M&E, based on 
Monitoring and
evaluation
Legislative or statutory
framework
Information and
communication tools
Social accountability
tools
Citizen/shareholder
participation
SMART indicators
Training and
capacity building
FIGURE 7.1 Integrated Strategy to Use Social Accountability and ICT Tools 
for M&E
Source: Author’s illustration.
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citizen participation and an appropriate set of speciﬁ c, measurable, achiev-
able, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) indicators to measure outcomes.
Social Accountability Tools
Social accountability tools involve a step-by-step procedure that ensures 
civic engagement and promotes citizen participation by revealing their per-
spectives and priorities regarding what they expect from the services ren-
dered by public offi  cials or state agencies. The tools are usually simple and 
replicable. The use of ICT improves access to information and transparency, 
particularly when information is provided in the public domain. Easy access 
to information for civil society, citizens, and other stakeholders also helps in 
evaluating a process or a public service in a manner that is people-centric 
and addresses their concerns and priorities.
Social accountability mechanisms can be employed to help society ob-
tain access to the process of governance in a participatory way. Mechanisms 
such as right-to-information movements, citizen advisory boards and vigi-
lance committees, public interest litigation, public hearings, or citizens’ 
charters create space for pro-active citizen and civil society engagement 
with the state. Other social accountability tools designed speciﬁ cally for the 
purpose of receiving citizen inputs include social audits, participatory bud-
geting and expenditure tracking, community or citizen score cards, inde-
pendent budget analysis, and participatory performance monitoring.1 These 
tools are intended to improve citizen participation in formulating public 
policy and to promote active involvement in the monitoring and evaluation 
of government processes, including those that have a bearing on service de-
livery, management of public assets, and ﬁ nancial and physical resources. 
The tools usually have a speciﬁ c methodology designed to improve trans-
parency in “government-to-citizen” engagement. Information technologies 
help improve citizens’ participation as stakeholders in the accountability 
mechanism and develop their conﬁ dence in the service delivery apparatus.
The joint use of technology and social accountability tools can serve as a 
framework to provide better access for poor and vulnerable people because 
it substantially reduces discretion and subjectivity on the part of state actors 
and bureaucracy. However, community and other stakeholders’ awareness 
and capacity to participate in this process must be improved to ensure the 
success of social accountability initiatives.
This strategy requires simultaneous eff orts to train and build capacity of 
stakeholders and to establish a legal framework. Using legislation in combi-
nation with the other components discussed here to enforce social account-
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ability is necessary. In general, the integrated strategy described in this chap-
ter is not only useful in ensuring the eff ectiveness of M&E; it also provides a 
favorable environment for good governance.
Information Technology for Social Accountability 
Tools—General Issues
Social accountability tools can be created or improved using an information 
technology platform. A number of technology options are available to enable 
citizens and civil society to interact with government agencies and other 
state-sponsored institutions. Examples include Web sites and portals, video 
conferencing, telecenters, citizen service centers, electronic kiosks, touch 
screens, mobile phone-based services using short messages, interactive 
voice recording, and hand-held devices such as personal digital assistants. 
Use of smart cards and mobile automated teller machines has also been very 
eff ective in improving service delivery and accountability in remote areas, 
particularly for citizen transactions involving social welfare beneﬁ ts or gov-
ernment employment program wage payments.2
Arroyo and Sirker (2005) note that Web sites are commonly used in sev-
eral diff erent ways, including preventive (for example, curbing corruption 
and reducing discretion), informative (giving useful details of various proj-
ects to enhance transparency), or punitive (for instance, publicizing the 
names of corrupt public offi  cials who are punished). The Cristal Web Site 
launched in Argentina is a good example of a site that widely informs citi-
zens about the activities of government agencies.
E-governance strategy
It is important to have a long-term strategy to provide a holistic environment 
for electronic enablement of vital government-to-citizen service as well as 
adequate infrastructure and connectivity to off er easy access to citizens, civil 
society, and other stakeholders. This requires the preparation of national 
and sub-national plans for uploading public services onto an e-governance 
platform. The success of these services will depend on how easy it is for the 
common citizen to access them.
An appropriate strategy should address issues of technology, infrastruc-
ture, reengineering of government processes, capacity building, and change 
management. The United Nations has developed an e-governance readiness 
index for comparing diff erent countries. The latest concept also considers 
how strong the inclusiveness of e-governance is in a given country. It asks 
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whether the national government publishes information on items under 
consideration, whether there are ways for the public to engage in consulta-
tions with policy makers, government offi  cials, and one another, and whether 
citizens can inﬂ uence decisions directly (for example, by voting online or by 
mobile telephone).
Capacity building
Capacity building and change management are important issues in the use of 
social accountability and ICT tools for M&E. The absence of these elements 
aff ects the sustainability of new practices. Building awareness in the com-
munity and equipping people with skills necessary to monitor and assess the 
quality of services is crucial.
There is very limited evidence of systematic and sustained training and 
capacity-building programs to prepare stakeholders to use social account-
ability tools. Available examples are mostly in speciﬁ c projects where stake-
holder feedback may be built into the project design and where stakeholders 
develop basic skills to use the accountability tools.
Use of Web sites to post learning material is very common, for example 
SASANET (see Figure 7.2) and similar initiatives through the Affi  liated Net-
work for Social Accountability.3 Web-based training in the use of India’s 
Right to Information Act has recently been initiated through an e-learning 
program.4 This initiative has targeted both civil society on the demand side 
and government offi  cials on the supply side. Through diff erent modules, this 
e-learning course has the following basic features:
• It is Web-enabled.
• It provides an online learning platform with a virtual classroom and both 
start and end dates.
• Modules are designed with graded diffi  culty levels, beginning with sim-
ple content.
• Learners may ask questions that are answered by mentors through the 
virtual classroom and discussion forum.
• At the end of the course, the system administers a test comprising a set of 
questions randomly selected from a question bank. Learners who pass the 
test are awarded a certiﬁ cate by the government. This certiﬁ cate recog-
nizes the eff ort put in by the participant.
This useful e-learning tool has the potential to solve the problem of train-
ing and capacity building for millions of people who need to understand the 
basics of using India’s Right to Information Act. It uses easily accessible 
means to disseminate knowledge on the technical details of using a legal pro-
92 Building Better Policies
cess. It is running well, and user feedback on the technology and the course 
content is very positive (Figure 7.3).
Benchmarking service standards
An essential ingredient for the success of social accountability initiatives is a 
benchmark for service standards and a measurable and veriﬁ able set of indi-
cators to monitor and evaluate the services provided. Setting the bench-
marking standards should involve all stakeholders—citizens, civil society, 
FIGURE 7.2 Web Site for Capacity Building
Source: http://www.sasanet.org.
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government offi  cials, and politicians. ICT helps by enabling a smooth ﬂ ow of 
information for the use of all stakeholders.
One way to implement this concept is to provide standards in citizens’ 
charters—offi  cial documents published by government departments and 
service providers stating their commitment to citizens regarding standards 
of service. These charters guarantee a minimum level of service available to 
the citizen. In case of a breach of this commitment, citizens have a mecha-
nism with which to raise a grievance and get it redressed through a pre-
scribed process.
The Charter Mark national standard of the United Kingdom provides 
benchmarking for services furnished by the public sector. The Malcolm Bal-
drige National Quality Improvement Act, signed in the United States in 1987, 
is another example of service standards.
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The use of citizen report cards in assessing public services in Bangalore, 
India, is a well-documented initiative. The Public Aff airs Center, a non-
governmental organization, rated citizen satisfaction with various public 
services, based on two surveys taken in 1994 and 1999. The services cov-
ered were housing, municipal services, water and sewerage, electricity, 
driving licenses, telephones, banking, and health care. The 1999 survey 
found that, after ﬁ ve years, overall satisfaction with the services improved 
from 9 percent to 34 percent (with ﬁ gures varying for each agency). These 
ﬁ ndings were widely published and an assessment of the impact of citizen 
report cards on the performance of public agencies gave a number of in-
sights into the related processes. Though the information provided by the 
report cards was signiﬁ cant, how that information was eventually used to 
improve the systems and services depended on many diverse factors, such 
as responsive leadership, available resources, and the institutional envi-
ronment of the agency concerned (Ravindra 2004). However, the report 
cards helped in benchmarking and comparing the feedback from users to 
articulate those issues in the public domain that triggered the change (Bal-
akrishnan 2006).
There is evidence of increasing use of citizen report cards, despite the 
initial reluctance of state agencies. This tool is now a permanent feature in 
Bogotá, Colombia, as part of the CómoVamos project. Report cards were also 
used in Peru to evaluate nutrition, education, health, and employment pro-
grams (Fiszbein 2005). The Ukraine People’s Voice project used citizen re-
port cards to benchmark service standards and gather people’s opinions of 
these services, with a goal of improving service delivery in Ukrainian cities.5 
This approach also involved building the capacity of citizens’ groups and of-
ﬁ cials to have meaningful interaction with each other. Citizens and offi  cials 
were also trained in technical issues, like the design and execution of surveys 
to monitor service delivery, which were conducted after a proper needs as-
sessment. It should be possible in the future to construct report cards with 
Web-based surveys to gather the opinions of service users who use the Inter-
net frequently.
Examples of Successful ICT Use for Social 
Accountability
The following paragraphs discuss several successful examples of social 
accountability tools utilizing ICT platforms. For more information, refer to the 
SASANET Web site developed by the Center for Good Governance in India.6
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Germany uses an interactive forum provided by a Web site to promote a 
participatory approach in preparing and evaluating citizens’ budgets in 
many cities—for example, Bergheim, Cologne, and the Lichtenberg district 
of Berlin.7 The four-stage process involves disseminating information, initi-
ating dialogue, decision making in the council, and communicating deci-
sions to the citizens. These Web sites also allow a “town dialogue” by which 
the public may freely exchange views on policy issues. One recent example 
was an online dialogue concerning the new use of Berlin’s Tempelhof 
Airport. These initiatives seem to have positive results: the local council in 
Lichtenberg borough passed 37 of the 42 proposed amendments to the 
budget or to policy issues, and the local administration’s accountability to 
the people of the city appears to have been enhanced (Caddy, Peixoto, and 
McNeil 2007, pp. 72–75).
The Republic of Korea has an online system to open up administrative 
procedures to public scrutiny and ensure transparency. It also uses an anti-
corruption index constructed through public opinion gathered from peo-
ple who have actually submitted civic applications (Caddy, Peixoto, and 
McNeil 2007, pp. 98–101). Positive opinion about the behavior of civil ser-
vants increased from 54 percent in 1998 to 71 percent in 1999. In the ﬁ ve 
years following the ﬁ rst survey in 1999, the anti-corruption index has 
been con sistently improving. This example shows how ICT platforms can 
improve transparency by disseminating government information and how 
e-governance can enforce social accountability through improved citizen-
government dialogue.
India has made extensive use of ICT to foster public accountability. For 
example, Karnataka reported that the proportion of citizens paying bribes to 
get copies of land records declined from 33.8 percent to 0.7 percent after 
these services were computerized (Bhatnagar 2009). An ambitious national 
program to provide supplementary wage employment to rural poor people, 
mandated under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guaran-
tee Act of India, 2005 (MGNREGA), has an open-access Web site that pro-
vides complete information (including the wage entitlement) to more than 
52 million poor rural households that were provided employment by the 
government. This drastically reduces the chances of corruption because all 
the information is in the public domain and may be easily accessed by civil 
society or any watchdog mechanism. The success of the MGNREGA lies in 
using a multipronged approach like the one shown in Figure 7.4. MGNREGA 
also uses social audits and intensive ICT to improve program functioning 
and targeting, as well as a robust grievance redress system with a central 
helpline.
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An evaluation of MGNREGA was done in the Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh, and the responses of the wage earners enrolled in the program are 
shown in Figure 7.5.8 A multi-pronged approach—including sustained aware-
ness campaigns, capacity building for target groups, introduction of account-
ability mechanisms, a social audit and public hearing, and the constant in-
volvement of civil society, higher-level bureaucracy, and the political 
executive—brought very positive results. More than US$2 million in misap-
propriated funds were recovered, and about 500 charges were ﬁ led under 
criminal law and administrative procedures in the state.9
An important lesson to be taken from India’s MGNREGA scheme is that in 
addition to using ICT, it helps if the social accountability tools have a legal or 
a formal position in offi  cial evaluation. The contribution of civil society and 
non-governmental organizations in an M&E exercise may be very useful in 
bringing about improvements in the services if the agencies providing these 
services recognize the importance of the input as useful feedback on which 
to base corrective action. Otherwise, there is a danger that civil society groups 
will be marginalized and their assessment ignored by the state bureaucracy.
Transparency in government has been legislated in the following 
countries:
FIGURE 7.4 Social Accountability and ICT in the MGNREGA
Source: www.nrega.net/ict/new_initiatives.
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• Australia—Federal Freedom of Information Act (1982)
• Canada—Access to Information Act (1983)
• France—Law on Access to Administrative Documents (1978)
• Germany—Freedom of Information Act (1999)
• Japan—Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative 
Organs (1999)
• United States—Freedom of Information Act (1966) and the Openness 
Promotes Eff ectiveness in Our National Government Act (OPEN Govern-
ment Act, 2007)
• India’s Community Participation Laws and the Right to Information Act 
(2005) and the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission,10 
which requires states to enact community participation laws
ICT and social accountability in subsidized housing for poor 
people in India
India has a very large housing program involving subsidies for construction 
of houses for the poor. An Internet portal for social accountability in the 
Source: Adapted from http://www.rd.ap.gov.in/SAuditStanding_Under_the_Arch-_V3.pdf.
FIGURE 7.5 Responses of Wage Earners under the MGNREGA, Andhra Pradesh
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housing program supporting this program in the state of Andhra Pradesh 
has a database of more than 6.5 million houses. This Web site brings trans-
parency, making the diversion or embezzlement of funds diffi  cult. The Web 
site11 has a facility to upload photographs of a building site before house con-
struction begins and at various stages of completion. All managerial pro-
cesses, including a management information system, are maintained online. 
It is also very useful for conducting a social audit and preparing report cards 
or community scorecards, because all information is available on the Inter-
net. This information can be veriﬁ ed easily by members of civil society or 
any independent agency wishing to compare the situation on the ground 
with what is reported on the Web site.
Call center for seeking information from public offi ces
An ICT-enabled call center known as Jankari, run by a non-governmental 
organization in the Indian state of Bihar, has contributed to improved social 
accountability, as evidenced by the number of requests ﬁ led under the Right 
to Information Act. This center is a simple facility through which even illit-
erate citizens can make a phone call and explain the information they re-
quire. Their needs are deciphered by the facilitator in the call center and are 
converted into a formal application for getting relevant information from 
government records. This information can help enforce accountability and 
redress grievances for people adversely aff ected by access to government 
welfare programs, subsidized housing programs for the poor, public distri-
bution systems, and the like. Figure 7.6 shows how the number of requests 
for information under the Right to Information Act has risen steadily over 
the last three years through the Jankari call center.
Quality improvements in government schools in Delhi, India
An initiative to improve accountability in government schools in the National 
Capital Territory of Delhi included training school offi  cials in the use of infor-
mation technology and providing a public interface to enhance accountability. 
The hallmark of this program was to provide e-governance in the manage-
ment of schools and to give citizens direct online access to all relevant offi  cers, 
including the minister of education. A feedback system was in place for citi-
zens and parents to communicate with the department to ask questions or 
give suggestions. The attendance report of both teaching and non-teaching 
staff  was kept in the public domain, with online recording of inspection re-
ports by superior offi  cers. These interventions showed a substantial reduction 
in the performance gap that had existed between government and private 
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schools, and the pass rate percentage increased from 40 percent in 2001 to 77 
percent in 2007 (Kundra and Kumar 2008). It is diffi  cult to attribute the posi-
tive changes in the government school system in Delhi to a possibly enhanced 
level of social accountability alone because there must have been all-round 
attempts at comprehensive systemic improvement simultaneously. But the 
importance of nurturing a culture of social accountability by skillful use of e-
governance cannot be  ignored in any such attempt at managing change in ser-
vice delivery systems.
Conclusions
ICT has a deﬁ nite role in the design and implementation of M&E systems for 
social accountability. Evidence is growing that even in case of pro-poor ser-
vice delivery from public agencies, the level of transparency in state-run pro-
grams increases substantially with the use of these tools. Information tech-
nology facilitates the free ﬂ ow of information, and its positive role in 
establishing a robust dialogue between the citizens and the agencies of the 
state cannot be disputed. This improves the eff ectiveness of social account-
ability tools in promoting the reliability and eff ectiveness of M&E systems. 
The capacity of civil society and of public offi  cials should be strengthened to 
leverage the use of information technology in social accountability, with the 
ﬁ nal aim of raising the standards of evaluation for better service delivery.
FIGURE 7.6 Bihar State: Number of Callers Requesting 
Information
Source: Author’s illustration.
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Notes
1. See http://go.worldbank.org/GIILYME1Y0.
2. See i4d (Information for Development), 2006, http://www.i4donline.net.
3. See http://www.ansa-africa.net.
4. The Indian government’s Department of Personnel and Training initiated 
capacity building for government workers and members of civil society that 
focuses on use of the Right to Information Act through this e-learning course. 
This was designed by the Center for Good Governance, Hyderabad, India. Each 
session runs for two weeks, and 7,000 participants have used the program since 
2009.
5. The project’s report card program is funded by the World Bank, the Canadian 
International Development Agency, the Open Society Institute, and the Cana-
dian Bureau of International Education. It was initiated in March 1997. Details 
may be found at http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/do cs08/soﬁ a/Case%20
Study%201-%20Citizens%20 Report%20Cards%20Ukraine%20FINAL.pdf.
6. SASANET stands for South Asia Social Accountability Network. Its Web site 
(http://www.sasanet.org) was developed by the Centre for Good Governance, 
Hyderabad, India, with support from the World Bank Institute. It provides 
information on tools such as procurement monitoring, Citizen Report Card, 
e-procurement, and participatory budgeting.
7. A citizen’s budget is the outcome of a statutory process of participation in which 
a citizen may submit his or her proposals for expenditure to the city govern-
ment. The proposal can be debated and ranked using the Internet.
8. The evaluation is available at: http://www.rd.ap.gov.in/SAudit/Standing_
Under_the_Arch-_V3.pdf.
9. The information is based on the author’s personal discussions with the offi  cials 
of the Rural Development Department.
10. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission is a ﬂ agship program of 
the Indian government intended to accelerate urban development.
11. http://housing.cgg.gov.in/phase3/BenShow.do?ben_id=091292421P3979523.
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Deﬁ ning and Using Performance 
Indicators and Targets in 
Government M&E Systems
Manuel Fernando Castro
CHAPTER 8
Developing eff ective national monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems 
and/or performance budgeting initiatives requires well-deﬁ ned formulation 
and implementation strategies for setting up performance indicators. These 
strategies vary depending on a country’s priority for measuring results and 
on the scope and pace of its performance management reform objectives. 
Some countries have followed an incremental method for developing indica-
tors, that is, progressively, at strategically selected programs/sectors (for ex-
ample, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Colombia), while others have 
taken a comprehensive, “big bang” approach by deﬁ ning indicators for all 
existing programs and sectors at once (for example, Mexico and the Repub-
For their comments, the author thanks Indu John-Abraham (Operations Offi  cer, Poverty, Gen-
der and Equity Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region), and the following members of 
the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group: Philipp Krause (Consultant), Gladys Lopez-Acevedo 
(Senior Economist), Keith Mackay (Consultant), and Jaime Saavedra (Director). The views ex-
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lic of Korea). In both cases, countries need to continuously work on their 
indicators to improve their quality and thus ensure that indicators can mean-
ingfully inform government processes. 
There is a large body of literature on performance management indica-
tors. However, the literature contains relatively few references to practical 
elements of successful government implementation of performance indica-
tor systems. This chapter encapsulates some of the main elements for senior 
offi  cials to realistically and practically consider when introducing per-
formance indicator and target systems in government and to ensure sustain-
ability. The ﬁ rst section highlights a number of technical elements regarding 
the formulation of indicators, the importance of institutional arrangements 
and procedures for consultation and political validation, and the role of indi-
cators in linking funding to results. The second section brieﬂ y notes the in-
formation challenges associated with developing performance indicators. 
The third section focuses on country examples of performance indicator 
systems, with particular emphasis on the United Kingdom and Colombia. 
The fourth section identiﬁ es speciﬁ c success factors for improving the rele-
vance and utilization of indicators in government. The ﬁ nal section con-
cludes by emphasizing the importance of quality data and processes and the 
necessity of tailoring performance indicator systems to match available re-
sources and capacities. 
Technical Aspects of Performance Indicators
Performance measurement is an essential part of a broader process often 
referred to as results-based management or managing for results, the objec-
tive of which is to improve effi  ciency, eff ectiveness, and accountability in 
government. This process involves the use of performance indicators to as-
sess the degree to which intended results are being achieved. But for indica-
tors to be relevant, timely, and of suffi  cient quality to facilitate better govern-
ment decisions, a number of technical elements need to be considered in 
their selection and for the processes through which they are deﬁ ned and 
used. These elements are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Go als, outcomes, and outputs 
At the national level, the task of setting performance indicators must diff er-
entiate between high (macro) and low (micro) levels of results in the govern-
ment’s implementation chain. The high level refers to the external inﬂ uence 
of all programs and includes impacts, outcomes, and outputs, which are pri-
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marily of interest to national planning and budget offi  cers. The low level 
 alludes to internal program management and involves outputs, activities, 
and inputs, which are mostly of concern to the sector and agency budget and 
program offi  cials. Both sides of the results chain are crucial for measuring 
performance, and outputs are the “bridge” between the high and low sides of 
the government’s implementation chain (Figure 8.1).
At the agency level, establishing a sequenced results chain for all pro-
grams starts with the identiﬁ cation of goals or high-level outcomes, which 
are medium to long term (4–15 years)—as for example, reducing infant mor-
tality. To identify what agencies expect to achieve with their budgets and to 
measure their performance with indicators, managers and their M&E offi  -
cers must therefore have good knowledge of where the agencies are going 
and what their fundamental business lines are. Then they can identify out-
comes and outputs that are linked with the agency goals. This will allow of-
ﬁ cers to know what successful spending looks like while providing clear and 
simple statements of what each program and agency aims to do.
Defi ning targets and setting performance indicators1
From their goals, agencies can derive shorter-range targets (1–4 years) that 
deﬁ ne the expected eff ects from budget allocations. In essence, targets are 
quantiﬁ able orders of a given variable for a speciﬁ c period of time. High-
Source: Author
FIGURE 8.1 Performance Indicators and the Results Chain
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level targets help improve eff ectiveness, and low-level targets address effi  -
ciency. One technique for deﬁ ning targets is translating outcomes and out-
puts into positive results-oriented statements that, starting from a baseline 
level, identify a path and destination (for example, increase coverage of nu-
tritional support programs from 35 percent to 40 percent of poor people be-
tween 2008 and 2010). Targets must capture improvements for a single out-
put or outcome, assuming a ﬁ nite number of required inputs and activities 
(Figure 8.1). 
Deﬁ ning relevant targets requires technical criteria for identifying credi-
ble baseline data, realistic consideration of the resources and capacities nec-
essary, as well as extensive knowledge of the policies and programs. How-
ever, target deﬁ nition cannot solely rely on planning or external experts. 
Deﬁ ning targets, as with program goals and objectives, is much more than a 
technical exercise. To be meaningful, targets require ownership by internal 
stakeholders (for example, managers, central ministry staff , and/or budget 
offi  cials), and therefore other key players, apart from technical offi  cials, 
should also participate in their deﬁ nition. Deﬁ ning targets for all the vari-
ables involved in resource allocations can be complex and time consuming, 
but it is important. Targets hold governments accountable and exert external 
pressure over ministry and agency performance. Lastly, for targets to be rel-
evant and credible, agencies must not be able to modify them at will, and 
once a target has been achieved, agencies must maintain that standard. 
Each target should be accompanied by a performance indicator—a quan-
titative or qualitative expression of a program or policy that off ers a consis-
tent way to measure progress toward the stated targets and goals. Perfor-
mance indicators reﬂ ect changes in variables connected to an intervention, 
and they should facilitate a timely and cost-eff ective measuring and moni-
toring of results. They allow managers and program and budget offi  cials to 
track progress all the way down the causal results chain, from impacts at the 
top to inputs at the bottom. 
Performance indicators, in contrast, are not necessarily dependent on tar-
gets. They can facilitate measuring and monitoring government results in a 
timely, standardized, and cost-eff ective manner even in the absence of a 
benchmark, but to be relevant, indicators need to be of good quality. The re-
sults literature contains various acronyms to help offi  cials set good indica-
tors through a set of technical criteria (see Box 8.1 for examples).
In practice, methodological considerations may apply diff erently to par-
ticular contexts. For instance, in the early stages of implementing an M&E 
system, it might be necessary to allow for a trade-off  between the need for 
performance information and a slightly uneven quality and larger number of 
Defi ning and Using Performance Indicators and Targets in Government M&E Systems  109
indicators. Such a trade-off  may imply a process of “improving by measur-
ing,” allowing suboptimal indicators while the process progressively im-
proves. Deciding what level of trade-off  is acceptable requires good techni-
cal judgment. There are no perfect indicators. In many cases it is necessary 
to use indirect or proxy indicators—for example, when data are not available 
or cannot be collected at regular intervals, or when information gathering is 
too costly. Understanding the likely cost of gathering and analyzing data is 
crucial to sustain performance M&E eff orts. Quite often agencies tend to se-
lect indicators without previously identifying the sources of information and 
conﬁ rming availability. But indicators are also frequently deﬁ ned according 
to readily available information, regardless of how crucial and cost-eff ective 
it could be to collect new data for more appropriately measuring perfor-
mance on a longer-term basis.
Finally, experience shows that developing performance targets can be 
more diffi  cult than formulating indicators. In particular, the challenge of set-
ting targets for the entire range of government performance can be quite 
signiﬁ cant. Targets, more than indicators, can create a complex series of un-
desirable and unintended side eff ects in government processes and “culture” 
(for example, in the morale and motivation of the civil service). Reducing the 
risk of perverse eff ects requires important knowledge of underlying incen-
tives. Accordingly, the decision to move from indicators to target setting 
should be taken with care. The development of targets and indicators should 
also be thought of as two diff erent stages in the evolution and institutional-
ization of M&E and performance management systems. 
Performance indicators should be: 
SMART or CREAM
Specifi c (precise and unambiguous) Clear 
Measurable (appropriate to the subject) Relevant
Achievable (of a reasonable cost) Economic 
Relevant (serve to assess performance) Adequate
Trackable (easy to validate or verify) Monitorable
Sources: SMART was outlined fi rst by Peter Drucker (1954).CREAM was introduced by 
Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999).
BOX 8.1
The Quality of Performance Indicators
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Linking funding to results with performance indicators
The robustness of performance management and M&E systems depends on 
the strength of the links between funding and results. One way of establish-
ing those links is to standardize costs for outputs provided on a unit basis 
(for example, patients treated in health centers or students enrolled in sec-
ondary education). Another is to identify broader quantitative connections 
between the level of outcome achieved and certain annual or multiannual 
budget  allocations (for example, increases in coverage of water and sanita-
tion).2 Both approaches seek to serve the same purpose, however, the former 
is more complex and not always feasible, because it is usually more of a nor-
mative proposition rather than a real possibility for the whole budget. The 
latter is more likely, but is more a way to better inform the budget, which is 
the dominant factor in funding decisions for only a few cases. In any case, 
establishing such links demands an enormous amount of technical judgment 
and signiﬁ cant operational work, because it must be done individually for 
each budget item and program category.3
The diff ering characteristics of government outputs and outcomes can 
therefore make it complicated to link some allocations to performance, such 
as when the unit costs of a service vary considerably. A key technical step for 
linking funding to results using indicators is establishing a program classiﬁ -
cation to allow the budget to be read in terms of the results it expects to 
achieve. In practice, such a classiﬁ cation implies having some form of pro-
gram budgeting in place. Program categories need to be a by-product of the 
whole process of deﬁ ning budget outcomes, outputs, targets, and indicators 
for each agency—preferably by national budget and program offi  cials work-
ing together.
The traditional ﬁ nancial classiﬁ cation, based primarily on global appro-
priations for inputs (for example, wages and salaries) or organizational 
units (for example, ministries or agencies), can say little about whether 
resources have achieved their targets or could produce higher beneﬁ ts. A 
program classiﬁ cation helps establish a logical sequence between the pro-
gram outcomes and outputs and the aggregated agency, sector, or policy 
results. With such a classiﬁ cation, the budget process can be seen more as 
a choice among diff erent priorities than as a list of budgetary items. The 
technical challenge is to ensure that program categories capture the vari-
ous allocative choices that governments face. When successfully imple-
mented, this exercise can serve the purposes of both accountability (as ex 
post reporting information) and budget preparation (as ex ante informa-
tion). But if it is to be eff ective, the whole budget process needs to be in a 
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program format (for example, ministries’ requests, legal appropriations, or 
evaluation of allocations), at least as a complement to the traditional ﬁ nan-
cial format. Again, some form of program budgeting is thus necessary to 
achieve sound linkages between program-based performance indicators 
and funding allocations. 
Program costing, the other essential technique for linking funding to re-
sults using performance indicators, provides information that traditional ﬁ -
nancial and accounting systems cannot off er. However, costing can be diffi  -
cult as well. On the one hand, government outcomes and outputs are not 
necessarily expressed in standard units. Outcomes, in particular, are often 
aff ected by external factors, such as crime, unemployment, or poverty. On 
the other hand, even outputs can be contingent on many services, such as the 
military or ﬁ re service. Sophisticated methods, such as activity-based cost-
ing, which segments organizational units and programs into discrete, quan-
tiﬁ able activities to estimate unitary costs and measurable productivity units 
(for example, number of hours work compared to units produced), reﬂ ect 
only some of these complexities. Consequently, it is often necessary 
to use complementary solutions to inform the budget—for example, perfor-
mance evaluations.
Consultation on and validation of indicators
The single most important characteristic of a strong M&E system is use of 
the information produced. Low or inadequate use of performance informa-
tion in management and particularly budgeting is often a problem for many 
indicator systems. Quite frequently this situation signals not only problems 
with performance data availability and quality, but also the existence of chal-
lenges with political consultation or a lack of buy-in of the performance in-
dicators and the types of information produced. 
Lack of consultation and validation are often signs of a weak institutional 
environment, which tends to result in indicator “inﬂ ation”—too many indi-
cators but a very low rate of utilization—which in turn deteriorates their 
quality. Offi  cials in such environments tend to perceive that information is 
not a problem; for them, information may in fact be abundant, while for oth-
ers (the producers), underutilization of the information they produce pro-
vides a very weak incentive to take data and indicators seriously. A vicious 
circle of overproduction, underutilization, lack of validation, and quality de-
terioration then takes place. It can therefore be useful to conduct surveys of 
data use (who is using/is willing to use what performance information, for 
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what purposes, and how) before embarking on a large-scale eff ort to deﬁ ne 
performance indicators.
Further, if performance measures are to inform ministry budgets or to be 
used for public accountability of results, both line ministers and central bud-
get offi  cials need to be closely involved and agree on what will be measured 
and how. High-level offi  cials need to agree on both goals and indicators, es-
pecially since the budget and public accountability are fundamentally politi-
cal processes with complex and varied implications. For instance, on the one 
hand, budget decisions are made between competing uses that reﬂ ect not 
only policy but also governments’ political commitments. On the other hand, 
external accountability can eventually alter political perceptions about the 
government’s performance in the legislature or with the general public. Ac-
cordingly, when deﬁ ning targets and indicators, program categories, and 
their links with measurable results, governments must also standardize and 
institutionalize procedures to ensure broad ownership and validation of 
their indicators and targets. Consultation procedures also help both central 
budget and line ministries by limiting discretion and reducing incentives for 
setting targets and indicators of low relevance, while making palpable the 
political risk associated with bad performance.
Performance Information
Measuring the results of government, including budget allocations, presents 
its own set of information challenges. First, collecting information on per-
formance indicators is not easy. For example, output indicators are mainly 
based on administrative records (day-to-day data produced by programs on 
their own), which can be very weak in many developing countries. Outcome 
indicators, on the other hand, often rely more on statistical estimations (dis-
crete observations obtained through survey approximations), which in many 
countries are not collected regularly enough to inform critical government 
decisions. In such weak institutional environments, national statistics offi  ces 
should be considered a valuable resource. 
Second, performance information needs analysis. Even if good informa-
tion exists, it cannot be considered performance information until it is pro-
cessed and organized in a structured, accessible, and timely manner. Utiliza-
tion strongly relies on sound analysis rather than on the existence of large 
volumes of indicators. The challenge is, therefore, who should conduct such 
analysis and how, so that the information can be digestible and useful for 
decision makers. Because this analysis can be demanding and time consum-
ing, it requires a technical unit made up of suffi  cient capable professionals 
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who specialize in conducting regular assessments and reporting perfor-
mance information within the government. 
Third, performance information is diff erent from ﬁ nancial information. 
Therefore, performance budgeting is possible only if the ministry of ﬁ nance 
has competence in policy analysis and assessment of the information to be 
reported from line ministries and evaluation bodies. Again, program classiﬁ -
cations of the budget can help identify links between performance and ﬁ -
nancial allocations. 
Fourth, experience shows that it takes time and practice to develop qual-
ity and timely performance information, which in turn requires direct 
knowledge of the speciﬁ c policies and programs to identify with precision 
what will be measured.
Performance Indicators and Monitoring Systems
To ensure effi  cient collection, management, and reporting of monitoring in-
formation on performance indicators, countries need to develop sound indi-
cator monitoring systems. Most budget systems collect ﬁ nancial data, par-
ticularly for budgeting control purposes (for example, commitments and 
payments). However, results-based monitoring requires the integration of 
ﬁ nancial and performance information; therefore the interaction between 
diff erent institutional spheres and the potential interoperation among na-
tional statistical systems, program information systems, and national ﬁ nan-
cial information systems are vital. Further, monitoring systems can be used 
not only to describe how a program is performing, but also to help explain 
why it performs one way or another. In addition, having such systems in 
place reduces the need for expensive and one-off  information collection pro-
cesses for individual program evaluation.
Choosing the type of monitoring system to implement depends strongly 
on the speciﬁ c purposes for which the government intends to use the perfor-
mance information. That purpose may be associated with the need to inform 
the budget process and improve effi  ciency in the provision of public ser-
vices—for example, the United Kingdom’s Public Service Agreements Sys-
tem. Alternatively, systems might also be directed toward monitoring the 
aggregate results of government to facilitate public accountability, such as 
Colombia’s Government Goals Monitoring Information System (Sistema de 
Gestión y Seguimiento a las Metas del Gobierno. In these two systems, perfor-
mance indicators serve “central” government purposes, and, to some extent, 
both governments have found it necessary to establish centralized require-
ments for producing performance information. Some of these central re-
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quirements relate to the methods and procedures for collection, validation, 
access, reporting, and use of performance indicators and targets, with a  focus 
on ensuring the reliability and suitability of the information for the govern-
ment’s own purposes. 
Unfortunately, there is no formula for the development of monitoring sys-
tems. Further, there is little evidence regarding the extent to which ﬁ nancial 
information systems can serve the purposes of performance information 
management. This seems to be an area with a shortage of good practices 
from which to learn, particularly in relation to systems capable of consoli-
dating aggregate information on public sector performance. 
Two notable exceptions, due to their emphasis on a target-setting ap-
proach, are the United Kingdom and Colombia cases referred to earlier. In 
these two countries, indicator systems have signiﬁ cantly beneﬁ ted from a 
custom-made and common sense approach with a strong emphasis on grad-
ual reﬁ nement, rather than investing substantial resources in sophisticated 
information technology developments (Box 8.2).
Two additional country examples of performance information systems 
are Finland and Chile. Finland developed the Netra Reporting System, which 
since 2004 functions as a publicly accessible Internet application that inte-
grates ﬁ nancial and performance information. Netra seeks to inform deci-
sion making and accountability through predeﬁ ned reports on service deliv-
ery and expenditures for diff erent government levels and users.4 Chile uses a 
Web application to transmit performance information from ministries and 
agencies to the budget offi  ce of the Ministry of Finance; however, this ap-
plication is not publicly accessible. 
It should be noted that in all of these cases, countries have from the outset 
had to devote considerable time and technical eff ort to deﬁ ne the roles and 
responsibilities of diff erent agencies, as well as establish standardized pro-
cesses and requirements for the production, management, access, use, and 
quality controls of indicator information.
Success Factors in Defi ning 
Performance Indicators 
A wide range of issues need to be considered in the development of perfor-
mance indicators to support government M&E systems, or performance 
management more broadly. There are a number of country lessons or suc-
cess factors that can help improve the relevance and utilization of perfor-
mance indicators in government; this section discusses six of the most im-
portant success factors. 
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United Kingdom: In 1998, the British govern-
ment introduced the Public Service Agree-
ments System (PSAS), a national system of 
explicit and measurable performance targets 
and indicators defi ned for each ministry and 
linked to the budget process for which the gov-
ernment is accountable. The performance infor-
mation underpinning public service agreement 
(PSA) targets provides the basis for monitoring 
what is working and what is not, helps ensure 
that good practice is spread and rewarded, and 
enables poor performance to be addressed. In 
1998, there were more than 300 PSAs with in-
dicators, primarily input and output based. The 
number has since progressively been reduced 
to around 30 (2008), with an average of six indi-
cators each, mainly outcome based. 
PSAs are set every three years as part of the 
government’s Comprehensive Spending Re-
view (CSR) process. PSAs defi ne government 
priorities and objectives for the next three-year 
period, while CSRs set fi xed departmental ex-
penditure limits within which departments 
must meet their objectives. PSAs comprise a 
fi xed set of indicators intended to provide a fo-
cus for delivering improved services and to help 
determine whether targets are met. PSAs are 
also intended to represent “contracts” or 
”promises” about the services that govern-
ment will deliver to the public in return for taxa-
tion received, as well as commitments by cen-
tral government departments to deliver on the 
government’s overall objectives in return for 
appropriate funding.
The use of information technology tools as 
part of PSAs has provided opportunities to mea-
sure and manage performance data, for exam-
ple, through electronic record management and 
the interoperation of systems, particularly at 
the ministry level. The use of Web-based func-
tionalities has created new opportunities for 
empowering citizens, in particular by providing 
them with better real-time data on government 
priorities and results at each department’s Web 
site. PSA targets are disclosed at the Treasury, 
the Prime Minister’s Offi ce, and each depart-
ment’s Web page. Through departmental Web 
sites, citizens can use this information for pub-
lic accountability purposes for politicians and 
executive offi cials at all levels of government 
(local, provincial, and central).
Colombia: Starting in 2002, Colombia devel-
oped the Government Goals Monitoring Infor-
mation System (Sistema de Gestión y Segui-
miento a las Metas del Gobierno—SIGOB), 
which uses a logical structure to consolidate 
and manage goals and indicators for all national 
government programs, including strategies for 
achieving the president’s priorities and the stra-
tegic objectives of the National Development 
Plan (NDP). SIGOB is an institutional arrange-
ment and a technology platform that allows 
monitoring of performance indicators in real 
time, providing readings of government perfor-
mance from different perspectives (for exam-
ple, four-year NDP objectives; cross-cutting 
strategies, such as poverty reduction, agency 
performance, and presidential priorities; or 
long-term goals such as the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals).
To ensure the quality and timeliness of infor-
mation, indicators and targets are: i) defi ned with 
the participation of the technical teams from the 
BOX 8.2
Two Country Examples of Performance Monitoring Systems
(continued)
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Success factor 1. There is no perfect system of indicators. In developing 
performance measures, governments have beneﬁ ted enormously from con-
sidering the fact that indicators have practical limits on the degree to which 
they can capture a precise picture of performance. Not only do good indica-
tors rely on information that is often not available, but some dimensions of 
performance are very diffi  cult to measure (for example, output quality). Fur-
ther, contextual factors can importantly inﬂ uence ﬁ nal results, and indica-
tors cannot eliminate or adjust these factors. This is one of the reasons gov-
ernments need to consider using evaluations as a complementary tool to 
enhance the information base for performance management. 
Success factor 2. Clearly deﬁ ne from the outset what for and how govern-
ment offi  cials intend to use performance indicators. For example, if indica-
tors are to provide information for program managers at the micro dimen-
sion of the implementation chain, or for central budgeting purposes at the 
macro dimension, then the type of indicators and their requirements can be 
very diff erent. For the ﬁ rst case, comparative or summary measures might 
National Planning Department and line agencies 
responsible for overseeing and implementing 
sectoral and national programs; ii) validated with 
the sector ministers and agency directors; and iii) 
discussed with and approved by the president in 
the Council of Ministers. Once these internal 
processes are set, targets and indicators are 
made public through printed documents and 
through the SIGOB Web site, to which citizens 
have open access. Responsible program offi cials 
(“goal managers”) in ministries, whose names 
are publicly displayed in the system to foster in-
formation reporting accountability, report results 
electronically via the system. 
SIGOB consolidates performance indicators 
and facilitates public consultation, widely dis-
seminating the results of government programs. 
The system interoperates with the Integrated 
Financial Information System (Sistema Inte-
grado de Información Financiera), allowing the 
level of appropriation and budget execution as-
sociated with the objectives and goals to be 
tracked. The presidency and the National Plan-
ning Department regularly check the informa-
tion and conduct managerial oversight meetings 
with the ministers and directors of insti tutions 
to identify progress and defi ne courses of action 
to resolve implementation problems that may 
affect target achievements. SIGOB currently 
has 626 indicators: 104 on impacts (16 percent), 
371 on outcomes (60 percent), and 151 on out-
puts (24 percent). Based on reported infor-
mation, SIGOB facilitates the preparation of 
monthly, quarterly, and annual reports on gov-
ernment progress, including the Annual Report 
of the President to Congress. 
BOX 8.2 continued
Sources: Institute for Government (2008); Castro (2009). 
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not be so important for informing on the details of a program, while for the 
second case these measures can have huge beneﬁ ts for enhancing the scope 
and perspective of performance. 
Success factor 3. Avoid complex performance indicator systems. In several 
country cases, a critical factor of success has been the adoption of a simple 
yet very careful approach to the development of performance indicators and 
monitoring systems. A number of experiences have shown that spending 
enormous amounts of money to develop sophisticated technological systems 
does not necessarily guarantee that the indicator base meets technical stan-
dards of quality and ensures utilization of performance data. A customized 
and common sense approach can be far more important. This approach 
would consider the necessary institutional arrangements, respond to the 
speciﬁ c performance measurement needs of key users, and ensure that in-
formation sources are available, reliable, and have adequate baseline mea-
surement. The information management model behind the performance 
indicators base is the real backbone of a system. 
Success factor 4. Develop formal quality controls for indicators. Countries 
have diff erent approaches to developing their performance indicators base. 
What is common to all countries, however, is the need to ensure that infor-
mation sources and data ﬂ ows emerging from indicators can be credible 
enough to ensure utilization by diff erent users. To that end, countries should 
be aware that indicators need continuous revision and improvement, and 
that an indicator base is not a one-shot eff ort. Experience shows that it re-
quires practice, and that it is necessary to devote time and various attempts 
to develop indicators that really capture the desired data. Accordingly, for-
mal processes for technical formulation and review, incentives linking indi-
cators to budgeting and planning processes, public access to the indicator 
base and information sources, and periodic external audits have all proved 
eff ective in controlling the quality of indicators and their information base. 
Success factor 5. Avoid starting out with an unmanageable number of indi-
cators. Governments do not need to measure everything, at least not all at 
once. To be useful, performance indicators need to be readily digestible to 
decision makers, who normally have great restrictions on their time. A cou-
ple of good indicators can be more useful than a comprehensive inventory of 
hundreds of indicators. Controlling inﬂ ation of the indicator base is neces-
sary to ensure a manageable indicator system and control indicator quality. 
Countries should be aware, however, that reducing the size of the indicator 
base can be technically and politically complex because it implies not only 
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the development of a robust strategic planning process, but a clear sense of 
the political priorities of the government. 
Success factor 6. Diff erentiate between performance indicator systems and 
target-setting regimes. Both indicators and targets are key elements of an 
M&E system or of a performance management model. However, setting per-
formance indicators should not be interpreted as having targets associated 
with each of them. To be meaningful, targets depend on an underlying mea-
sure, but performance indicators do not necessarily need to have associated 
targets to be useful. The process of deﬁ ning targets, for which a government 
will be accountable and against which managerial controls will be exerted, 
requires a certain level of M&E institutionalization and good performance 
management practices. 
Conclusions
Developing indicators and target systems is not simply a matter of compiling 
a comprehensive list of algorithms and benchmarks with a series of corre-
spondent reference values. Rather, it implies an elaborated, systematic pro-
fessional judgment that in turn requires robust strategic planning, important 
knowledge of the government’s priorities and program base, intensive tech-
nical and operational work, and a signiﬁ cant understanding of the wide 
range of incentives, explicit or implicit, that can inﬂ uence good or bad per-
formance in government. 
It is also important to understand that the process of developing indica-
tors is normally a gradual one, which may allow suboptimal versions in the 
early stages of a system, particularly if their quality and quantity is to im-
prove progressively over time (for example, by sectors or speciﬁ c agencies). 
Therefore it will be paramount for a country not only to deﬁ ne the purpose 
and scope of a system right from the start, but also to establish the institu-
tional setting that will guarantee sustainability, technical adaptability, and 
political backing for the process so that the eff ort remains functional and 
relevant over time. 
In terms of indicator utility, experience shows that it might be more im-
portant to have good quality information on a fairly small number of simple 
measures rather than a set of complex algorithms with limited information. 
It is important that the information feeding the indicators be of good quality, 
because the results generated will be of the same quality. Strengthening the 
quality of information should be a continuous process within the govern-
ment organization, and one for which protocols, technical standards, sound 
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administrative procedures, and adequate technological tools will be re-
quired. Ensuring public access to information, making the beneﬁ ts of having 
timely and quality information visible to public managers, and establishing 
meaningful incentives are also key requirements. 
It is not a simple task to formulate, manage, and continuously monitor a 
country system of performance indicators, but, as detailed in this chapter, 
it is important and worth undertaking, particularly if a country really 
wants to improve the effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of its public service de-
livery. Over the last decade, there has been growing interest and greater 
political priority for goal setting, performance indicators, and targets in 
developing countries, particularly in the poorest ones. This interest and 
priority are increasingly being translated into the content of poverty re-
duction strategies and global development agendas. Governments should, 
however, consider many issues before deciding to embark on a large-scale 
formulation of performance indicators, and even more so in the case of 
targets. How far to go with respect to the introduction of indicators will 
depend on the speciﬁ c capacity challenges faced by each country. These 
challenges can be considerable, particularly in countries with limited man-
agerial and policy analysis capabilities. 
Notes
1. See also Hatry’s discussion of setting up monitoring systems at the agency level 
in Chapter 5.
2. The British Public Service Agreements System is an example, outcome targets 
are linked to the multiyear budgeting process (see Robinson 2007).
3. This is especially the case when the exercise is ﬁ rst carried out, but the burden 
can signiﬁ cantly be reduced over time with practice, particularly if technology is 
effi  ciently used to make the process automatic.
4. See the Finnish State Internet Reporting (www.netra.ﬁ ).
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Key Choices for a 
Menu of Evaluations
Gloria M. Rubio
CHAPTER 9
Every day, policy makers and program managers face major decisions result-
ing from insuffi  cient funding, complaints about service delivery, unmet 
needs among diff erent population groups, and limited results on the ground. 
A menu of evaluation types has been implemented by developing and devel-
oped countries to tackle a wide range of policy and program management 
issues, while taking into account time, resources, and capacity constraints. 
International experience highlights the importance of a gradual approach 
when introducing evaluation tools into country-level monitoring and evalu-
ation (M&E) systems. Diff erent paths may work better for diff erent coun-
tries depending on the main purpose of their M&E system, existing institu-
tional capacity, the availability of funds, and external technical assistance. 
Policy makers and program managers tackle questions such as how to al-
locate resources across diff erent interventions or program components, 
For their comments, the author thanks Manuel Fernando Castro (Consultant, IEGCS), and the 
following members of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group: Philipp Krause (Consultant), 
Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior Economist), Keith Mackay (Consultant), and Jaime Saavedra
(Director). The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author.
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whether to add a new program or reform an existing one, how to choose 
between alternative service delivery mechanisms, or how to improve pro-
gram operations. Any decision, even one favoring the status quo, entails 
some kind of assessment weighing diff erent courses of action. The extent to 
which these assessments are systematic and grounded in empirical evidence 
inﬂ uences the chances of making a decision based on accurate information 
and being able to take advantage of opportunities to improve policy 
interventions.
Evaluation is the systematic collection and analysis of information to pro-
vide relevant feedback for decision making and policy formulation. A menu 
of evaluation types addresses a wide range of policy and program manage-
ment questions. This chapter discusses the policy relevance, application, 
and requirements of diff erent evaluation types to facilitate the selection of a 
mix of evaluation tools depending on the information and feedback needs 
for decision making at any given moment in the lifespan of an intervention, 
while also accounting for time, resource, and capacity constraints. Interna-
tional experience illustrates uses of diff erent evaluation tools across coun-
tries and over time.
Key Considerations in Selecting an 
Evaluation Tool
Evaluations are valuable when properly conducted and focused on their in-
tended purpose. Hence, the selection of the right evaluation tool is critical. 
Choosing an evaluation tool, or combination of tools, depends on two main 
considerations. First, it depends on what information is needed to make ma-
jor decisions. For example, is the evaluation prompted by the need to have 
overall performance information across programs to decide how to allocate 
resources? Or is it motivated by the need to have information on a particular 
program operation to identify bottlenecks that hinder adequate service de-
livery? Policy and program management issues and concerns drive the need 
for the evaluation, and in turn, point to the selection of a particular set of 
evaluation tools. 
The second consideration in selecting an evaluation tool is the availability 
of resources to conduct the evaluation. The menu of evaluation tools in-
cludes diff erent alternatives in terms of costs, duration, and capacity re-
quirements. For example, some evaluations tools provide rapid feedback at 
relatively lower costs, while others require a longer implementation period, 
and their costs vary accordingly. Although there are usually trade-off s be-
tween evaluation depth and rigor and resource requirements, the selection 
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of an evaluation type allows some ﬂ exibility in accommodating particular 
circumstances. 
Key questions to ask before deciding on an evaluation tool, or combina-
tion of tools, include:
1. What is the purpose of the evaluation—that is, what decision will be in-
formed by the evaluation?
2. What kinds of information are needed to make the decision? At what 
stage in the life of the program will the evaluation be conducted? These 
questions are closely related—information needs may vary depending on 
the program life stage. For example, a program that has just been planned 
would require an ex ante cost-beneﬁ t analysis to inform the decision on 
whether or not to implement it. Alternatively, a newly implemented pro-
gram would beneﬁ t from information on how well operational proce-
dures are followed, and whether any adjustments are necessary for suc-
cessful program operation. 
3. How quickly or (unexpectedly) is the information needed? Sometimes 
evaluations are planned well in advance and results are expected in due 
course, giving maximum ﬂ exibility in evaluation tool choice. In other 
cases, the selection of an evaluation tool is inﬂ uenced by the time frame of 
information demands from a particular policy process, such as budget 
preparation. In many cases, however, information needs arise suddenly, 
triggered by events that demand a quick response, such as a macroeco-
nomic crisis or reform opportunity.
4. Who is the audience for the evaluation information? Some evaluations 
may be demanded internally within the organization by program manag-
ers or policy makers in the ministry. Others may be externally required by 
the ministry of ﬁ nance, legislature, or a donor organization. Internal and 
external information needs may be diff erent, leading to diff erent evalua-
tion types.
5. What resources (ﬁ nancial and human) are available to conduct the evalu-
ation? Evaluation scope and tools should be aligned with available re-
sources. In some cases, an experienced team may be in charge of evalua-
tions with an earmarked budget. However, in most cases, resources 
devoted to evaluation are limited or non-existent and institutional capac-
ity is just developing.
Three Major Types of Program Evaluation
Once the key questions above have been answered, an evaluation tool or 
tools can be selected. Evaluations can be classiﬁ ed in several ways and some 
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categories may overlap. For example, evaluations can be grouped according 
to the analytical paradigm (rationalist, pluralistic, participative, and so forth), 
purpose (formative versus summative), content (goals, process, outcomes/
impact), time perspective (ex ante versus ex post), or the evaluator (internal 
versus external). Using a content-based classiﬁ cation, this section discusses 
three major types of program evaluation.1 Table 9.1 summarizes the policy 
relevance, application, and requirements of each type of evaluation. 
TABLE 9.1 Main Evaluation Types
Goal-based evaluations
Process-based 
evaluations Impact evaluations
What are the 
main questions 
answered by 
this type of 
evaluation?
• Do policies or programs 
have clear objectives?
• Is the program/policy 
design appropriate to 
achieve the objectives?
• To what extent have 
policy/program objec-
tives been achieved?
• What are the actual 
steps and activities 
involved in delivering a 
product or service? How 
close are they to agreed 
operation? Are they 
effi cient? 
• Are there adequate 
resources (money, 
equipment, facilities, 
training, and so forth) 
and systems (fi nancial, 
management informa-
tion, and so forth) in 
place?
• Are program participants 
receiving quality 
products and services?
• How have participants’ 
well-being changed as a 
result of the program/
policy?
• Are there any unintended 
consequences, positive or 
negative, on program 
participants?
• Are program/policy costs 
justifi ed in terms of 
welfare impact?
When can this 
evaluation be 
conducted?
• It may be conducted at 
early stages of program/
policy implementation, 
for mid-term review, or 
at project completion 
• It may be conducted at 
any time, once or 
regularly, to check that 
implementation is on the 
right track, or when 
there are specifi c 
operational concerns
• They are most effective 
when applied selectively 
to answer strategic policy 
questions or to assess 
innovative pilot interven-
tions testing a new, 
unproven, but promising 
approach 
What data 
collection and 
analysis are 
required?
• Desk review of existing 
documents, possibly 
complemented by 
monitoring data analysis, 
interviews, and fi eld 
visits
• A mix of interviews with 
program staff and 
clients, user and facility 
surveys, record review, 
direct observation
• focus groups and 
analysis of monitoring 
data 
• Statistical and economet-
ric analysis of survey and 
administrative data, 
ideally combined with 
qualitative data analysis
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Goal- or objective-based evaluations 
Goal-based evaluations assess the clarity of a program’s objectives and its 
progress in achieving these objectives. Questions asked by this type of evalu-
ation include:
1. How were program objectives established? Was the process eff ective and 
are the resulting objectives clear and appropriate?
2. Is there a sound theory of change behind the program design?
3. Are program inputs, activities, and outputs aligned with the objectives or 
outcomes (internal consistency)?
4. Are there sound performance indicators to assess the program’s progress 
in achieving its objectives?
5. What is the status of the program’s progress toward achieving the 
objectives? 
6. Will the goals be achieved according to the timelines speciﬁ ed in the pro-
gram implementation or operations plan? If not, why?
7. Do personnel have adequate resources (money, equipment, facilities, 
training, and so forth) to achieve the goals?
Goal-based evaluations
Process-based 
evaluations Impact evaluations
What skills are 
needed?
• Policy and program 
analysis, possibly simple 
quantitative methods
• Process analysis, 
quantitative and 
qualitative methods
• Statistical and economet-
ric analysis, possibly 
qualitative methods
How long does 
it take?
• 1– 3 months • 1–6 months • At least 6 months 
(retrospective evaluation)
• At least 12–18 months 
(prospective evaluation)
What are the 
costs?
• Generally low • Low to medium • Medium to high
What are some 
examples of 
this type of 
evaluation?
• Mexico: Performance 
Specifi c Evaluation
• World Bank: Project 
Performance 
Assessment
• Process evaluations
• Spot checks
• Operational audits
• See suggested Web sites 
at the end of the chapter
Additional 
comments
• Large variation in depth 
and breadth
• Time duration and costs 
depend on outcomes of 
interest and data 
availability
Source: Author.
TABLE 9.1 continued
126 Building Better Policies
8. Do priorities need to be changed to ensure focus on achieving the goals?
9. Should any goals be added or removed? Why?
This type of evaluation may be conducted at any time during program 
implementation. In early stages it could provide useful feedback on program 
design, such as early warnings on a lack of clear objectives or inconsistencies 
between resources, activities, and objectives. It may also be a useful tool for 
a mid-term progress review or project completion assessment. This type of 
evaluation is usually based on a desk review of program or project documen-
tation and may be complemented by analyzing monitoring data (if available). 
In some cases, this evaluation includes interviews with program staff  to bet-
ter understand the goal-setting process and the enabling or hindering fac-
tors behind observed progress. These are generally low-cost evaluations that 
can be completed in a short period of time. 
Examples of this type of evaluation include:
• Mexico, Design Evaluations: This evaluation analyzes new program de-
sign, including the link to national development objectives, internal con-
sistency, alignment between program log frame and operation rules, and 
potential synergy or duplicity with other programs. It relies on a desk re-
view of program documentation, including the log frame.2
• Mexico, Performance-Speciﬁ c Evaluation: This evaluation assesses social 
program progress in meeting objectives and annual targets based on a 
desk review of the Performance Evaluation System (SED) data. These 
evaluations are conducted annually for about 120 diff erent programs and 
cost on average US$5,500.3
• World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, Project Performance Assess-
ment: These assessments evaluate the relevance of project objectives, 
whether goals are being met, effi  ciency, results sustainability, and institu-
tional development impact. They are generally conducted at the end of 
the project by reviewing project documentation, visiting the borrowing 
country, and interviewing staff  and government offi  cials.4
Process-based evaluations
Process-based evaluations are aimed at understanding how a program 
works. What are the actual steps and activities involved in delivering a good 
or a service? How close are they to agreed operation? Is program operation 
effi  cient? Numerous questions might be asked in a process-based evaluation, 
including: 
1. Is the program being implemented according to design?
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2. Are operational procedures appropriate to ensure the timely delivery of 
quality products or services?
3. What is the level of compliance with the operations manual?
4. Are there adequate resources (money, equipment, facilities, training, and 
so forth) to ensure the timely delivery of quality products or services?
5. Are there adequate systems (human resources, ﬁ nancial, management in-
formation, and so forth) in place to support program operations?
6. Are program clients receiving quality products and services?
7. What is the general process that program clients go through with the 
product or program? Are program clients satisﬁ ed with the processes and 
services?
8. Are there any operational bottlenecks? 
9. Is the program reaching the intended population? Are program outreach 
activities adequate to ensure the desired level of target population 
participation?
This type of evaluation is useful in a variety of circumstances. For exam-
ple, process-based evaluations are helpful to obtain early warnings of opera-
tional diffi  culties in newly implemented programs or components, particu-
larly among those involving complex procedures. It may also be conducted 
at regular intervals to check that operations remain on track and follow es-
tablished procedures, or at any time when there are staff  or client complaints 
about service delivery. Furthermore, there may be fears of ineffi  ciency in 
long-existing programs that warrant a process-based evaluation.
Process-based evaluation tools vary considerably in depth and breadth, 
and thus in required costs and time. They range from qualitative assessments 
in a few program sites to user or facilities surveys involving representative 
samples. Process-based evaluations use a combination of data collection and 
analysis methods including interviews with program staff  and clients, user 
and facility surveys, focus groups, direct observation, record review, and 
analysis of monitoring data. 
Impact evaluations
An impact evaluation assesses if a program is producing the intended out-
comes through providing relevant, quality outputs and services to the tar-
geted population. Outcomes are changes in well-being experienced by indi-
viduals as a result of participating in the program. They are diff erent from 
program outputs, which are measured by the number of goods or services 
delivered or the number of people served. Outcomes involve beneﬁ cial 
transformations in participants’ knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, behav-
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iors, condition, or status. Intended outcomes vary depending on program 
objectives and design, for example, increased literacy, improved nutrition, 
decreased disease incidence, and so on. The main questions asked in an im-
pact evaluation are:
1. Does the program or policy have the desired eff ects on individuals, house-
holds, or institutions?
2. Are these eff ects attributable to the program or would they have occurred 
anyway?
3. Are there any unintended consequences, positive or negative, on program 
participants?
4. Are program costs justiﬁ ed in terms of its welfare impact?
5. When there are various program implementation alternatives, which one 
is the most cost-eff ective? 
Impact evaluations are useful to inform a range of policy decisions, from 
scaling up eff ective interventions to adjusting program design to curtailing 
unpromising interventions. In addition, they help generate evidence on 
which approach is more eff ective in reaching a particular objective when 
comparing diff erent programs or diff erent intervention options within a 
program.
Impact evaluations rely on quantitative methods (statistics and econo-
metrics), but can be complemented with qualitative analysis. Compared to 
other evaluation types, impact evaluations require more time, technical 
skills, and are costlier. Hence, they are most eff ective when applied selec-
tively to answer strategic policy questions or to assess innovative pilot inter-
ventions testing a new, unproven, but promising approach. Although the 
impact evaluation process can start very early in a program life, results are 
not usually available until after several months of program implementation. 
Diff erent outcomes of interest require varying exposure and maturation 
times for measurement. For example, changes in household consumption 
can be measured after six months of program implementation, but changes 
in nutrition outcomes require a longer period.
Impact evaluation results combined with program cost analysis create an 
additional evaluation tool. Cost-eff ectiveness analysis compares the relative 
performance of two or more programs or program alternatives in achieving 
a common outcome. Once impact and cost information are available across a 
variety of programs, cost-eff ectiveness analysis will allow policy makers to 
make informed decisions on which intervention to invest in.
Resources for impact evaluations include:
• The World Bank Impact Evaluation Web site, which includes method-
ological and implementation guidelines for conducting impact evalua-
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tions as well as a database of evaluations of World Bank-supported 
interventions.
• The Poverty Action Lab at MIT, which promotes the use of randomized 
evaluations to answer questions critical to poverty alleviation by provid-
ing methodological guidance, a randomized evaluations database, and 
policy lessons from cost-eff ectiveness analysis. 
In addition to the three types of evaluation discussed here, other ana-
lytical tools and approaches are widely used. Box 9.1 brieﬂ y discusses 
cost-beneﬁ t analysis and Box 9.2 provides an overview of participatory 
evaluation.
Selecting a Mix of Evaluation Tools: 
International Experience
A number of M&E systems at the country level use a combination of evalua-
tion tools. The combinations vary across countries and have evolved over 
time. Country experiences show that the selection of an evaluation tool re-
sponds to diff erences in the driving principles of their M&E systems: trans-
parency and accountability, policy and spending eff ectiveness and effi  ciency, 
or improved program management. The type of tool selected also reﬂ ects 
myriad country conditions, such as institutional capacity, resource availabil-
ity, and institutional arrangements. Most countries have followed an incre-
mental approach in the use of evaluation tools, starting relatively simple and 
increasing in complexity and comprehensiveness over time. 
In Chile, for example, the Budget Department (Dirección de Presupuestos—
DIPRES) at the Ministry of Finance is in charge of the Management Evalua-
Cost-benefi t analysis is a widely used tool to assess the desirability of a particular 
intervention. It answers questions such as whether a new airport should be built 
or a highway expanded. It compares the present value of the proposed interven-
tion’s benefi ts and costs. It is typically conducted ex ante and involves calculating 
intervention benefi ts in monetary terms and detailed cost estimates. It can be 
conducted at a high or low level of rigor, and costs vary accordingly. Examples of 
agencies using this technique include the Departments of Transportation in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and the European Union. 
BOX 9.1
Another Analytical Tool
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tion and Control System. Its main emphasis is to promote the effi  cient allo-
cation of public spending, and it uses various M&E tools that were gradually 
added between 1994 and 2002. DIPRES made a conscious decision to start 
simple by incorporating the monitoring of performance indicators into the 
budget process. In 1997, DIPRES began conducting a relatively low-cost and 
rapid evaluation known as the Government Program Evaluation (Box 9.3). 
Since then, these evaluations have been consistently used to inform the bud-
get process. In 2001, impact evaluations were added to the Chilean M&E 
system. Programs are selected for an impact evaluation if they involve a sub-
stantial amount of public resources and there is no evidence from previous 
evaluations of their ﬁ nal outcome. DIPRES and Congress jointly decide 
which programs should be evaluated each year.
In Mexico, the M&E system stems from an increasing demand for trans-
parency and accountability coupled with the demonstration eff ect of the im-
Goal-, process-, and outcome-based evaluations can be conducted using a par-
ticipatory approach.This entails: 
A process of self-assessment, collective knowledge production, and coop-
erative action in which the stakeholders in a development intervention par-
ticipate substantively in the identifi cation of the evaluation issues, the de-
sign of the evaluation, the collection and analysis of data, and the action 
taken as a result of the evaluation fi ndings (Jackson and Kassam 1998). 
Participatory evaluation emphasizes the voices and decisions of program 
participants when analyzing implementation diffi culties or program effects, or 
when information is needed on stakeholders’ knowledge of program goals or 
their views of progress.
Participatory evaluation usually employs rapid appraisal techniques, which 
are simpler, quicker, and less costly than other conventional data collection 
methods. This evaluation tool relies on qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques. Qualitative methods used include community evaluation commit-
tees, community workshops, self-directed focus groups, popular theater, com-
munity radio, transect walks, and wealth ranking, among others. Quantitative 
methods include short surveys. The choice of methods depends on local condi-
tions, skills, and interests of various stakeholders.
Source: Jackson and Kassam 1998.
BOX 9.2
A Participatory Approach to Evaluation
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pact evaluation of the conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA.5 Start-
ing in 2000, the Appropriations Bill required an annual external evaluation 
for all federal programs subject to rules of operation. At the time, evaluation 
guidelines did not distinguish between diff erent types of evaluations. How-
ever, every year external evaluations were expected to answer questions 
ranging from compliance with operation rules to impact to cost beneﬁ ts. 
This was an overwhelming demand given the nascent evaluation institu-
This tool is a combination of the three types of 
evaluations discussed earlier—goal-, process-, 
and outcome-based evaluations. A number of 
countries have incorporated this tool in their 
M&E system because it enables a rapid assess-
ment of program performance through a desk 
review of program or project documentation, 
existing evaluations, and monitoring data. Using 
standardized evaluation criteria, overall perfor-
mance evaluations can be compared across dif-
ferent programs and used for benchmarking. 
This evaluation may be conducted at any 
time during the life of an intervention, although 
some assessment topics may have to be 
adapted for recently implemented programs. 
The main strengths of this evaluation are its 
short time requirement—three to fi ve months—
and relatively low cost. Its main disadvantages 
compared to more rigorous approaches are 
the weaker empirical evidence on which it is 
based and the typically very limited statistical or 
econometric techniques used for data analysis.
A number of countries include overall perfor-
mance evaluations in their M&E systems:
Chile, Government Program Evaluations: 
Their purpose is to assess program design, op-
eration, and results to inform the budget alloca-
tion process. They are based on a desk review of 
program documentation and staff interviews.
United States, Program Assessment Rating 
Tool: Although it is no longer used in the United 
States, this tool served as a model for overall 
performance evaluations in countries such as 
Colombia and Mexico. This tool was used to 
evaluate a program’s purpose, design, planning, 
management, results, and accountability to de-
termine its overall effectiveness. Every year, 20 
percent of agency programs were evaluated 
and all programs were evaluated at least once 
every fi ve years.
Colombia, Executive Evaluations: They pro-
vide feedback for mid-term program adjust-
ment by analyzing programs’ design, inputs, 
operation, results, organizational structure, stra-
tegic planning, and monitoring and evaluation.
Mexico, Consistency and Results Evalua-
tion: At the beginning of the new government 
administration, all federal government pro-
grams had an overall performance evaluation. 
This served as a baseline performance mea-
surement and helped identify the strengths and 
weaknesses across programs and sectors. 
BOX 9.3
Overall Performance Evaluation
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tional capacity, both from the demand (ministries) and the supply side 
(universities and research institutions). In 2007, the newly created National 
Evaluation Council (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación—CONEVAL), the Min-
istry of Finance (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público—SHCP), and 
the Ministry of Public Management (Secretaría de la Función Pública—SFP) 
jointly issued a revised set of guidelines including a set of evaluation tools 
and the criteria for tool application. The guidelines established the publica-
tion of an Annual Program Evaluation that speciﬁ es which programs are re-
quired to have a particular type of evaluation, depending on their strategic 
relevance, particular policy interest, and previous evaluation results. The 
selection of programs and evaluation tools is made jointly by CONEVAL, 
SHCP, and SFP. Ministries can also propose additional evaluations to sup-
port policy or management decisions or to get speciﬁ c program performance 
information.
Colombia’s M&E system, SINERGIA, was launched in 1994. Its main fo-
cus is on national planning and accountability. SINERGIA’s two main com-
ponents consist of a system of performance indicators that tracks progress 
against the National Development Plan goals and an agenda of rigorous im-
pact evaluations. The evaluation component did not become operational un-
til 2002. Technical assistance and funding from donors allowed Colombia to 
opt for a more complex and costlier evaluation tool. Recently Colombia in-
corporated a lower cost and more rapid alternative known as Executive 
Evaluations (Box 9.3).
Key Lessons
Using the appropriate tool, evaluations can help address a number of diff er-
ent management issues. The appropriate evaluation tool depends on the in-
tended use of the evaluation ﬁ ndings, budget and time availability, and ca-
pacity constraints. There are usually trade-off s between evaluation depth 
and rigor and resource requirements. Goal-based evaluations are quick and 
low cost, but tend to have data limitations and less rigorous analysis. By con-
trast, impact evaluations are more rigorous, but require considerable techni-
cal expertise, take longer to yield results, and cost more. Moreover, it is im-
portant to realize that any particular type of evaluation can be conducted at 
a higher or lower analytical level, and thus costs vary accordingly. 
Another important lesson is that evaluations are not a once-in-a-lifetime 
exercise, nor does the use of one evaluation type exclude the rest. Policy and 
program information needs are continuous and change over time, so can the 
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evaluation tool. Moreover, evaluation tools are complements rather than 
substitutes. When they are combined, they provide an even deeper under-
standing of program and policy strengths and weaknesses. For example, 
whereas impact evaluations can produce reliable estimates of the causal ef-
fects of a program, they are not typically designed to provide insights into 
program implementation. Monitoring data and process evaluations are 
needed to track program implementation and examine questions of process 
that are critical to informing and interpreting the results from impact 
evaluations. 
International experience highlights the importance of gradually incorpo-
rating evaluation tools into country-level M&E systems. Countries will re-
quire diff erent evaluation tools depending on the main purpose of their 
M&E system, existing institutional capacity, and the availability of funds and 
external technical assistance. In some cases, using less complex evaluation 
tools, but ensuring that they are properly applied and providing consistent 
feedback, may be an appropriate strategy to build an M&E system. In other 
cases, a few properly conducted and highly relevant impact evaluations with 
large demonstration eff ects may be a good way to motivate a shift toward 
results-based management.
Finally, as important as it is to select the right mix of evaluation tools, it is 
also important that evaluation results are used to inform policy and program 
decision making. Decision making that is informed and supported by reli-
able and systematic evaluations is more likely to lead to the success of policy 
and program interventions.
Notes
1. Other types of evaluations focus on other levels of the public sector, including 
organizations and sectors that are not considered in this chapter.
2. For more information on Mexico’s design evaluations, see http://www.coneval.
gob.mx/coneval2/htmls/ evaluacion_monitoreo/HomeEvalMonitoreo.
jsp?categorias=EVAL_MON,EVAL_MON-diseno.
3. For more information on Mexico’s performance-speciﬁ c evaluation, see http://
www.coneval.gob.mx/.
4. For more information on the World Bank’s Project Performance Assessments, 
see http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?startPoint=0&startDate=
2008%2F01%2F01&theSitePK=1324361&piPK=64254724&pagePK=64254514&
menuPK=64253143.
5. PROGRESA, now called Oportunidades, is a conditional cash transfer program 
launched in 1997 as an innovative pilot intervention to reduce poverty through 
human capital investment. The program impact evaluation became a role model 
for other social development interventions in Mexico.
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Reconstructing Baseline Data 
for Impact Evaluation and 
Results Measurement
Michael Bamberger
CHAPTER 10
Many international development agencies and some national governments 
base future budget planning and policy decisions on a systematic assessment 
of the projects and programs in which they have already invested. Results 
are assessed through mid-term reviews (MTRs), implementation comple-
tion reports (ICRs), or through more rigorous impact evaluations (IE), all of 
which require the collection of baseline data before the project or program 
begins. The baseline is compared with the MTR, ICR, or the post-test IE 
measurement to estimate changes in the indicators used to measure perfor-
mance, outcomes, or impacts. However, a baseline study is often not con-
ducted, seriously limiting the possibility of producing a rigorous assessment 
of project outcomes and impacts. This chapter discusses the reasons why 
baseline studies are often not conducted, even when they are included in the 
The author wishes to thank these colleagues from the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group: 
Jaime Saavedra (Director), Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior Economist), Keith Mackay (Consul-
tant), Emmanuel Skouﬁ as (Lead Economist), Philipp Krause (Consultant), and Helena Hwang 
(Consultant) for comments. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author.
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project design and funds have been approved, and describes strategies that 
can be used to “reconstruct” baseline data at a later stage in the project or 
program cycle.
Baseline Data—Important but Often 
Not Collected 
Baseline data can come from the project’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
system, rapid assessment studies, surveys commissioned at the start and end 
of the project, or from secondary data sources. Whatever the source, the 
availability of appropriate baseline data is always critical for performance 
evaluation, as it is impossible to measure changes without reliable data on 
the situation before the intervention began. Despite the importance of col-
lecting good baseline data, there are a number of reasons why they are fre-
quently not collected, and this chapter presents a range of strategies that can 
be used for “reconstructing” baseline data when they are not available.
The strategies for reconstructing baseline data apply to both discrete 
projects and broader programs (the term “interventions” is used here to 
cover both), although they must sometimes be adapted to the special charac-
teristics of each. Projects often introduce new M&E systems customized to 
the project’s speciﬁ c data needs, but often with signiﬁ cant start-up delays, 
which can be problematic for collecting baseline data. In contrast, ongoing 
programs can often build on existing M&E and other data collection sys-
tems, and can also have access to secondary data and sampling frames, al-
though these systems are often not suffi  cient for evaluation and tend to be 
diffi  cult to change. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), important de-
velopment players in many countries, may face diff erent issues with respect 
to baseline data for their activities. 
Although most interventions plan to collect baseline data for results mon-
itoring and possibly impact evaluation, often data are not collected or collec-
tion is delayed until the intervention has been under way for some time. The 
reasons may include a lack of awareness of the importance of baseline data, 
lack of ﬁ nancial resources, or limited technical expertise. Even when man-
agement recognizes its importance, administrative procedures (for example, 
recruiting and training M&E staff , purchasing computers, or commissioning 
consultants) may create long delays before baseline data can be collected. 
M&E systems collect baseline information on indicators for measuring 
program outputs and outcomes for the target population. Impact evalua-
tions collect similar information, but from both beneﬁ ciaries and a compari-
Reconstructing Baseline Data for Impact Evaluation and Results Measurement  137
son group. Information is also collected on the social and economic charac-
teristics of individuals, groups, or communities, on contextual factors such 
as local economic conditions, and on political and organizational factors that 
might explain variations in outcomes and impacts among diff erent project 
locations.
The World Bank and other development agencies incorporate this in-
formation into a results-based M&E system. Kusek and Rist (2004) describe 
a 10-step system for implementing a results-based M&E  system, three of 
which involve creating a baseline:
Step 2: Agreeing on the outcomes to monitor and evaluate
Step 3: Selecting key indicators to monitor outcomes and performance
Step 4: Collecting baseline data
Operational Implications of Collecting 
Baseline Data 
Even when an agency is strongly committed to setting up an M&E system to 
generate the baseline data required for results-based management and 
 impact evaluation, there are often other pressing staffi  ng, organizational, 
and ﬁ nancial matters, so there will often be considerable delays before the 
M&E systems are operational. The following measures can increase the like-
lihood that the M&E systems will be in place from the time of program 
launch: 
• Deﬁ ne funding arrangements that avoid long delays in contracting moni-
toring unit staff  and commissioning evaluation consultants. 
• Begin recruiting M&E staff  before intervention launch. 
• Arrange for M&E staff  to receive basic training before intervention 
launch. 
• Recruit an experienced M&E staff er early on. 
Having staff  on board who are familiar with the practical and technical 
problems faced when trying to reconstruct baseline data can avoid many of 
the problems that typically occur when generalist task managers attempt to 
handle these problems themselves. 
An agency can enhance its ability to generate baseline data in a number of 
ways. Using evaluation funds to contract additional administrative staff  may 
remove bottlenecks and facilitate good quality data collection. In other cases, 
baseline data on target households, communities, or organizations such as 
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schools, health clinics, or agricultural cooperatives may not be organized or 
archived in a way that facilitates identiﬁ cation of a comparable sample one 
or two years later for repeat interviews. Discussions with agency staff  at the 
planning stage could ensure that valuable data, such as application forms 
that include socioeconomic data on households or communities applying to 
participate in a project or program or feasibility studies for the selection of 
roads to be built or upgraded, are not discarded once beneﬁ ciaries have been 
selected or the sites for road improvements chosen. Eff ective coordination 
with agency staff  is critical. 
M&E systems compare progress at diff erent points over the life of 
the project, and baseline data for these comparisons must be collected 
throughout the life of the project. So it is important to ensure that M&E 
 systems continue to provide good quality data. 
National sample surveys conducted at least once a year on topics such as 
income and expenditure, access to health or education, or agricultural pro-
duction provide very valuable baseline data for results-based management 
and impact evaluation.1 Household income and expenditure surveys have 
proved very valuable. If these surveys can be used in the evaluation of several 
diff erent development programs, they become very cost-eff ective and they 
also can provide a larger and methodologically more rigorous comparison 
group sample than an individual evaluation could aff ord. Regularly repeated 
surveys provide a very valuable longitudinal database that can control for 
seasonal variation and economic cycles. 
The value of these surveys for results-based management and impact 
evaluation can be greatly enhanced if they are planned with this purpose in 
mind and in coordination with the agencies and donors who may use the 
surveys to generate baseline data and comparison groups. Some of the ways 
to enhance their utility include:
• Ensure that the sample is suffi  ciently large and has a suffi  ciently broad 
regional coverage to generate sub-samples covering particular target 
populations with suffi  cient statistical power to be used for major program 
evaluations.
• Include, in consultation with social sector agencies, core information on 
topics such as school enrollment, access to health services, and participa-
tion in major development programs. This facilitates selecting samples of 
participants and comparison groups for impact evaluations.
• Include one or more special modules in each round of the survey to cover 
the needs of a particular evaluation that is being planned.
• Document the master sampling frame to facilitate its use for selecting 
samples for particular evaluations. 
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Many of these approaches can only be considered for large and expensive 
evaluations or for studying issues that are of high priority to government 
agencies and/or donors. Also, national statistics offi  ces are typically overbur-
dened, so they can only be expected to help out when the program is particu-
larly important or when special funding can be arranged to cover the costs of 
additional staff  for data collection or analysis. 
Strategies for Reconstructing Baseline Data
This section presents some practical strategies for estimating (“reconstruct-
ing”) conditions of the project, and sometimes also the comparison group, at 
the time the intervention is launched. Most of these are economical, rela-
tively simple to apply, and do not require too great an investment of time.
Timing of the baseline 
Evaluations, often implicitly, assume that an intervention only starts to pro-
duce impacts after it offi  cially begins, but, in fact, changes may occur long 
before this. For example, once it is known that roads, water supply, or other 
services are to be provided to certain communities, speculators may begin to 
buy land and families may start to make improvements to their property. If 
the baseline is not conducted until the offi  cial program launch, many of these 
important changes may not be captured. Using techniques such as recall or 
key informant interviews to capture information on these early changes 
should be considered.
Using secondary data to reconstruct the baseline 
Many documentary sources can provide information on the beneﬁ ciary pop-
ulation or comparison groups around the time the intervention began. Cen-
suses covering areas such as population, agriculture, industry, education, 
and environment may be available. Other useful sources are household 
 socioeconomic surveys, the largest of which are the Living Standards Mea-
surement Study, which have been conducted in at least 35 countries.2 When 
surveys are repeated periodically, it may be possible to ﬁ nd a reference point 
close to the intervention launch date. However, while many surveys have a 
large enough sample to generate a comparison group, the samples are often 
too small or do not contain suffi  ciently detailed information to generate a 
sample of the beneﬁ ciary population (particularly when this population is 
relatively small). 
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Ministries of education, health, and agriculture, among others, publish 
annual reports that can provide baseline reference data, and they can some-
times provide information on particular schools, health centers, or other 
 facilities in the target areas. Donor agencies, NGOs, and universities also 
conduct studies providing useful reference data. Birth and death certiﬁ cates 
can be used to examine life expectancy, family size, and common causes of 
death, while legal documents relating to marriage and divorce can provide 
information on, for example, the property rights of women. Mass media also 
provide information on issues concerning local schools, clinics, public trans-
port, and so forth that can provide background information on conditions at 
the start of the intervention. Box 10.1 presents two examples where second-
ary data were used to reconstruct baseline data for matched project and 
comparison groups using propensity score matching. 
A number of factors aff ect the utility and validity of secondary data sources: 
the data cover the wrong reference period, key information is missing, infor-
mation was not collected from the right people (for example, only the house-
hold head was interviewed), the sample does not cover the whole population 
of interest or is too small, or the information is not reliable or complete. These 
factors must always be assessed before utilizing any of these sources. 
The evaluation of the Nicaragua Emergency Social Investment Fund used the 
1998 Living Standards Measurement Study, conducted fi ve years earlier, to iden-
tify baseline project and comparison communities for each project component 
(water supply and sanitation, health, education, etc.). Propensity scores were 
then used to improve the match of the two samples (Pradhan and Rawlings 
2002).
The World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED, now the Inde-
pendent Evaluations Group) evaluated the impacts of the Bangladesh Inte-
grated Nutrition Project using three separate secondary data sets to reconstruct 
the baseline and to monitor implementation progress. Each survey had 
strengths and weaknesses, some having more information on project imple-
mentation while others had more demographic and nutrition information. The 
study created a new comparison group using propensity score matching. Com-
bining the data sources reduced bias and strengthened the validity of the im-
pact estimates (OED 2005).
BOX 10.1
Using Secondary Sources to Reconstruct Baseline Data
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Using administrative data from the intervention 
Many interventions collect monitoring and other kinds of administrative 
data that could be used to estimate baseline conditions for the target popula-
tion (Box 10.2). Examples include socioeconomic data in the application 
forms of people, communities, or organizations applying to participate or 
receive beneﬁ ts, planning and feasibility studies, monitoring reports, and ad-
ministrative records providing information such as changes in project eligi-
bility criteria or the services provided to particular beneﬁ ciaries. Sometimes 
the application forms for people not accepted can provide a comparison 
group of non-participants. 
While administrative data are a potentially valuable source of baseline 
data, the data are often not available in a convenient format for analysis. 
 Often the evaluator must work closely with program staff  to ensure that ad-
ministrative data are collected and ﬁ led in a usable format (discussed later in 
this chapter). Often when the evaluator discovers that the expected admin-
istrative records have vanished or are not organized in a usable format, staff  
respond that they were not told that the information would be required for a 
future evaluation. Better coordination between the evaluators and program 
staff  can ensure that the information is available.
A recent post-test multi-donor evaluation of the Nepal “Education for All” proj-
ect used the project’s Education Management Information System to obtain 
gender-disaggregated data on school enrollment, repetition, and academic 
test scores at the start of the program and at various key milestones during 
implementation.
The evaluation of the poverty impacts of the World Bank–fi nanced Vietnam 
Rural Roads project used administrative data collected at the canton level to 
understand the selection criteria used to determine where roads would be built 
and to monitor the quality and speed of construction (Van de Walle 2009).
The evaluation of the feeder roads component of the Eritrea Community 
Development Fund used planning and feasibility studies commissioned by the 
implementing agency to obtain socio-economic baseline data on the communi-
ties affected by the roads. 
BOX 10.2
Using Project Administrative Data to Reconstruct 
the Baseline
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Recall 
Recall techniques ask individuals or groups to provide information on their 
social or economic conditions, access to services, or the conditions of their 
community at a particular point in time (for example, project launch) or over 
a particular period of time. Recall is used in poverty analysis, demography, 
and income expenditure surveys (Deaton and Grosh 2000) to elicit informa-
tion on behavior (for example, contraceptive usage or fertility) or economic 
status (household income or expenditure). Several comparative studies (for 
example, Deaton and Grosh 2000; Belli, Staff ord, and Alwin 2009) have con-
cluded that recall, when carefully designed and implemented, can be a use-
ful estimating tool with predictable and, to some extent, controllable errors, 
and a potentially valuable way to reconstruct baseline data. 
Recall can be applied through questions in surveys and individual or 
group interviews (Box 10.3). In addition to collecting numerical data such as 
income or farm prices, recall can also be used to obtain estimates of major 
changes in the welfare conditions of the household, such as which children 
attended a school outside the village before the village school opened and 
the travel time and costs of getting there. Families can also provide informa-
tion on questions such as access to health facilities and where they previ-
ously obtained water and how much it cost. 
An evaluation of the gender impacts of a World Bank–fi nanced rural roads proj-
ect in Bangladesh asked women to recall the situation of their family before the 
upgrading of the roads and to compare this with their current situation on 20 
indicators of economic status, access to water, quality of housing, and con-
sumption of basic items. The differences were used to estimate project impact 
(unpublished study funded through the World Bank Gender and Transport Initia-
tive 2000). 
An evaluation of the impacts of the village school construction component 
of the Eritrea Community Development Fund asked families to recall which of 
their children had attended school before the school was built in their village, 
how far the children had to travel, and the means and cost of transport. Families 
were able to clearly recall all of this information, and in the opinion of the re-
searchers the information was reliable because the respondents had no incen-
tives to distort their answers (unpublished consultant report). 
BOX 10.3
Using Recall to Reconstruct Baselines
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Recall always involves a risk of bias due to memory or distortion. Unin-
tentional distortion occurs when, for example, people romanticize the 
past (“when I was young there was much less crime in the community”) or 
unintentionally adjust their response to what they think the researcher 
wants to hear. Intentional distortion occurs when, for example, families 
are reluctant to admit that their children had not been attending school, or 
they might underestimate how much they spend on water to convince 
planners they are too poor to pay the water charges proposed in a new 
project. The reliability of recall data also depends on the nature of the out-
come variable being studied. For example, families will usually be able to 
recall major events such as a death in the family or enrollment of a child in 
school, but it may be more diffi  cult to obtain reliable responses on nutri-
tion questions or changes in the frequency of diarrhea or other very com-
mon ailments. 
A challenge in using recall is the absence of studies providing guidelines 
for estimating or adjusting for systematic bias. The most detailed research 
on this question was conducted on the recall of expenditures in national 
household income and expenditure surveys and studies on fertility. The in-
come and expenditure studies identiﬁ ed some consistent biases that can be 
used to adjust estimates: “telescoping,” that is, reporting major expenditures 
as being more recent than they actually were, and underestimating small ex-
penditures. Also, men and the better off  of both sexes are more likely to re-
port that they have been sick than women and poorer people. Other areas 
where research on the validity and reliability of recall is available include 
substance abuse, adolescent health research, assessment of stressful events, 
and time use. Belli, Staff ord, and Alwin (2009) report that the reliability of 
recall is signiﬁ cantly enhanced when using the calendar method of life 
course research (in which topics of interest are linked to critical events in the 
life course of the subject: birth, death, marriage, enrollment in school, and 
changing employment) compared to conventional recall questions in a struc-
tured questionnaire.
Recall can sometimes provide better self-assessment estimates of behav-
ioral changes and knowledge (for example, child care and nutrition, leader-
ship skills) than pre- and post-test comparisons. People often overestimate 
their behavioral skills or knowledge before entering a program because they 
do not understand the tasks being studied or the required skills. After com-
pleting the program, they may have a better understanding of these behav-
iors and provide a better assessment of their previous level of competency 
or knowledge and how much these have changed (Pratt, McGuigan, and 
Katzeva 2000). 
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Key informants 
Key informants (Box 10.4) can provide knowledge and experience on a par-
ticular agency and the population it serves, an organization (such as a trade 
union, women’s group, or a gang), or a social group (mothers with young 
children, sex workers, or landless farmers). For example, when evaluating 
a program to increase secondary school enrollment, key informants could 
include school directors, teachers and other school personnel, parents of 
children who do and do not attend school, students, and religious leaders. 
Key informants combine “factual” information with a particular point of 
view, and it is important to select informants with diff ering perspectives. For 
example, low-income and higher-income parents may have diff erent opin-
ions on programs to increase school enrollment, as may those from diff erent 
ethnic or religious groups. 
Group interview techniques for reconstructing baseline data 
Focus groups are used in market research and program evaluation to obtain 
information on socioeconomic characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors of 
groups that share common attributes (Krueger and Casey 2000). Groups, 
usually with ﬁ ve to eight persons, are selected to cover diff erent economic 
strata, as well as people who have and have not participated in the project or 
who received diff erent services. The group moderator goes systematically 
through a checklist of questions making sure that each person responds to 
every question. For the purposes of reconstructing baseline data, partici-
In the author’s work on the evaluation of urban housing programs in Latin Amer-
ica, local storekeepers were a valuable source of information on changes in the 
economic conditions of the community. For example, an increase in the de-
mand for meat was an indicator that households had more disposable income. 
Most stores provide credit and the level of default was another good indicator 
of changing community fortunes. Storekeepers have a good memory for trends 
in the sales of key items over long periods of time. 
BOX 10.4
Store Owners as Key Informants on Economic Trends in 
the Community
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pants could be asked to provide information on, for example, conditions of 
their household, group, community, or agricultural production at some point 
in the past. 
When properly designed and implemented, focus groups ensure that all 
key sectors are sampled and that responses provide a representative snap-
shot of each group. However, readers of evaluation reports should be aware 
that focus groups are often used in development evaluation as a fast and eco-
nomical way to obtain general information on the opinions of the target pop-
ulation, with very little attention to participant selection or ensuring bal-
anced participation in the discussion. Market research companies make 
extensive use of focus groups, developing sampling frames to select samples 
with the socioeconomic characteristics required by diff erent clients. If funds 
are available, contracting a market research company to design and imple-
ment focus groups for a program evaluation could be considered. 
Participatory assessment techniques (PRAs), originally meaning 
“participatory rural appraisal,” is now used as a generic term for all partici-
patory studies in which communities or groups report on their conditions, 
problems, and changes over time. Groups can provide estimates on things 
such as the volume and quality of water, crop production and sales, travel 
time and costs, and time use. PRAs are widely used with poor rural and ur-
ban communities with low literacy levels or where participants have diffi  -
culties in expressing complex ideas (such as changes in environmental con-
ditions). PRAs include construction of charts, maps, or tables where the 
group agrees on the placement of familiar objects, such as stones or seeds, on 
a chart to illustrate trends, important events, magnitude, or causal patterns. 
Timelines, trend analysis, historical transects, seasonal diagrams, and daily 
activity schedules can be used to assess changes over time or the situation at 
the baseline reference point (Kumar 2002). 
These PRAs have several beneﬁ ts. Respondents may feel more comfort-
able expressing themselves in a group with their peers, rather than in a 
one-on-one interview with an outside researcher. If participants are se-
lected to ensure their representativity, the group consensus can also pro-
vide a more cost-eff ective way to obtain an approximate estimate for the 
situation of the whole population of interest, rather than having to use a 
sample survey. Synergistic group interaction also generates new ideas that 
might not have come up in one-on-one interviews. There are also potential 
risks: the group may be dominated by a few vocal people, participants may 
defer to politically powerful, wealthier, or more educated group members, 
or the group facilitator may inadvertently direct the group toward certain 
decisions. 
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Applying Reconstruction Strategies to Fill In 
Baseline Data for Results-Based M&E 
M&E systems often take some time to get established, so there may be a pe-
riod at the start of the intervention when monitoring data are not being col-
lected. So when setting up the M&E system, a ﬁ rst step should be to check: 
What key indicators are required for baseline data? Which indicators are 
available and which are missing? Why are the data missing and how easily 
can the problems be overcome? Is any important information not being col-
lected during the interim period before the monitoring system becomes fully 
operational? All of the techniques for reconstructing baseline data can be 
applied to ﬁ lling in baseline data gaps. 
Results-based M&E systems are usually based on a program theory model 
that includes how the program is intended to achieve its objectives, imple-
mentation and outcome indicators to be measured, key assumptions to be 
tested, and the time horizon over which diff erent results are to be achieved 
(Bamberger, Rugh, and Mabry 2006, Chapter 10). Often the program theory 
model was not deﬁ ned or fully articulated at the start of the project. In these 
cases, the evaluator may need to work with the implementing agency and 
other stakeholders to reconstruct the implicit program theory on which the 
program is based. Sometimes staff  agree on the underlying theory model and 
a short workshop may be suffi  cient to put this on paper. However, in other 
cases, staff  may have diffi  culty articulating the model or may disagree on the 
purpose of the program, how it will achieve its outcomes, and the critical as-
sumptions on which it is based.3
Applying Baseline Reconstruction Strategies for 
Evaluating Outcomes and Impacts
A wide variety of evaluation designs can estimate project impacts and eff ects, 
ranging from strong statistical designs with before-and-after comparisons of 
project and comparison groups, to statistically weaker quasi-experimental 
designs that may not include baseline data on the comparison or project 
groups, to non-experimental designs that do not include a comparison group. 
Diff erent baseline reconstruction strategies can be applied to diff erent evalu-
ation designs. For weaker quasi-experimental designs and non-experimental 
designs where no baseline data have been collected for the project and/or 
the comparison group, all of the baseline reconstruction techniques dis-
cussed earlier could be considered. Stronger quasi-experimental and experi-
mental designs all include baseline data for both project and control groups. 
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However, in most cases only quantitative data are collected (for example, the 
number of students enrolled in school or patients visiting health centers), 
and the design would be strengthened by complementing this with qualita-
tive data such as the quality of services, women’s participation in household 
decision making at the time the project began, and how diff erent ethnic 
groups were received when they visited health clinics. 
Quantitative and qualitative evaluations rely on diff erent types of data 
and data collection procedures. When quantitative researchers collect pri-
mary data to reconstruct baselines, they are likely to incorporate recall ques-
tions into a structured questionnaire. In contrast, qualitative researchers use 
a wider range of techniques, including key informants, in-depth individual 
interviews, focus groups, and PRAs. Both quantitative and qualitative re-
search designs can beneﬁ t from incorporating mixed-method approaches to 
baseline reconstruction so as to combine depth of understanding with gen-
eralizability of the ﬁ ndings (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010). 
Selecting a well-matched baseline comparison group presents special 
challenges. Participant selection procedures often result in project partici-
pants having special attributes that aff ect, and frequently increase, the prob-
ability of successful program outcomes. Often these attributes, termed “un-
observables” or “omitted variables,” are not included in the baseline surveys. 
For example, in a microcredit program for women, many of the women who 
are successful in starting or expanding small businesses might have more 
control over household decision making than is normally the case in their 
community, or they may have previous experiences with a small business. 
These characteristics might aff ect project outcomes, but this information 
will usually not be included in the baseline data. The following methods 
could be used to assess the importance of these omitted variables: key infor-
mant interviews (for example, staff  of microcredit and other economic de-
velopment programs), administrative data from the loan programs, focus 
groups, in-depth interviews with participants and non-participants, and 
PRAs. 
Conclusions
Good quality baseline data that measure the conditions of the target popula-
tion and the matched comparison group are an essential component of eff ec-
tive monitoring, results-based management, and impact evaluation. Without 
this reference information, it is very diffi  cult to assess how well a project or 
program has performed and how eff ectively it has achieved its objectives or 
results. 
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However, many projects and programs fail to collect all of the required 
baseline data. While some of the reasons for this can be explained by inade-
quate funding or technical diffi  culties in collecting the data (particularly for 
control groups), many of the causes could be at least partially corrected by 
better management and planning. Many reasons relate to administrative de-
lays in releasing funds, recruiting and training staff , and contracting consul-
tants. While administrative procedures are often diffi  cult to change, ways 
could probably be found to reduce some of these delays. Other issues con-
cern the relatively low priority that is often given to M&E, particularly when 
there are so many other urgent priorities during the early stages of a project 
or program. 
Even with the best of intentions, these administrative challenges will 
never be completely resolved and there will continue to be many situations 
where the collection of baseline monitoring data is delayed and the commis-
sioning of baseline studies for impact evaluations never takes place. Included 
in this chapter are a range of strategies, many of them relatively simple and 
cost-eff ective, for reconstructing baseline data when necessary. Appropriate 
tools should be built into results-based M&E and impact evaluation systems 
as contingency tools for reconstructing important baseline data. While some 
of the statistical techniques such as propensity score matching have been 
widely used and their strengths and weaknesses are well understood, others 
such as recall or the systematic use of key informants have often been used 
in a somewhat ad hoc manner and more work is required to test, reﬁ ne, and 
validate the methods. Finally, many potentially valuable sources of adminis-
trative data from the project itself tend to be underutilized and more atten-
tion should be given to their development and use.
Notes
1. National surveys that are only repeated every few years can also provide useful 
baseline data, but it is more diffi  cult to obtain data collected close to the time the 
project began. The greater the time interval the less reliable the baseline 
estimates as economic, climatic, and other factors change over time.
2. Other widely-used multi-country surveys include UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys that now provide 42 indicators of the health and welfare of 
children and women in more than 100 countries, and the USAID-supported 
Demographic and Health Surveys that since 1984 have conducted more than 240 
surveys providing a broad range of demographic and health data on more than 
85 countries.
3. See Bamberger, Rugh, and Mabry (2006, 179–82) for a discussion of the diff erent 
strategies for reconstructing a program theory model.
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Combining Quantitative and 
Qualitative Methods for Program 
Monitoring and Evaluation:
Why Are Mixed-Method
Designs Best?
Michelle Adato
CHAPTER 11
Over the last decade, development programs in Latin America, Asia, and Af-
rica have increasingly undertaken rigorous impact evaluation. Despite ad-
vances, much program monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data have limited 
utility because of an over-reliance on quantitative methods alone. Survey 
methods will tell us, for example, the rate of change in attended hospital 
births, while qualitative methods will explain why some women now go to 
hospitals to give birth while others will not, despite a program designed to 
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Protection Team), and the following members of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group: Philipp 
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encourage their attendance. Qualitative methods also improve survey de-
sign, identify social and institutional impacts that are hard to quantify, and 
uncover unanticipated processes or outcomes, and trace impact pathways.
Mixed-method approaches are necessary, because whether development 
programs work as intended depends not only on how effi  ciently resources 
and knowledge are transferred, but also on complex economic and social 
dynamics in households, communities, and institutions. These dynamics 
cannot be disentangled through surveys alone. When used together, quanti-
tative and qualitative approaches provide more coherent, reliable, and useful 
conclusions than do each on their own. This chapter provides guidance on 
how to combine quantitative and qualitative methods for M&E to maximize 
the ability to assess program performance and interpret and act on that in-
formation. The chapter includes examples of diff erent mixed-method de-
signs used in Haiti, South Africa, Nicaragua, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. 
What Do Mixed-Method Evaluation 
Designs Offer?
Quantitative methods provide uniform measures of project outputs and im-
pacts, for example the number of farmers trained or vaccines administered, 
or changes in income, crop yields, school enrollment, or child stunting. Rep-
resentative sample sizes ensure that ﬁ ndings are generalizable among a 
wider population. Econometric analysis further enables inferences of cau-
sality and relationships between impacts and explanatory variables.
Quantitative methods perform less well in explaining these results, par-
ticularly when explanations involve issues that are hard to quantify, but are 
often fundamental to understanding program results—such as beliefs and 
perceptions, social relationships, administrative bottlenecks, or institu-
tional dynamics. Qualitative methods better capture these issues because 
they use more ﬂ exible questions, ask for open-ended responses, thoroughly 
explore the topic, and promote rapport between researchers and research 
subjects, which results in more candid responses. Observation methods in-
dependently conﬁ rm or contradict what people say. There is, however, a 
trade-off  between depth and breadth, and smaller sample sizes in qualita-
tive studies mean that ﬁ ndings are rarely statistically representative of a 
broad population. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods com-
pensate for each other’s weaknesses, and each approach provides more value 
when used in a mixed-method design, providing information and conclusions 
that are more coherent, reliable, and useful than those from single-method 
studies. 
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Quantitative
• Household demographics 
• Targeting accuracy
• Participation rates (for example, in training 
or services)
• Impacts (for example, on production, income, 
expenditure, employment, education, health, 
or nutrition) 
• Intra-household decision making
• Service quality (for example, waiting times, 
availability of supplies, accuracy of rations, 
staff absenteeism)
• Test scores
Qualitative
• Processes in households, communities, 
and organizations
• Beliefs, norms, values, attitudes, social 
relationships
• Gender relations and women’s status
• Experiences with institutions (for example, 
government agencies, banks, and hospitals)
• Institutional and political dynamics (for 
example, interdepartmental cooperation 
and confl ict)
• Service delivery (for example, care practices 
and attitudes of service providers toward 
benefi ciaries)
• Local satisfaction with program design, 
targeting, and administration
BOX 11.1
Examples of Issues Normally Studied Through Quantitative and 
Qualitative Methods
Some issues tend to be best addressed by either a quantitative or qualita-
tive approach (Box 11.1). Note, however, that categories represent relative 
strengths for emphasis, but not a dichotomy. Each topic can potentially be 
addressed in diff erent ways by quantitative and qualitative methods, yield-
ing diff erent types of information. Furthermore, surveys can include ques-
tions with open-ended responses, and qualitative data can be quantiﬁ ed. 
Most importantly, the approaches work in complementary ways to ad-
dress a given issue. In the evaluation of the Child Support Grant in South 
Africa, for example, qualitative methods identiﬁ ed the full range of adoles-
cent high-risk behavior and its economic and social drivers. These were 
turned into survey questions and responses were carefully tailored to this 
program context. Furthermore, the focus groups tested a key assumption 
used to construct the survey’s control group, tested respondent stratiﬁ cation 
and recruitment strategies, and provided data that would later help with in-
terpretation of survey data. 
Qualitative methods explain process. Quantitative methods can deter-
mine, for example, whether dissemination through farmers’ organizations 
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leads to increased adoption of an agricultural technology. Qualitative meth-
ods will tell us about the social and political relationships that explain why 
diff erent types of farmers join, and about formal and informal practices—
factors necessary for understanding whether such organizations are likely 
to generate the intended outcomes under diff erent circumstances. Such pro-
cess issues “can be crucial to understanding impact, as opposed to simply 
measuring it” (Rao and Woolcock 2003). The study of process is also an im-
portant component of program monitoring. Studying what actually occurs 
during program implementation can determine whether failure to achieve 
intended outcomes or impact results from design failure or implementation 
failure (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010).
Quantitative and qualitative methods support each other in a wide variety 
of ways (Box 11.2). Triangulation is a central function of mixed-method M&E 
designs: comparing quantitative and qualitative datasets to see how each one 
conﬁ rms, challenges, or explains the other. In the evaluation of the condi-
tional cash transfer (CCT) program in Turkey, a survey was used to measure 
program impacts on attendance rates at school and health check-ups, while 
Qualitative methods support quantitative 
survey research through:
• Identifying hypotheses
• Suggesting or confi rming the validity of 
identifi cation strategies, constructs, 
proxies, assumptions, and instrumental 
variables
• Identifying and testing topics, questions, 
response options, and local meanings of 
language for surveys
• Identifying sampling and measurement 
error
• Determining the direction of causality
• Identifying unanticipated issues
• Making “unobservables” observable
• Triangulating, confi rming, challenging, and 
explaining survey fi ndings
Quantitative methods support qualitative 
methods through:
• Identifying topics and questions for 
investigation
• Identifying a stratifi cation strategy and 
providing data for drawing a qualitative 
sample
• Providing background data on households, 
communities, and institutions
• Comparing profi les of qualitative sample 
communities or households with broader 
populations to determine degree of 
similarity or difference
• Testing the generalizability of qualitative 
fi ndings
• Triangulating, confi rming, and challenging 
qualitative research fi ndings
BOX 11.2
Complementarities between Qualitative and Quantitative Methods
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the qualitative research collected the full range of economic, political, and 
socio-cultural explanations for attendance and lack of attendance at both. 
The survey found, for example, that the CCT program raised secondary 
school enrollment for girls by 10.7 percent, but enrollment rates were still 
very low at the secondary level: 38.2 percent for secondary school girls na-
tionally, and lower in some regions. The qualitative study found that socio-
cultural beliefs and practices, and especially gender issues, frequently over-
powered the ﬁ nancial incentive of the transfer. The issues hindering the 
success of the CCT program included the belief that women’s primary roles 
are as wives and mothers, the perceived lack of beneﬁ ts of education, and 
fear of girls’ sexuality and male advances bringing harm to family reputation 
and honor, exacerbated by inadequate transportation and location of schools 
that were perceived to put girls at further risk. The ﬁ ndings explained why 
the CCT was successful in some contexts and not others, and the need for 
complementary interventions (Adato 2008). 
Single-method studies do not have this ability to explain. In the evalua-
tion of a CCT for nutrition in Brazil, the survey found a small negative eff ect 
of the program on children’s weight gain. The evaluators speculated, based 
on anecdotal information, that mothers might have deliberately kept their 
children malnourished due to a mistaken belief that they would lose beneﬁ ts 
if they gained weight (Morris et al. 2004). Qualitative methods could have 
been used to test whether this explanation—or a diff erent one—was likely to 
be correct. In another example, from a study of domestic violence, a survey 
found a strong correlation between domestic violence and female steriliza-
tion. This would have been diffi  cult to explain without qualitative research, 
which found both that sterilized women tended to be less interested in sex 
and that husbands became more suspicious of their ﬁ delity due to reduced 
risk of pregnancy, thereby increasing the risk of violence (Rao and Woolcock 
2003). Surveys may be able to further test the generalizability of some of 
these ﬁ ndings, but qualitative work is necessary to identify these pathways. 
Choosing Among Methods
The most common qualitative methods used for M&E are focus groups, par-
ticipatory appraisal, beneﬁ ciary/non-beneﬁ ciary interviews, key informant 
interviews, and observation. These can be used in rapid appraisals, spending 
a day to several days in a locality or program delivery setting, or as part of 
extended case studies and ethnographic studies spending several weeks 
or months in one location. Monitoring systems tend to use these methods 
through shorter data collection exercises at regular intervals. Which meth-
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ods are selected depends in part on M&E budgets and time frames, but also 
on the purpose, stage of M&E at which they are used, and the types of issues 
to be investigated.
Focus groups and participatory appraisal tend to be best suited for broadly 
identifying issues and preferences. They are frequently used at early stages 
of evaluation design to inform the design of surveys, though they can also be 
used at later stages to provide data on how well a program is functioning and 
why. A main advantage of focus groups is that a large number of people can 
be included in the study in a relatively short period of time, maximizing the 
diversity of experiences and opinions identiﬁ ed while minimizing costs. An-
other advantage is that a group discussion can stimulate recollection and 
debate. Participatory appraisal methods, which combine visual exercises 
with discussions, provide more control and beneﬁ ts to participants. The 
main limitations of focus groups are that there is relatively little time to es-
tablish rapport and trust, or to investigate issues in depth, and it is diffi  cult to 
link the information to other datasets. People may also be less willing to dis-
cuss sensitive topics in groups (though not always), such as domestic vio-
lence or HIV, particularly with respect to their own experience. Finally, mi-
nority opinions or those of the less powerful may not be revealed: careful 
disaggregation of focus groups by categories such as gender, wealth, age, or 
ethnicity is essential for reducing this risk. Still, these are useful methods for 
rapid, low-cost identiﬁ cation of issues and for assessing beneﬁ ciary or ser-
vice provider perceptions and experiences.
In-depth interviews and observations can be used at any stage of M&E to 
identify issues early on and—more frequently—to gather data once a pro-
gram is under way. These methods allow the ﬁ eldworker to pursue a topic 
until it is well understood. People may be more willing to respond candidly 
in individual interviews, and observations enable independent conﬁ rmation. 
These data can then be triangulated and analyzed in relation to other indi-
vidual and contextual data. In evaluation, ethnographic case study methods 
are sometimes used, where ﬁ eldworkers live for a period of time (for exam-
ple, three to six months) in program communities. These methods permit 
the most reliable picture of program processes and impacts by providing the 
time to establish strong rapport and trust with program stakeholders, con-
duct iterative sets of interviews, and observe household, community, and 
program interactions and key activities over time. These methods are, how-
ever, more time- and resource-intensive compared to focus group methods, 
and sample sizes are normally smaller. 
Key informant interviews are essential for M&E, gathering the knowledge 
of program offi  cials and staff , service delivery professionals, community 
leaders, business owners, contractors, and other stakeholders. Key informant 
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interviews provide information and analysis based on day-to-day observa-
tions of the program. Another mixed-method approach, particularly valu-
able for operations or process M&E, are systematic observations of service 
delivery, combining quantitative instruments to record and rate observed 
conditions and practices with qualitative interviews and observations. 
Key Issues in Mixed-Method Designs
Sequencing of methods. Although sequencing can be done in various ways, a 
best practice evaluation design might proceed as follows. The evaluation 
starts with qualitative methods to identify key issues and gather information 
to inform survey design. This is followed by the baseline survey. The survey 
data are used to design and select the sample for a new stage of qualitative 
research and to identify issues for investigation—such as impact ﬁ ndings 
that need explanation. Following this qualitative study, an evaluation survey 
mirrors the baseline, but adds new questions identiﬁ ed in the qualitative 
study. Depending on the length of the program, resources, and needs, addi-
tional rounds may follow. For program monitoring, a subset of quantitative 
indicators and qualitative data can be collected at regular intervals, main-
taining common indicators but also adapting indicators based on new ﬁ nd-
ings. Many governments invest substantial resources in monitoring systems 
that collect large quantities of quantitative data that reﬂ ect expected out-
puts. They typically do not explain the reasons for good or poor performance, 
which limits the ability to respond. Complementary use of qualitative meth-
ods in monitoring systems can help provide these explanations and identify 
unanticipated issues and outcomes.
Site and household selection. While some qualitative studies involve a con-
venience sample of locations or households, a more rigorous approach uses 
survey data to stratify qualitative samples. The qualitative sample would 
then reﬂ ect characteristics of the quantitative sample. Within these strati-
ﬁ ed categories, households or individuals are often selected purposively to 
ensure inclusion of households across the distribution; if a random sample is 
used, the sample should be large enough to capture this distribution. In an 
evaluation of an agro-forestry intervention in Kenya, for example, survey 
data were used to select a sample of households for qualitative case studies 
that captured Luo and Luhya ethnic groups; male- and female-headed 
households; richer and poorer farmers; and agro-forestry early adopters, late 
adopters, non-adopters, and “dis-adopters” (Place, Adato, and Hebinck 
2007). In evaluations of CCT programs in Turkey, Nicaragua, and El Salva-
dor, survey data were used to stratify the qualitative sample between house-
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holds where children performed well and poorly on the key education and 
health indicators targeted by the program. In this way, the qualitative re-
search could investigate the conditions and characteristics that explained 
this diff erent performance, with and without the program (Adato 2008). 
Data analysis and integration. Many M&E systems that collect quantita-
tive and qualitative data fail to take advantage of their synergies. For exam-
ple, data from alternating rounds of surveys and qualitative research are not 
always used to inform the questions for the alternating next round. Even 
more common is the failure to triangulate and integrate the ﬁ ndings at the 
analysis stage—thus losing much of the principle analytic power of mixed-
method designs. Under the typical time pressure to complete evaluation or 
monitoring reports, data are analyzed and reported separately. It is critical 
that data integration becomes a priority, and that the time and resources 
needed for data integration at the analysis stage are included in the budget. 
What Do We Learn? Findings from 
Mixed-Method M&E 
Examples of mixed-method M&E from three countries are outlined in this 
section, illustrating the diff erent purposes, designs, and methods discussed 
above.
Monitoring a food-assisted maternal and child health 
and nutrition program in Haiti
An operations research approach was used for the M&E system for World 
Vision’s food-assisted maternal and child health and nutrition program in 
Haiti (Loechl et al. 2005). The objectives were to assess the implementation 
of service delivery, identify constraints to eff ective operation, and imple-
ment corrective actions. The quantitative method used was structured ob-
servations at program delivery points. The qualitative methods were struc-
tured and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and focus group 
discussions with the program staff . The service delivery points were: rally 
posts, where targeting, health education and services, and growth monitor-
ing and promotion took place; mothers’ clubs, where smaller groups of par-
ticipants gathered to discuss health and nutrition topics; and food distribu-
tion points, where beneﬁ ciaries received monthly food rations. Selected 
ﬁ ndings from the service delivery points include:
Rally posts. These were found to be operating as planned; however, prob-
lems identiﬁ ed included crowding, a high participant/staff  ratio, long wait-
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ing times, bottlenecks at registration, and the lack of supplies and transport 
for staff . Improvements were needed in the general education sessions and 
the communication between health staff  and caregivers. Measurement er-
rors were also identiﬁ ed in weighing and plotting children’s weight on the 
growth chart; this was a critical area because the growth charts were used 
for targeting children for recuperative action.
Mothers’ clubs. These were found to be highly popular among health staff  
and beneﬁ ciaries. A new behavior change and communication strategy and 
new materials and techniques were recently developed to improve infant 
and young child feeding practices. The mixed-method approach enabled an 
objective assessment of the technical content of the sessions and health 
staff ’s facilitation and teaching skills, which were found to have improved. 
However, ensuring the intended composition of the clubs was identiﬁ ed as 
an ongoing challenge, and continued supervision and retraining of the staff  
was recommended. 
Food distribution points (FDPs). Observations of the FDPs identiﬁ ed ex-
cessive crowding and long waiting times, delays in arrival of the food and 
staff , and the reasons for these problems: bad road conditions, limited trans-
port facilities, and fuel scarcity. Exit interviews revealed that a large propor-
tion of beneﬁ ciaries did not receive the amount of food commodities they 
were entitled to. The sharing of food commodities among other relatives, 
neighbors, and others was reported to be widespread. This was determined 
to be inevitable, and it was recommended that an additional indirect ration 
be provided to cover this, and that the program should continue to empha-
size the use of fortiﬁ ed commodities with micronutrient content targeted to 
beneﬁ ciaries, especially young children.
After implementation of the recommendations, a new round of opera-
tions research was conducted to monitor the corrective measures and docu-
ment improvements in the program.
Evaluation of the conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua 
The evaluation of the CCT in Nicaragua (Adato 2008) involved baseline and 
follow-up panel surveys with 1,359 households, conducted in 42 administra-
tive units (comarcas) with and without the program. Survey data were later 
used to stratify households by high and low performance in health and edu-
cation indicators, with a qualitative sample drawn from each category. In 
total, 120 households were included in the qualitative study in Nicaragua. 
Fieldworkers lived in the study communities for approximately four months, 
conducting interviews about program experiences and impacts and people’s 
attitudes and behavior, and observing meal preparation, health and hygiene 
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practices, shopping, beneﬁ ciary and community gatherings, health service 
delivery, health and nutrition education, and other program activities. Some 
of the beneﬁ ts of this mixed-methods design are outlined below.
Targeting. The survey found that the program was well targeted, with 
under-coverage rates of 3 to 10 percent. The qualitative research found, 
however, that people saw themselves as “all poor” and did not understand 
why households were selected into or out of the program, resulting in sev-
eral types of stress and tension in the communities. This led to recommenda-
tions to improve program communications and to provide some limited ben-
eﬁ ts to non-beneﬁ ciary households.
Iron supplements. The survey found a large increase in the percentage of 
children receiving iron supplements: from under 25 percent to nearly 80 
percent. However, it found no impact on the high anemia rates in this popu-
lation. In initial interviews in the qualitative research, mothers said that they 
gave the supplements to their children. However, over time, the case study 
methods revealed a diff erent picture: mothers were picking up the supple-
ments but not giving them to their children because of the perception that 
iron negatively aff ected children’s stomachs and teeth.
“Stuffi  ng” children before weighing. In the ﬁ rst phase of the program, if 
children twice fell below an established rate of weight gain, beneﬁ ts could be 
suspended. Although this policy was dropped, many beneﬁ ciaries did not 
know this. The study found that to avoid losing beneﬁ ts, some mothers were 
stuffi  ng their children with food and liquids on the day or days leading up to 
the weighing. This revealed important information about poorly conceived 
incentives, as well as the impact of inadequate communications. 
Program impacts on gender relations. Concerns have been raised that giv-
ing cash transfers to women could cause tensions with their male partners, 
possibly contributing to domestic violence. The qualitative research was 
able to explore this delicate topic, but found that men largely supported 
women receiving the beneﬁ t, because they saw the CCT program as for chil-
dren and believed that women would spend it more wisely. Furthermore, the 
new resources in households helped to ease tensions. It also found that the 
program’s discourse on women’s empowerment and women’s receipt of the 
cash increased their self-conﬁ dence and gave them some new autonomy in 
certain spending decisions.
Evaluation of high yielding maize varieties in Zimbabwe 
This evaluation (Bourdillon and others 2007) used data from a panel survey 
conducted in resettlement areas from 1983 to 1984, 1987, and annually from 
1992 to 2000. The surveys contained extensive information on agricultural 
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and non-farm activities, expenditure, assets, and other impacts. Qualitative 
household case studies, focus groups, and key informant interviews were 
conducted during a six-month period of ﬁ eldwork in 2001. Findings include:
Gender relations and intra-household resource control. Despite a modest 
reduction in household-level poverty, beneﬁ ts to men from high yielding 
 varieties (HYVs) of maize undermined women’s control of resources. 
Whereas men operated within the public commercial markets for HYV 
maize, women preferred the open-pollinated varieties (OPVs), which HYV 
maize had displaced, because OPV seeds and maize were marketed through 
informal networks where women operated. Women also did not have access 
to credit for the commercial fertilizer necessary for HYV maize but not for 
OPVs. Although money from the sale of HYV maize was called “family 
money,” the qualitative research revealed that “family money” was really the 
household head’s money, kept in his bank account. This family money was 
often invested in cattle (traditionally male property), and in one case study a 
woman explained her fear that if her husband died, his relatives would take 
the cattle away and she would be left with nothing. 
The signiﬁ cance of age for extension approaches. The qualitative research 
revealed generational diff erences in how farmers value knowledge. Young 
people trusted the knowledge of the national extension service offi  cers, 
viewing them as trained and experienced. In contrast, older people trusted 
their own experiences and demonstration units. Cultural values and beliefs 
attributed wisdom to age, and older men especially found it hard to admit to 
limitations in their knowledge, preferring their own practical knowledge to 
theoretical knowledge.
Culture and magic. In the case study communities, there was widespread 
belief in the eff ect of witchcraft on crop performance. People frequently at-
tributed magical powers to those who achieved unusually high yields, and 
poor yields to theft of crops through witchcraft. In one resettlement area, 
people would not show interest in the crops of others, because observing 
how others grew their crops could arouse suspicions of witchcraft. In an-
other area, there was a widespread belief that implements or animals lent to 
other farmers could be returned bewitched. This had important implica-
tions for farmer-to-farmer methods of dissemination and extension, and the 
expectation that farmers “learn from each other.” 
Conclusions
Although mixed methods are widely used by governments and international 
agencies, there are a number of reasons why it is still common to ﬁ nd single-
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method approaches. The high cost of survey research means that decisions 
are often made to allocate an entire evaluation budget to a single approach. 
Second, timelines are often perceived as too tight for iterative rounds of data 
collection. Third, researchers are usually trained in one approach—quantita-
tive or qualitative—and do not suffi  ciently understand or appreciate the 
methods and value of the other. However, research designs can be adapted to 
ﬁ t a given set of conditions, and the beneﬁ ts are likely to far exceed the costs. 
Still, it is important to recognize that the open-ended nature of qualitative 
research methods requires a considerable degree of skill on the part of ﬁ eld 
researchers to obtain quality data, and that suffi  cient resources are needed to 
ensure a strong research design, a sample size large enough to capture het-
erogeneity, adequate time for ﬁ eldwork, and the systematic analysis and in-
tegration of data. If both quantitative and qualitative research are under-
taken with rigor, then mixed-method M&E will result in a far better 
understanding of program results than either approach alone. This level of 
understanding is critical to provide eff ective feedback that will improve per-
formance and enable programs to meet their goals.
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CHAPTER 12
Fifteen years ago, Mexico, like most countries, had conducted a few scat-
tered evaluations, but had not implemented systematic performance mea-
surement. Political changes in the late 1990s generated an increased demand 
for transparency and accountability. These changes led to new legislation 
and institutions aimed at strengthening independent government oversight 
through several channels, including external evaluations, public access to 
information, and the creation of a supreme audit institution (Figure 12.1). 
Also in the late 1990s, Mexico implemented Oportunidades,1 an innovative 
conditional cash transfer program with a rigorous impact evaluation built 
into its operational design. The program’s evaluation component became a 
role model within the Mexican public administration. 
The development of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system in Mex-
ico can be divided into two stages. The ﬁ rst phase, from 2000 to 2006, was 
characterized by good intentions, but a limited vision on the institutional 
The author thanks Amparo Ballivian (Lead Economist, LCSPP), Philipp Krause (Consultant, 
Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit [PRMPR]), Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior Economist, 
PRMPR), and Keith Mackay (Consultant, PRMPR) for their comments. The views expressed in 
this chapter are those of the author.
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capacity building required for the new evaluation eff orts. The budget law 
compelled federal programs involving subsidies, cash or in-kind transfers, 
and some infrastructure, health, and education services to carry out annual 
external evaluations. This requirement provided the necessary push to start 
systematic evaluation in Mexico. However, it also implied that ministries 
with incipient experience in this area had to prepare terms of reference, 
identify institutions capable of conducting evaluations, and supervise their 
work. At the time, evaluation guidelines did not distinguish between diff er-
ent types of evaluations. Nonetheless, annual external evaluations were ex-
pected to address questions ranging from compliance with operation rules, 
to program impact, to program cost-beneﬁ t. This was an overwhelming task 
given the nascent institutional capacity on both the demand (ministries) and 
the supply (universities and research institutions) sides. 
Despite the overall implementation shortcomings in this period, some 
ministries made substantial progress in developing sectoral M&E sys-
tems. For example, key champions at the Ministry of Social Development 
(Secretaría de Desarrollo Social [SEDESOL]) embraced the M&E agenda. 
SEDESOL reorganized to create a deputy minister offi  ce in charge of plan-
ning, analysis, and evaluation, and invested in setting up an adequately 
FIGURE 12.1 M&E Legal Framework
Source: Adapted from Rubio, 2009.
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staff ed and resourced evaluation unit. Following the Oportunidades exam-
ple and encouraged by the growing evidence-based approach of many pro-
fessionals in the ﬁ eld, key champions in SEDESOL promoted the use of im-
pact evaluation methodologies in a number of social development programs. 
They also supported the implementation of various innovations, including 
the use of logical frameworks and an evaluation feedback mechanism. Fur-
thermore, the key champions participated in pushing legislation institution-
alizing evaluation and creating the National Evaluation Council (Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación [CONEVAL]), an autonomous institution in charge 
of social program evaluation and poverty measurement. 
M&E during the ﬁ rst phase lacked the incentives and institutional ar-
rangements to ensure the use of the ﬁ ndings. More than 500 external evalu-
ations were conducted in this period, but very little of that information was 
eff ectively used (Castro et al. 2009). Since the driving force behind M&E was 
transparency and accountability, there was little attention to the role that 
evaluation could play in improving government programs. Congress, the 
Ministry of Finance (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP]), and 
the Ministry of Public Management (Secretaría de la Función Pública [SFP]) 
were the main recipients of the evaluation reports. 
The 2006 Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law established a 
governmentwide performance evaluation system. This legislation, coupled 
with a change in administration,2 provided a new impetus to implement the 
M&E system. Fiscal concerns increased SHCP interest in promoting public 
expenditure effi  ciency and eff ectiveness. In addition, international experi-
ences from Chile and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, along with policy dialogue with multilat-
eral institutions, motivated SHCP to renew eff orts to incorporate the perfor-
mance dimension in the budgeting process. 
A key factor leading to the second phase of the M&E system implementa-
tion (2007 to present) has been the strategic partnership between SHCP and 
CONEVAL. The former had the mandate to implement a performance-based 
budget, but its experience in M&E was limited, while the latter had substan-
tial M&E technical expertise, but no “stick” to ensure that ministries outside 
the social sector participated in the system. The combination of forces has 
led to a federal governmentwide M&E system with much better chances of 
sustained utilization. 
In 2007, CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP jointly issued a revised set of evalua-
tion guidelines that introduced technical criteria for regulating M&E activi-
ties and allowed a more selective and strategic approach. Moreover, the 
guidelines established mechanisms to ensure evaluation quality and utiliza-
tion, such as standardized terms of reference, uniform procedures to select 
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performance indicators, creation of evaluation counterparts in line minis-
tries, and a systematic feedback mechanism.
Mexico’s Performance Evaluation System
M&E in Mexico has gradually evolved into the Performance Evaluation 
System (Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño [SED]). SED’s main purpose 
is to assess progress in meeting policy and program objectives to inform 
the  performance-based budgeting decision-making process. It also aims at 
strengthening transparency and accountability. The scope of the system cov-
ers federal government spending by executive branch agencies and federally 
funded programs administered at the local level. This limits the inﬂ uence of 
the government performance focus, since the legislature, judiciary, and au-
tonomous agencies, as well as state and municipal-level spending, are not 
required to participate.3 SED has three main components: performance indi-
cator monitoring, evaluation, and a feedback mechanism.4
Performance indicator monitoring 
Performance indicator monitoring has been part of the M&E system since 
the late 1990s. However, it was initially a challenging exercise. There were 
multiple overlaps of indicator reporting demands from diff erent actors in-
cluding SHCP, SFP, and the presidency. The focus of these indicators on out-
comes was limited. There was no clear understanding of the diff erence be-
tween process, output, and outcome indicators. Moreover, data quality 
standards were absent, resulting in diff erent values for the same indicator. 
Finally, although it had some application for accountability purposes, indica-
tor monitoring was not relevant for decision making.
Since 2007, SED has required programs to identify performance indica-
tors through a logical framework methodology (matrix of indicators for re-
sults [MIR]). MIRs are reported regularly through the SED informatics plat-
form. This information is an input for annual performance evaluations. 
Moreover, a subset of MIR is submitted to Congress as part of the budget 
request. This subset is reported to Congress quarterly during the ﬁ scal year 
and included in the federal government ﬁ nal accounts and Government Ac-
tivities Report. 
The logical framework methodology was adopted to provide a uniﬁ ed 
framework for program planning, monitoring, and evaluation to standardize 
results measurement. Also, it was expected that the process of building the 
framework would help improve consistency and quality in program design. 
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In practice, however, SHCP and line ministry budget offi  cials have struggled 
to take full advantage of the fairly comprehensive performance measure-
ment provided by the framework, given the need to report quarterly a man-
ageable number of indicators. Thus, programs are often discouraged from 
registering in SED a broader set of indicators that may take longer—one year 
or more—to be measured, even if they are necessary to fully account for pro-
gram outcomes. Another diffi  culty with SED is setting meaningful targets 
for indicators resulting from strategic planning exercises. According to the 
2008 speciﬁ c performance evaluation, around 20 percent of indicators 
achieved levels that were 20 percent higher than the established target value. 
This raises questions about the merit of the target setting process.
Evaluation 
Evaluation has struggled to balance the demand for accountability for all 
programs and the need to selectively and strategically apply diff erent ana-
lytical tools to respond to speciﬁ c policy questions. After an ambitious start 
in which evaluations were expected to assess program operation, impact, 
cost-beneﬁ t, and client satisfaction every year, the revised evaluation guide-
lines introduced an Annual Evaluation Program (Programa Anual de Evalu-
ación [PAE]) and a menu of evaluation tools. Each year PAE speciﬁ es which 
evaluation tools will be applied to which programs. Evaluation tools are se-
lected from a comprehensive menu addressing a broad range of policy ques-
tions including program design, operation, impact, and overall performance 
(Box 12.1). The menu of evaluation tools includes various alternatives in 
terms of purpose, audience, and duration. For example, speciﬁ c performance 
evaluations provide rapid feedback for annual program assessment. Impact 
evaluations require a longer implementation period but respond to more 
strategic policy questions. The menu also includes the possibility of analyz-
ing strategies, policies, and institutions. 
The selection of programs and evaluation tools is made jointly by 
CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP by considering programs’ relevance, particular 
policy interest, and previous evaluation results. Ministries can also propose 
 additional evaluations to support policy or management decisions or to get 
speciﬁ c program performance information.
Despite the progress made in promoting a more sensible application of 
evaluation, legislation still requires annual external evaluations of all social 
programs. This entails a number of challenges: ﬁ rst, development of a low-
cost evaluation tool that provides rapid feedback, yet is informative; second, 
identiﬁ cation of objective and technically sound evaluators to conduct over 
100 evaluations every year; third, an organizational structure capable of 
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Design evaluation is conducted on programs 
that are in their fi rst year of implementation. 
The evaluation assesses if a program makes a 
clear contribution to the solution of a particular 
policy problem and if the objectives of the pro-
gram are clearly defi ned and aligned with the 
strategic objectives of its ministry. Moreover, it 
analyzes to what extent there is a sound and 
evidence-based results chain behind program 
design. This evaluation only uses secondary in-
formation and involves no original data collec-
tion. It is mandatory for all new programs and is 
targeted to inform program managers, budget 
offi cials, and other ministry staff. The assess-
ment goal is to identify early on any potential 
problems or fl aws in program design, thereby 
increasing the effectiveness of interventions. 
This assessment is also expected to clarify how 
a new program will add to existing policies, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of duplication.
Process evaluation appraises the effi ciency 
and effi cacy of a program’s operational pro-
cesses and provides feedback for improve-
ment. It allows program managers to identify 
bottlenecks in the program’s service delivery 
mechanisms and leads to improvements in the 
program’s  operation, which then benefi t the 
 target popu lation. As such, it should play an im-
portant role in providing explanations for low 
performance. The process evaluation is imple-
mented on a case-by-case basis and is targeted 
for use by program managers, budget offi cials, 
and other ministry staff.
Program consistency and results evaluation 
is a rapid assessment used to obtain a general 
and comparative perspective of a program’s de-
sign, strategic planning, coverage and target-
ing mechanisms, operation, benefi ciary percep-
tion, and results. It is used to highlight specifi c 
strengths and weaknesses and to motivate 
 decision makers to consider which of these 
should be evaluated in a more rigorous way, us-
ing the other methods. This type of evaluation 
only uses secondary information and involves 
no original data collection. It is targeted at a 
broad range of users, including program manag-
ers, high-level decision makers, and the general 
public.
Impact evaluation seeks to measure changes 
in the conditions of well-being of the target 
population that are attributable to a specifi c pro-
gram. This type of evaluation provides the most 
technically robust evidence about whether a 
program is working or not. As such, its purpose 
is to inform high-level offi cials on whether a 
program should be continued or not, or if any 
potential modifi cations are needed. This kind of 
evaluation is implemented on a case-by-case 
basis and is targeted toward more executive 
levels of government, although it does provide 
useful information to program managers and all 
kinds of government offi cials.
Specifi c performance evaluation is a rapid as-
sessment of program progress in meeting ob-
jectives and annual goals. This type of evalua-
tion analyzes program coverage, MIR monitoring 
data entered in the SED, as well as progress on 
implementing previous evaluations’ recommen-
dations. It is implemented annually for all federal 
programs and is mainly for the review of Con-
gress, executive levels of government, budget 
offi cials, and the general public. 
BOX 12.1
Menu of Evaluations
Source: Updated from Castro et al. (2009).
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planning and implementing such a large number of evaluations; and last but 
not least, a formal process to ensure that evaluation results feed back into 
policy making.
Feedback mechanism 
SED established a feedback mechanism in 2008. Following the completion 
of annual evaluations, program managers, along with planning, evaluation, 
and budget units within ministries, are required to prepare an evaluation 
response document. The document should identify issues for program im-
provement based on evaluation recommendations and classify them accord-
ing to the actors involved in their solution (program operation unit, ministry, 
several ministries, and diff erent government levels) and their relevance in 
achieving program objectives. In addition, each ministry should develop a 
two-level (program and institution) implementation plan to deal with evalu-
ation recommendations that can be addressed at the program operation unit 
and at the ministry level. These plans should outline the improvement ac-
tions, the offi  cials responsible for them, and their timeline. They should be 
published on the ministry’s Web site with the evaluation reports.5
Undoubtedly, this mechanism has helped evaluations get the attention of 
program managers as well as other key actors. Moreover, by requiring an 
institutional plan, it forces ministries to consider sector-wide issues that 
cannot be addressed at the program level. However, program managers or 
ministries often commit to addressing the easier-to-solve problems only. 
They tend to dismiss evaluation ﬁ ndings involving major changes as invalid 
or unfeasible. Furthermore, although annual performance evaluations 
should assess the progress in carrying out improvements, this is only a mild 
incentive to follow up the implementation plan.
Institutional Setup 
SED institutional arrangements result from the parallel eff orts to promote 
M&E. In practice, SED is coordinated by SHCP with technical advice from 
CONEVAL, and some participation by SFP (Figure 12.2).6 Institution-
speciﬁ c roles and responsibilities have been shaped ad hoc by their broader 
mandate and technical capacities. Hence, CONEVAL autonomy and aca-
demic expertise lend to providing technical leadership in deﬁ ning the scope, 
methodologies, and processes of SED evaluation and feedback activities 
(Box 12.2). Moreover, CONEVAL is responsible for evaluating social sector 
programs and ensuring that results feed back into policy making. SHCP is in 
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charge of the performance-based budgeting initiative. It coordinates perfor-
mance monitoring activities and, in principle, ensures that this information 
is used for the budgetary decision-making process. SFP participation is less 
well-deﬁ ned: although it has the mandate to coordinate the internal govern-
ment M&E system, in fact its main focus on oversight has narrowed its per-
spective on the best way to contribute to SED.7
SED institutional arrangements pose some challenges. The fragmented 
institutional responsibility for diff erent sectors and activities is a potential 
source of coordination problems (OECD 2009). SHCP’s coordinating role 
is critical in linking M&E with planning and budgeting. However, SFP par-
ticipation in SED coordination has yet to be thought-out. Moreover, the fact 
that CONEVAL responsibility is limited to the social sector hinders the even 
progress of SED implementation across the public administration. Although 
SED has beneﬁ ted from CONEVAL’s technical guidance, evaluation imple-
mentation outside the social sector still lags. 
Other key players are the SED counterparts in the line ministries. Tradi-
tionally, SHCP’s liaison with line ministries is the Budget Offi  ce, which is 
responsible for implementing the performance-based budgeting process. In 
addition, administrative units in charge of coordinating the contracting, im-
FIGURE 12.2 SED Institutional Arrangements
Source: Author’s compilation.
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plementation, supervision, and feedback of evaluations within line minis-
tries were introduced in 2007. These units are separate from program opera-
tion and their purpose is to ensure that evaluation work within each ministry 
is conducted independently and with the necessary human and ﬁ nancial 
resources. Finally, program operating units have the duty of reporting per-
formance information, providing data needed for evaluation, and imple-
menting evaluation recommendations.8
SED implementation is complemented by congressional budget over-
sight through the Federal Supreme Audit (Auditoría Superior de la Feder-
CONEVAL is the lynchpin of the social sector 
M&E system in Mexico. CONEVAL coordinates 
evaluation activities, sets standards and meth-
odologies for the evaluation of social programs, 
develops evaluation terms of reference, pro-
vides technical assistance to ministries and 
agencies, and undertakes or manages some 
specifi c evaluations. It also coordinates with de-
velopment organizations to plan and undertake 
evaluation work and to advise national entities 
and sub-national governments in the implemen-
tation of their M&E systems, as well as on how 
to conduct quality program evaluations.
In addition, CONEVAL prepares and consoli-
dates evaluation reports and disseminates the 
evaluation fi ndings among Congress, govern-
ment agencies, and civil society. To accomplish 
these tasks, CONEVAL has a staff of 73 profes-
sionals, including administrative personnel, and 
for 2011 has an annual budget of about Mex$155 
million (US$12.4 million).
One particular feature that deserves atten-
tion is the mixed nature of CONEVAL, which is 
a relatively independent government agency 
with a unique governance structure. Although it 
is located within the executive branch and its 
executive director is appointed by the federal 
government, leadership of CONEVAL relies on 
an independent collegiate body made up of 
six academic advisers chosen from certifi ed 
academic institutions. They are democratically 
elected for a period of four years by members 
of the National Social Development Commis-
sion, which includes 32 state government offi -
cials responsible for social development, the 
presidents of the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives Social Development Committees, 
representatives of the national municipal gov-
ernments’ associations, and the heads of fed-
eral government ministries responsible for so-
cial development, education, health, agriculture, 
labor, and environment. The councilors are in-
volved in all of the agency’s decisions and the 
defi nition and review of evaluation projects. 
They also provide general guidance on the ad-
ministrative direction of the institution and play 
an important role in the methodologies for pov-
erty measurement. 
BOX 12.2
The National Evaluation Council for Social Development 
Policy—CONEVAL
Source: Updated from Castro et al. (2009).
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ación [ASF]). ASF conducts performance audits to assess program progress 
in meeting objectives and goals and generate recommendations to improve 
government results. It also reviews performance indicators included in the 
budget. 
Extent of SED Utilization 
SED’s implementation progress is to a large extent the result of the combi-
nation of the M&E legal framework and the public administration’s strong 
legalistic tradition that provides the incentives to comply with SED re-
quirements. However, sustained SED use depends on shifting to a perfor-
mance management and evidence-based policy-making culture through-
out government. This cultural shift is still in the making, but at least a great 
deal of attention has been placed on identifying relevant outlets for SED 
information and formalizing feedback mechanisms. Established proce-
dures feed M&E information back into decision-making processes in four 
areas. A pending task in SED implementation is to systematically monitor 
and publish budget and program or policy decisions informed by M&E 
information. 
1. At the program level, the feedback mechanism described earlier provides 
the connection between evaluation recommendations and program de-
sign and operation. At the end of the 2009 evaluation exercise, CONEVAL 
reported that 78 percent of programs had clearly deﬁ ned areas for im-
provement based on evaluation recommendations and a plan to address 
them. Programs identiﬁ ed on average six subjects for improvement. Most 
of them are design or operational issues that can be addressed at the pro-
gram level, and more than half were considered a high priority for achiev-
ing program objectives. Upcoming results from the 2010 evaluation 
should reveal to what extent programs followed the improvement plans.
2. In the budgeting process, the use of evaluation ﬁ ndings is fostered by 
SHCP through the implementation of performance-based budgeting. 
With the incumbent administration, the Offi  ce of the Presidency has also 
played a key role in supporting this process by considering performance 
information when signaling budget priorities and agreeing on total minis-
try budget ceilings. In preparation for the 2009 budget and building on 
the logical framework exercise, SHCP analysts discussed with their coun-
terparts in line  ministries the progress made in the previous year’s perfor-
mance indicators and proposed indicators and targets for the following 
year. This information was combined with the ministries’ self-assessment 
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and a traffi  c light system developed by CONEVAL, using the 2007 Consis-
tency and Results Evaluation, to create a summary picture of the perfor-
mance of programs and ministries. SHCP top political offi  cials met with 
the presidency to discuss budget ceilings for each ministry considering 
ﬁ scal priorities and performance summaries. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that a few programs received additional resources for performing 
well (OECD 2009). In addition, there are some examples of program im-
provements informed by evaluation ﬁ ndings (Table 12.1). 
3. In social policy decision making, CONEVAL presents summary reports 
of cross-cutting issues revealed by evaluations to the Interministerial 
and the National Social Development Commissions. These commissions 
are in charge of coordinating social policy within the federal government 
and the national level, respectively. For example, some of the 2009 rec-
ommendations include implementing at the local level a maintenance 
scheme of social infrastructure ﬁ nanced by federal programs; simplify-
ing and harmonizing administrative processes across ministries to speed 
up project approval; and clarifying the role of state and municipal gov-
ernments in coﬁ nancing and operating federal programs.
4. In congressional budget oversight, ASF revises program performance in-
dicators and issues an offi  cial report on their consistency, with binding 
recommendations for the programs. Unfortunately, the ASF annual re-
port does not summarize the nature of performance audit recommenda-
tions or their follow up. 
TABLE 12.1 Examples of Use of Evaluation Findings in the 2009 Budget Preparation
Programs Evaluation fi ndings 2009 Budget
1.  Community model for mestizo 
population education
– Need to improve program 
planning 
– Duplication of efforts; a single, 
unifi ed design suggested
Programs were merged into a 
single intervention: Initial and Basic 
Education for Rural Indigenous 
Population
2.  Community model for 
indigenous and migrant 
populations’ education
3. Training support – Limited job skills generation Program was substituted by a new 
intervention focused on supporting 
productivity
4.  Effi cient use of water and 
electricity 
5.  Hydroagricultural infrastructure 
use
– Same target population and 
similar components 
– Merging would simplify 
administrative structure and 
improve monitoring
Programs were integrated into a 
new single intervention: Modern-
ization and Technical Improvement 
of Irrigation Units
Source: Adapted from Castro et al. (2009).
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In addition, national media regularly use evaluation and poverty mea-
surement results published by CONEVAL. There are also some examples of 
civil society organizations beginning to use evaluation ﬁ ndings as a way to 
exert public inﬂ uence.
The Sustainability of the M&E System 
Eff orts to introduce M&E activities have been continuous since the late 
1990s. The ﬁ rst attempts to conduct performance M&E started more than a 
decade ago and continue today. However, the comprehensiveness and suit-
ability as well as the institutional arrangements of the M&E initiatives have 
varied considerably across the three diff erent administrations governing the 
country during this period. Although there is still a long way to go in building 
a successful M&E system, so far the trend has been positive. One explanation 
for this favorable evolution is the combination of local demand for transpar-
ency and accountability and the existing capacity and external technical as-
sistance available from a global trend on performance management.
Nonetheless, the jury is still out on M&E system sustainability, particu-
larly in the case of a change in the governing party. Enabling elements for 
continuity in building an M&E system include a fairly solid legal framework. 
Moreover, demand from civil society and Congress for accountability and 
performance measurement does not seem to be fading away, and the eco-
nomic and political economy factors that contributed to this demand remain 
valid and are likely to persist. Furthermore, to the extent that the civil service 
continues to operate adequately, some public servants who have experi-
enced the change in the way government business is conducted could con-
tribute to sustaining the new evaluation culture. Finally, an encouraging sign 
is the growing development of M&E initiatives at the state level. A number of 
states, regardless of their governing party, have created M&E institutions 
and systems resembling CONEVAL and SED.
A number of risk factors threaten the continuity of the positive trend in 
building and sustaining the M&E system beyond 2012. First, although some 
degree of M&E institutionalization has been achieved, progress to date has 
relied heavily on key champions in the presidency, CONEVAL, line minis-
tries, and SHCP. Many of them are unlikely to remain in offi  ce another term. 
Second, Congress has not fully come to grips with the need of the executive 
branch to have a strong M&E system that supports its management deci-
sions. Congress tends to favor the view of M&E as an accountability tool that 
should be in the hands of control and oversight entities such as ASF or SFP. 
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This is a potential threat to SED credibility and its institutional setup. Fi-
nally, it is inevitable that new administrations will want to make their mark 
in policy making. In some cases, changes may be merely cosmetic or even 
improve the system. However, there are also examples from members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of well-
functioning M&E activities or systems that have suff ered changes compro-
mising eff ectiveness when a new administration takes over. Hence, the chal-
lenge will be to adapt the system to the new administration’s vision while 
retaining the soundness of the critical elements.
Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead 
SED is the result of a conﬂ uence of several factors over time that have led to 
a federal M&E system. Political economy changes since the late 1990s have 
increased the local demand for accountability and transparency, thus pro-
ducing a legal framework promoting M&E. During the early stages, the po-
litical and technical leadership of key champions helped pilot M&E activi-
ties and created crucial institutions such as CONEVAL. Sectoral experience 
served as an example to design and implement a national M&E system to 
support a renewed performance-based budgeting initiative. Performance-
based budgeting was motivated by ﬁ scal concerns and OECD country expe-
riences. Here again, key champions in SHCP, the presidency, and CONEVAL 
promoted the application of sound M&E tools and the use of results in bud-
get and policy decisions. 
Policy dialogue and external technical assistance from diff erent institu-
tions, including the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the OECD, and the World Bank, 
have played a key role in strengthening institutional M&E capacity. In par-
ticular, external support has been critical in generating momentum for re-
forms, ensuring continuous training, learning from other country experi-
ences, and getting access to top-notch technical advice. For example, the 
World Bank supported SEDESOL through an Institutional Development 
Fund grant to design and implement a sectoral results-based M&E system. 
ECLAC technical assistance helped introduce the use of the logical frame-
work methodology, ﬁ rst in the ministry and then across government as part 
of SED. SHCP beneﬁ ted from technical assistance and a grant from IDB. 
Mexico’s well-trained public service has facilitated SED implementation. 
In addition, sustained capacity building through constant training has helped 
overcome limited experience with some M&E methodologies. Continuous 
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training also contributed to maintaining institutional capacity despite staff  
turnover during the change in administration. The introduction of the logical 
framework has been accompanied by widespread instruction of government 
offi  cials and evaluators. There is also regular training and guidance for line 
ministry counterparts to implement SED activities, particularly performance 
indicator monitoring and annual performance evaluations.
Despite its progress, the M&E system in Mexico faces a number of chal-
lenges. First and foremost is sustaining use of the M&E system in budget 
decisions and policy making. The incentives to move toward evidence-based 
policy making and performance budgeting are weak or vulnerable to the 
leadership of key actors. Higher utilization depends on the full engagement 
of four players: Congress, SHCP offi  cials, line ministries, and civil society. As 
OECD (2009) pointed out, the role of Congress in using performance infor-
mation is yet to be fully realized. Congress’s role is critical in holding govern-
ment agencies accountable for their performance and ensuring the use of 
M&E information to inform budget decisions and policy making. M&E in-
formation should be seen as a means for improving public policy eff ective-
ness and government performance rather than as an instrument for control-
ling the executive.
Budget offi  cials in SHCP and line ministries are critical players for using 
M&E in performance budgeting. Hence, it is necessary to change their 
mindset from detailed line item costing and regulation compliance to pol-
icy eff ectiveness and government performance. Their recruitment and 
training should emphasize more policy and analytical skills, including 
evaluation. Internal discussions as well as external negotiations with line 
ministries and Congress will beneﬁ t from an enhanced policy and perfor-
mance focus. 
Internal use of performance information is heterogeneous across minis-
tries, as is their institutional capacity to implement evaluations. Social min-
istries tend to be at the forefront, in part due to CONEVAL guidance, while 
the rest lag behind. It is important to level the capacity across ministries and 
provide incentives for performance management at the program level, for 
example, through benchmarking and showcasing good practices. Executive 
training for top and middle-level management, particularly program manag-
ers, should include performance management principles and practice.
Finally, it is necessary to generate broader demand for the use of perfor-
mance information outside the government. The media, academia, and civil 
society organizations can use publicly available M&E information to hold 
Congress accountable for its decisions, as well as government offi  cials for 
their performance. The media are already regular users of evaluations, but 
they need to focus more on discussing policy issues rather than attacking the 
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government. Academia and civil society organizations could strengthen 
their role in monitoring SED implementation, as well as the use of perfor-
mance information by Congress and the government.
A second challenge of M&E system implementation is the fragmented 
institutional arrangements and ad hoc coordination mechanisms. The stra-
tegic alliance between SHCP and CONEVAL is highly beneﬁ cial for the sys-
tem, but it is vulnerable to changes in leadership and does not take full ad-
vantage of each institution’s potential. SED coordination should remain in 
SHCP, but CONEVAL’s voice and vote in SED design and implementation 
should be institutionalized. Ideally, CONEVAL’s mandate should be ex-
panded to all sectors, making the necessary adjustments to its organiza-
tional structure. However, Congress has rejected this proposal in the past. 
SFP’s role in SED should be reexamined to proﬁ t from its comparative ad-
vantage and avoid unnecessarily cumbersome arrangements. Care should 
be taken not to replicate the pitfalls of institutional arrangements at the 
central level among planning, budgeting, and evaluation units within the 
line ministries.
Last but not least is the challenge of producing quality performance infor-
mation. Speciﬁ cally, a long-term eff ort involving other partners such as the 
National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía) is 
required to improve weak ministerial administrative records and data man-
agement systems. Moreover, it is important to take advantage of national 
surveys, particularly for higher outcome monitoring. Finally, given Mexico’s 
M&E system’s strong reliance on contracting out external evaluations, it is 
necessary to build capacity and expand the evaluators’ market to ensure the 
objectivity and soundness of performance analysis. 
Notes
1. PROGRESA (Education, Health, and Nutrition Program) was launched in 1997 
and it was renamed Oportunidades in 2001.
2. A new administration from the same ruling party came into offi  ce at the end of 
2006.
3. A constitutional reform in 2008 led the way to introducing evaluation at the 
state and municipal level, so the process of building sub-national M&E systems 
is just starting.
4. SED comprises M&E and a Medium-Term Program (Programa de Mediano 
Plazo [PMP]) to increase public spending effi  ciency and reduce administrative 
costs, which has not been fully implemented yet. This chapter focuses only on 
M&E.
5. Since 2004, ministries are required to publish all external evaluations on their 
Web sites.
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6. Although it is not formally a part of SED, the National Institute for Women 
(INMUJERES) participates in some M&E activities, such as revising the gender 
focus of the MIR.
7. SFP is supposed to spearhead the Program for Improving Public Management 
(PMG), in which one of the inputs is recommendations from evaluations. 
However, this initiative has not gotten off  the ground. 
8. According to PMG plans, the chief administrator is the SFP liaison within line 
ministries in charge of coordinating PMG activities with the collaboration of the 
Internal Control Offi  ce.
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Chile’s M&E System
Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna
CHAPTER 13
The Chilean Management Control and Evaluation System (Sistema de Eval-
uación y Control de Gestión) is internationally regarded as an example of how 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) can be successfully put into practice. 
Chilean M&E tools are the product of both cross-national lesson-drawing, 
and national policy learning experiences. The main M&E tools are centrally 
coordinated by the Ministry of Finance’s Budget Offi  ce (Dirección de Presu-
puestos—DIPRES) and promote the use of M&E information in government 
decision-making processes, particularly those related to the budget. 
Elements of the Chilean M&E system are discussed very favorably in 
other chapters of this volume. Authors particularly underline the technical 
quality of the instruments and tools used in Chile. This overall very positive 
depiction is not contradicted by the fact that in Chile as everywhere else, 
there are also shortcomings in practice, and that the system as such is em-
bedded in a particular political and institutional context. The experience 
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described below does not necessarily off er a “model” that can, or should, be 
easily transferred to other countries with diff erent institutional contexts. 
However, the Chilean experience summarized here, covering the period of 
1994–2010, provides interesting examples and highly relevant lessons about 
the beneﬁ ts and limitations of M&E design and implementation. 
The Development of Chile’s M&E System
Chile’s M&E system originates in a series of reform eff orts that go back to the 
1990s. During the presidencies of Patricio Alwyn (1990–94) and particularly 
Eduardo Frei (1994–2000), an administrative modernization agenda gained 
currency among political and technocratic elites. While democratization ad-
vanced in the political realm, the new governing coalition faced a number of 
administrative and managerial challenges for which the Chilean bureau-
cracy was ill-prepared, such as how to ensure policy coordination within the 
central government, how to assess the performance of public programs and 
the eff ectiveness of government policies, and how to better monitor the use 
of public resources. 
In response to these challenges, during the 1990s a set of reform initia-
tives were implemented, including the “ﬁ rst generation” of some of the tools 
that would later become the M&E system that was put in place during 2000–
10. For example, the ﬁ rst round of performance indicators sponsored by 
DIPRES was implemented in 1994, and the ﬁ rst program evaluations and a 
preliminary version of the General Management Reports were both devel-
oped in 1997. A ﬁ rst round of Programs for Management Improvement took 
place in 1998. 
These and other eff orts triggered a process of trial and error within the 
central government. In fact, some of these initiatives were voluntary and 
deemed to be part of a long-term process of M&E capacity building (Marcel 
2006). Public offi  cials thus received training in M&E tool design and imple-
mentation, and actively participated in target-setting and evaluation exer-
cises. Although neither the quality of performance indicators nor the reliabil-
ity of the information produced were ideal (Arenas and Berner 2010), the 
experience and institutional learning process that accompanied these years 
were deﬁ nitely helpful assets when the M&E system was introduced in 2000. 
Whereas the development of these M&E tools originated in Chile’s own 
political transition to democracy, inspiration and some of the initial “techni-
cal” ideas came partly from abroad (Marcel 2006; Armijo 2003). Chilean 
policy makers studied “best practices” through documentation and inter-
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views with government offi  cials in Australia, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand, among other countries. Then a series of seminars took place in San-
tiago in the mid-1990s, in which administrative modernization strategies and 
M&E practices from these and other countries were discussed by national 
and international experts. Additional information was gathered via the study 
of public management reforms, communications with World Bank experts, 
and the participation of DIPRES offi  cials at the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) senior budget offi  cials meetings. In 
the end, Chilean offi  cials did not “copy” any particular foreign model. How-
ever, these cross-national policy learning activities were essential to inform 
them about methodologies and tools used by other countries, which could be 
eventually adapted to ﬁ t the Chilean administrative environment.
The Chilean M&E System 
An M&E system was formally introduced in 2000, centrally coordinated by 
the Ministry of Finance’s DIPRES. Since the 1990s, DIPRES played a key 
sponsorship/management role in developing and implementing M&E tools. 
The Chilean M&E system eventually comprised eight tools (Guzmán 2005, 
2010; Arenas and Berner 2010), which are listed in Table 13.1 and brieﬂ y de-
scribed below. 
Monitoring tools
Strategic deﬁ nitions were introduced in 2000 to provide information about 
each organization’s mission, strategic objectives and products (public goods 
and services provided), and its clients, users and/or beneﬁ ciaries. Every year 
Monitoring tools
Strategic defi nitions 2000
Performance indicators 1994; redesigned in 2000
Comprehensive management reports 1997; redesigned in 2000
Programs for management improvement 1998; redesigned in 2000
Evaluation tools
Government program evaluations 1997; redesigned in 2000
Impact evaluations 2001
Comprehensive spending evaluations 2002
Evaluations of new programs 2009
Source: Author, based on Arenas and Berner (2010).
TABLE 13.1 Chile’s M&E Tools
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public institutions are asked to prepare their strategic deﬁ nitions on the ba-
sis of information provided during the previous year. They also take into ac-
count the government’s priorities set by the Ministry of the Presidency 
(MINSEGPRES) as well as the budgetary priorities deﬁ ned by DIPRES in 
the Budget Law submitted to Congress. 
Strategic deﬁ nitions go hand in hand with performance indicators, which 
are quantitative measurements supposed to reﬂ ect targets/results to be 
achieved annually by each institution in the provision of public services and 
goods. Institutions prepare their performance indicators on the basis of 
those submitted in previous years, in order to facilitate comparisons across 
time and thus provide information about institutional performance. Indi-
cators are designed by each institution, but according to formats and inter-
nationally accepted quality criteria set out by DIPRES. Indicators can be 
process-oriented, product-oriented, or results-oriented, and are required to 
measure eff ectiveness, effi  ciency, economy, or quality of service factors. In-
stitutions are required to notify DIPRES about the means used to verify the 
validity of information used. Performance indicators are then included in 
the Budget Law proposal submitted to Congress.
Comprehensive management reports are a third monitoring tool used by 
the Chilean government. While they have existed since the mid-1990s, the 
ones introduced in 2000 seek to incorporate broader institutional informa-
tion, such as organizational structure, strategic deﬁ nitions, human resources 
management, ﬁ nancial management, the description and justiﬁ cation of tar-
get achievement, and links between this information and the budgetary re-
sources used. Comprehensive management reports are prepared by each in-
stitution following formats and criteria set by DIPRES, and are sent yearly to 
Congress. According to DIPRES, they are also used to comply with the 2003 
State Financial Administration Law, which requires that central government 
organizations provide information about their institutional performance. 
Programs for management improvement (PMIs) are designed around 
ﬁ ve management areas established by DIPRES: human resources, user ser-
vice quality, planning and control, ﬁ nancial administration, and gender 
focus. Ministries/agencies that have completed these areas advance to a 
further stage which includes ISO-9000 certiﬁ cation. Speciﬁ c indicators and 
targets are agreed upon between DIPRES and each institution, so that the 
latter improve their managerial capacity and organizational performance. 
Progress assessment is carried out by an “experts network” and overseen by 
the Tri-Ministerial Committee comprised of DIPRES, the Ministry of Inte-
rior, and MINSEGPRES. PMI annual results are tied to salary increases, and 
are also taken into account when agency funding levels are discussed during 
budget formulation (Guzmán 2005; Zaltsman 2009). 
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Figure 13.1 summarizes the relationships among diff erent actors in man-
aging and implementing monitoring tools in the Chilean system during 
2000–10. 
Evaluation tools
The Chilean M&E system for 2000–10 has also used four evaluation tools. 
These are coordinated by DIPRES on the basis of priorities set out by 
the Interministerial Committee for Evaluation, which is integrated by 
DIPRES, MINSEGPRES, and the Ministry of Planning and Co-operation 
(MIDEPLAN). A key deﬁ ning feature of all evaluations conducted in the 
Chilean government has been the central role assigned to external experts 
(consultants and academics), who are selected through public tendering 
procedures managed and paid by DIPRES. Furthermore, all evaluation 
Source: Author.
Notes: SDs = Strategic Defi nitions; PIs = Performance Indicators; CMRs = Comprehensive Management Reports; PMIs = Programs for 
Management Improvement. 
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practices are meant to follow principles, such as independence, transpar-
ency, reliability, and timeliness of the ﬁ ndings, as well as cost-eff ectiveness 
(Arenas and Berner 2010).
Government program evaluations—introduced in 1997—are conducted by 
panels of three external experts, including one expert in evaluation prac-
tices, one in the policy ﬁ eld/sector under analysis, and one in program/
public management (Guzmán 2010). On the basis of “logical frameworks,” 
which map out the foundations of each program, these experts assess the 
soundness of the program’s design, objectives, internal organization and 
management, and results. Evaluations usually begin in January of each year 
and last for about six months, so that DIPRES can use evaluation ﬁ ndings for 
budget proposal formulation. 
Impact evaluations started in 2001 as a means to know how public pro-
grams ultimately aff ect their beneﬁ ciaries. Impact evaluations usually take 
about 18 months to implement, are based on a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative information, and use a completely diff erent methodological ap-
proach. Instead of logical frameworks, they are based on quasi-experimental 
methods, in which evaluators compare two groups or “populations”: one inte-
grated by beneﬁ ciaries of the program, and another integrated by people who 
did not receive the goods/services provided. Evaluators also measure the vari-
ables under study before and after the program has been implemented, thus 
seeking to eliminate potential measurement biases due to external factors. 
Comprehensive spending evaluations were introduced in 2001 in response 
to a congressional petition. Instead of evaluating a program or agency, com-
prehensive spending evaluations try to evaluate the whole set of institutions 
that integrate a given policy sector. As the name implies, these evaluations 
assume a more comprehensive perspective, and thus usually take a year or so 
to evaluate a varied number of factors, including the links between institu-
tional and sector objectives, management processes, organizational struc-
tures and functions, and services/products provided. 
Evaluations of new programs were introduced in 2009. It seeks to provide 
relevant baselines to more eff ectively evaluate future performance of new 
programs. These evaluations include the selection of a control group from 
the beginning, and are planned to cover an evaluation period of between two 
and three years in total. This type of evaluation is supposed to receive techni-
cal support from an international advisory panel and the University of Chile’s 
Economy Department (Arenas and Berner 2010). 
The ﬁ ndings and recommendations obtained through the various evalua-
tion tools are sent to Congress and are made publicly available through 
DIPRES’s Web site. Within the central government, evaluation results are 
discussed between the ministry or agency involved and DIPRES to deter-
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mine whether the program requires minor adjustments, modiﬁ cations in its 
design or in some of its management systems, a substantial redesign, an insti-
tutional relocation, or termination. Evaluated institutions and DIPRES then 
elaborate work plans, which establish a set of commitments to be imple-
mented during the following two or three years. Institutions report progress 
in their comprehensive management reports and to DIPRES, which then 
includes relevant information in the Budget Law proposal submitted to Con-
gress. Figure 13.2 broadly synthesizes the diff erent activities performed by 
the actors involved in evaluation activities until 2010. 
As the previous description shows, the Chilean M&E system for the 
 period 2000–10 contained a number of diff erent tools designed to serve a 
variety of information demands, as well as a number of actors and institu-
FIGURE 13.2 Chile’s Evaluation Tools and Actors Involved
Source: Author. 
Note: CMRs = Comprehensive Management Reports.
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tions taking part in the design and implementation of the tools. Ministries 
and agencies have been, of course, the main producers of relevant informa-
tion. Similarly, they have been responsible for adjusting their institution’s 
management, organization, and policy in response to their performance re-
ported in indicators and PMIs and evaluation ﬁ ndings and recommenda-
tions. Some particular ministries, such as MINSEGPRES, the Ministry of 
Interior, or MIDEPLAN, have played important albeit limited roles at cer-
tain points or with regard to speciﬁ c M&E tools. Congress has received all 
relevant information through comprehensive management reports or as 
part of the Budget Law proposal prepared by DIPRES. While Congress has 
had some inﬂ uence in determining areas for evaluation, it has remained a 
rather passive consumer of M&E information. 
At the other extreme, DIPRES has played the crucial role in every phase 
of the system. DIPRES has overseen the production of targets and perfor-
mance indicators, had the ﬁ nal word regarding which evaluations should be 
conducted, set the general criteria and procedures to select evaluators, coor-
dinated information gathering, followed up on institutional improvements, 
and has been in charge of linking monitoring data and evaluation ﬁ ndings 
with budget preparation and proposals. 
Achievements of the Chilean M&E System 
2000–10
What were the main achievements of the Chilean experience during the 
 period of 2000–10? First, the Chilean M&E reforms have contributed to de-
veloping a “measurement”-orientated culture across central government 
ministries and agencies. This is recognized by current and former DIPRES 
offi  cials, public servants in other ministries, and various academic and inter-
national assessments. Nowadays, central government offi  cials seem to un-
derstand the relevance of measuring outputs, setting targets, assessing pro-
grams, and evaluating policy impacts. Furthermore, they apparently see 
these as regular activities that are both an essential component of Chile’s 
management and control system and of contemporary public management 
practices. 
Second, data produced by the various M&E tools has been used for mak-
ing budgetary policy decisions (Arenas and Berner 2010; Rojas et al. 2005; 
Zaltsman 2009). As mentioned above, high levels of PMI achievement are 
linked to salary increases, which in turn have impacted budget levels for 
incumbent agencies. Similarly, evaluation results have sometimes aff ected 
agency appropriations, as evaluation recommendations require increased 
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resources for implementation. DIPRES has also been more open to increase 
budget appropriations proposals for high performing agencies. By the same 
token, poor performing agencies (those with low results in their PMIs 
or with poor evaluation results) have been occasionally “punished” by 
DIPRES, either in terms of budget reductions or by rejecting budget in-
crease requests (Zaltsman 2009). This link between M&E tools and budget-
ary policy making acquires particular relevance when one takes into ac-
count the following data for the period 1997–2004 (Rojas et al. 2005): about 
64 percent of Chile’s budget had been subject to various kinds of evaluations 
even then. Between 2000 and 2008, 393 evaluations were carried out. Sixty-
four percent of these recommended major adjustments or substantial rede-
sign of the evaluated program, a further 23 percent recommended minor 
adjustment. Eighty-two percent of these recommendations were subse-
quently implemented fully, and a further 11 percent implemented partially 
(see also the discussion in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1).
Third, the Chilean government has made a signiﬁ cant eff ort to use evalu-
ation results for making policy and management decisions (Guzmán 2005, 
2010; Rojas et al. 2005). Information produced by impact evaluations, for 
example, has been employed to refocus links between policies and beneﬁ cia-
ries. Government program evaluation results have been used by agencies to 
improve internal management processes as well as for redesigning logical 
frameworks or performance indicators. Evaluation results have also in-
formed decisions about institutional relocation of programs or, in some 
cases, have even led to policy termination. All of this has been possible 
 because of DIPRES’s forceful role in agreeing to program changes with 
 ministries/agencies, monitoring the extent of implementation, and enforc-
ing compliance through its high level of power and inﬂ uence. This has been 
possible, in turn, because of Chile’s institutional setting (constitution and 
budget legal framework), which provide DIPRES with a leverage potential 
that is not that common in other OECD countries.
Fourth, Chile’s M&E system has introduced mechanisms for promoting 
the objectivity, impartiality, and reliability of evaluation procedures and 
ﬁ ndings. As described above, external experts (consultants and academics) 
have been involved in the design and implementation of evaluations. This 
has served to increase the expertise with which evaluations are carried out, 
as well as their validity and reliability.
Lastly, the Chilean M&E system of 2000–10 has acquired a high level of 
institutionalization within the central government administration. Based on 
a continuous work that spans more than a decade, evaluation units have 
been created in almost every government ministry and agency. Many public 
servants have been (and continue to be) involved in M&E and broader ad-
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ministrative modernization activities. M&E activities have been coordinated 
by DIPRES’s Management Control Division, which was created explicitly 
for that purpose in 2000. Implementation of most M&E instruments has 
taken place on a regular basis during the past decade, with formats and 
methodologies that are by now well known by ministries and agencies. 
Limitations of the Chilean M&E System 2000–10
Despite the achievements described above, various analysts, users, and man-
agers have also pointed out important limitations in the design and manage-
ment of the Chilean M&E system as it has worked during 2000–10. First of 
all, DIPRES’s crucial role in promoting and ensuring the use of the M&E 
system has brought with it some signiﬁ cant issues. For instance, M&E infor-
mation has in the end been mainly used by DIPRES, but less so by other bu-
reaucratic actors, Congress, or the Chilean society (Rojas et al. 2005). Simi-
larly, DIPRES’s control over the design and management of the M&E tools 
has introduced a strong budgetary-centered perspective, which has left 
aside alternative values (planning, participation) that are present in other 
international experiences. These might need to be addressed in the future if 
the M&E system seeks to contribute to public results and democratic ac-
countability considerations, and not only to budgetary policy making and 
internal bureaucratic control.
A second limitation, closely related to the previous one, has been the 
downside of the high level of centralization achieved by DIPRES (May et al. 
2006; Rojas et al. 2005). Relationships between DIPRES and the other par-
ticipating agencies have been rather asymmetrical, with the latter having 
limited inﬂ uence on deﬁ ning performance indicators and evaluation crite-
ria. This has signiﬁ cantly aff ected the degree of ownership from senior civil 
servants in agencies and ministries regarding evaluation results and recom-
mendations. Moreover, according to a recent study by Zaltsman (2009, 455), 
“certain aspects of Chile’s budgetary process limit the beneﬁ ts that can be 
gained from use of performance information. One of them is the relatively 
little room for maneuvering that agency offi  cials have to decide on allocation 
of their appropriated resources without DIPRES approval.” These features 
have limited the system’s legitimacy among central government institutions, 
as well as its potential transferability to other nations. 
A third set of limitations are in the technical dimension of the Chilean 
M&E system. A World Bank study of Chile’s evaluation tools carried out in 
2005, for example, pointed out that the quality of some early evaluation re-
ports has not always been in line with international standards (Rojas et al. 
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2005). Another World Bank study (2008) also pointed out that the PMI 
might be too complex to manage and verify, as well as too homogenous for 
the heterogeneous conditions of the Chilean public administration. A recent 
document by DIPRES similarly states that the quality and relevance of the 
performance indicators and targets used in the budget preparation process 
require further reﬁ nement, and that the various monitoring and evaluation 
tools have yet to achieve better integration (Arenas and Berner 2010). Fur-
thermore, broader “inter-sectoral” indicators and evaluation frameworks 
are missing for situations where multiple institutions share both tasks and 
responsibility over a given policy/program (May et al. 2006, 17). Lastly, some 
observers have suggested that the Chilean government should actually dedi-
cate more resources to evaluations, and even spend a higher amount of pub-
lic resources in individual evaluations of programs that might be particularly 
relevant because of their social impact (May et al. 2006; Guzmán 2010).
Finally, two central limitations of the sometimes called “Chilean model” 
relate to the nature of the system as it has evolved during 2000–2010. The 
World Bank study stated that Chile’s evaluation program “has not showed 
yet the speciﬁ c way or degree in which it contributes to increasing the ef-
fectiveness and effi  ciency of public expenditure” (Rojas et al. 2005, 16). Fur-
thermore, the M&E system may not have become systematically linked to 
other monitoring frameworks developed within the Chilean government 
during the same period. In particular, this has been the case with regard to 
MINSEGPRES’s scheme for monitoring ministerial goals and indicators, 
which has been in place since the early 1990s. While these are issues that 
aff ect other countries as well, they will certainly remain central challenges 
for the Chilean government in the near future. These limitations do not nec-
essarily undermine the high technical quality achieved by most of the ele-
ments that comprise the M&E system. They show, however, that when M&E 
is implemented in a particular context, there are always tradeoff s between 
competing priorities and constraints to overcome.
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has off ered a brief introduction to Chile’s M&E system, from 
its origins in the mid-1990s to the way it functioned during the period 
2000–10. The experience of the Chilean system provides useful information 
about the way M&E works in practice, the beneﬁ ts M&E can have for 
decision-making processes, policy implementation, and program evaluation, 
and the potential limitations that governments elsewhere might face when 
developing M&E tools. 
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The case of Chile off ers a set of interesting lessons about the “nuts and 
bolts” of M&E systems, including both its advantages and potential limita-
tions. For example, Chile’s various M&E tools have been designed to solve 
speciﬁ c government needs, and not because of external international pres-
sures or fashions. Performance indicators were implemented when mea-
surements of agency performance across time were deemed to be necessary, 
and impact evaluations were introduced when it was considered that gov-
ernment program evaluations were not providing enough information about 
policy eff ectiveness. Similarly, the Chilean experience exempliﬁ es how 
timely and relevant M&E information can enrich decisions about budgetary 
policy making, as well as about program management or policy reﬁ nement/
termination. 
The case of Chile suggests how a strong institutional leadership (in this 
case that of DIPRES) might be key for ensuring a system’s institutionaliza-
tion and continued relevance, but might also “bias” the purpose of the sys-
tem and the way information is eventually used/owned. In the end, the Chil-
ean experience exempliﬁ es how M&E capacity building is a long-term 
process, in which methodologies need to be adjusted, practical shortcom-
ings have to be periodically addressed, and the design and use of M&E tools 
require continuous adaptation.
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The Australian Government’s 
M&E System
Keith Mackay
CHAPTER 14
Countries from all over the world have shown an interest in Australia’s expe-
rience in creating a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system that supports 
evidence-based decision making and performance-based budgeting. The 
Australian M&E system, in existence from 1987 to 1997, was generally con-
sidered to be one of the most successful in the world and was driven by the 
federal Department of Finance (DoF). This chapter discusses the genesis, 
characteristics, and success of this particular system and brieﬂ y considers 
the Australian government’s approach to M&E after the system was abol-
ished. The contrast between these two periods provides many valuable in-
sights into success factors and challenges facing M&E systems, and into im-
plementing evidence-based decision making more broadly. 
By the early 1980s, Australia was facing a very diffi  cult economic situa-
tion—not unlike the current diffi  culties faced by many developed and devel-
oping countries. A reformist Labor government was elected in 1983, and it 
For their comments, the author thanks Jim Brumby (Sector Manager, Public Sector Gover-
nance), Philipp Krause (Consultant, Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit [PRMPR]), as well as 
Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior Economist, PRMPR), and Jaime Saavedra (Director, PRMPR). 
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was committed to a substantial reorientation of public spending toward the 
poor, while also signiﬁ cantly reducing budget spending. By 1989–90, the La-
bor government had reduced the budget share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) from 30 to 23 percent—a major reduction by international standards. 
The ﬁ scal pain of budgetary cuts was shared by the federal, state, and territo-
rial governments. The federal government collects the bulk of taxes in Aus-
tralia, and it provides considerable funding to other levels of government. 
Most public services are the responsibility of the states and territories. 
The federal government wanted not simply to reduce spending, but also 
to signiﬁ cantly improve its effi  ciency and eff ectiveness and thereby receive 
greater value for its money from government expenditures. A number of 
public sector reforms were implemented to encourage this new approach, 
including a substantial devolution of powers and responsibilities to govern-
ment departments known as “letting the managers manage.” The reforms 
also included a series of changes to streamline the budget system and enable 
the budget process to focus on “big picture” policy issues rather than on 
smaller details. Thus, Australia led the world in introducing a medium-term 
expenditure framework, a system of budget forward estimates, and consoli-
dated running costs. 
DoF was a major driver of these public sector reforms and had the active 
support of other central departments and a number of reform-oriented 
 government ministers. The senior leadership of DoF wanted to shift the 
 departmental focus from relatively minor spending issues to higher-level 
policy issues, as spelled out in its policy analysis and brieﬁ ngs prepared for 
the annual budget process. 
While DoF leadership had hoped that sector departments and agencies 
would conduct M&E to help them manage their own performance, it was 
evident that they were not prepared to do so. DoF therefore asked the Cabi-
net to agree to a formal evaluation strategy to force departments (and agen-
cies) to plan and conduct evaluations on a systematic basis (Box 14.1). Cabi-
net agreement was formalized in a cabinet decision. In Westminster systems 
of government, such decisions virtually have the force of law, and few public 
servants would dare to defy them. An advantage of such decisions is that 
they can be taken quickly; a disadvantage is that the lack of a legislative basis 
means they can easily be reversed when there is a change in government.1
Main Characteristics of the M&E System
Evaluation was the most important component of the M&E system. Evalua-
tion was stressed because it was considered to be much more valuable than 
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performance information due to the detailed insights it could provide into 
issues of causality. Some eff ort was paid to the collection and publication of 
monitoring information, but mainly from 1995 onward.
The evaluation strategy had three main objectives. The ﬁ rst, and arguably 
the most important, objective was to provide fundamental information about 
program performance to aid Cabinet decision making and prioritization, 
particularly in the annual budget process when a large number of competing 
proposals are advocated by individual ministers. The second objective was 
to encourage program managers within departments to use evaluations 
to improve their programs’ performance. Lastly, the strategy aimed to 
strengthen accountability in a devolved environment by providing formal 
evidence of program managers’ oversight and management of program re-
sources. The strategy thus had the important element of letting the manag-
ers manage.
It was the responsibility of individual departments to conduct their own 
evaluations: they decided which programs to evaluate, the focus of each 
evaluation, and the evaluation techniques that would be used. Many diff er-
ent types of evaluations were conducted, including rapid evaluations, which 
can take at least three to four months to complete; rigorous impact evalua-
tions taking 12–18 months; and cost-beneﬁ t analyses, which were conducted 
mostly for infrastructure investments. A sample of these evaluations showed 
There were four formal requirements:
• That every program be evaluated every 3–5 years
• That each portfolio (that is, comprising a line department plus outrider agen-
cies) prepare an annual portfolio evaluation plan, with a 3-year forward cov-
erage, and submit it to DoF—these plans were to comprise major program 
evaluations with substantial resource or policy implications
• That ministers’ new policy proposals include a statement of proposed ar-
rangements for future evaluation 
• That completed evaluation reports should normally be published, unless 
there exist important policy sensitivity, national security, or commercial-in-
confi dence considerations, and that the budget documentation that depart-
ments table in parliament each year should also report major evaluation 
fi ndings.
BOX 14.1
The Australian Government’s Evaluation Strategy
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that their cost ranged from about $56,000 to $560,000 (in 1993 prices); their 
average cost was about 1 percent of the annual cost of the program being 
evaluated. Departments could decide not to evaluate a program if it had re-
cently been subject to a performance audit by the national audit offi  ce, since 
these audits were also regarded as a form of evaluation. 
Although features of the evaluation strategy were devolved, key aspects 
were centralized. The strategy itself was designed and managed by the DoF. 
By overseeing the strategy, DoF played a strong quality assurance role, and it 
could amend the strategy when it deemed an element to be ineff ective. DoF 
also used its signiﬁ cant power and inﬂ uence as the central budget agency 
(and as the overseer of departments’ ﬁ nancial estimates) to promote the 
beneﬁ ts of evaluations, and to point out to departments if they were not in-
vesting suffi  cient eff ort into evaluation. The DoF desk offi  cers (and also the 
desk offi  cers of the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet) who “shadowed” each line department and agency would fre-
quently attempt to inﬂ uence the evaluation plans of the line departments. 
The key aspects of evaluation plans were the decisions about which pro-
grams would be evaluated, when, and which particular issues would be ad-
dressed in each evaluation. DoF involvement was intended to ensure that 
evaluations addressed the diffi  cult issues of program performance (rather 
than bland, uncontroversial issues) in an honest and objective manner. 
Major disagreements concerning evaluation planning priorities would often 
be escalated to the ministerial level. DoF desk offi  cers would also seek to 
become involved in major evaluations, usually through participation in eval-
uation steering committees and by commenting on draft evaluation reports. 
Figure 14.1 represents the evaluation planning and reporting relationships 
among the key stakeholders inside and outside government. 
The evaluation strategy lasted from 1987 to 1997, and continued to evolve 
over this entire period. It required eff ort to create the M&E system, and it 
was also found to be important to monitor the M&E system itself, so that 
DoF and other stakeholders could understand what was working well and 
what was not, and identify areas for improvement. A lot of trial and error was 
needed to progressively reﬁ ne the M&E system. 
By the mid-1990s, about 160 major evaluations were under way at any 
point in time. Evaluations were deﬁ ned as “major” if they related to pro-
grams that involved large expenditures or were of major policy signiﬁ cance. 
This level of evaluation activity involved considerable eff ort on the part of 
DoF, as well as on the part of departments and agencies.
While Australia’s overall M&E system stressed evaluation, it became 
clearer in the 1990s that insuffi  cient attention had been paid to the regular 
collection, reporting, and use of performance information. DoF had hoped 
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that by stressing the planning and conduct of evaluations, which can be tech-
nically diffi  cult, departments would be induced to improve their collection 
of performance information. However, DoF reviews found evidence that 
program performance was not being well measured nor reported using per-
formance information. Thus in 1995, DoF secured the Cabinet’s agreement 
to a rolling series of in-depth reviews of the objectives and key performance 
information for every government program. These reviews were conducted 
jointly by DoF and each line department. They provided the new govern-
ment elected in 1996 some of the groundwork for shifting the emphasis to 
performance information.
Another initiative related to performance information was the publica-
tion, from 1995 onward, of annual reports on service delivery by the federal, 
state, and territorial governments.2 These reports included public hospitals, 
schools and vocational training, public housing, police, court administration, 
and prisons. Initially these reports covered $38 billion in annual expendi-
tures, or about 9 percent of GDP, and their coverage has since expanded.3 
The purpose of these reports was to provide greater transparency and ac-
countability for government programs. In addition, it was hoped that the 
reports would both support and spur improved performance by enabling 
comparison across diff erent jurisdictions—described as “yardstick competi-
tion”—and thus help to identify best practice.
Source: Author.
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Success Factors and Obstacles
The fact that M&E information—especially evaluation ﬁ ndings—was fre-
quently used was due to a number of factors. The strong support of reform 
champions at the most senior levels of DoF, and of reformist ministers in the 
government, was particularly important. DoF was highly active in managing 
the M&E system and in both coercing and supporting departments to under-
take M&E. DoF’s incentives included carrots, sticks, and sermons. The car-
rots included the evaluation advisory support provided by DoF, such as eval-
uation handbooks, introductory M&E training, and identiﬁ cation of good 
practice departmental M&E arrangements, as well as access to resource 
agreements to help line departments improve management of their under-
performing programs. The sticks included DoF’s ability to inﬂ uence line de-
partments’ budget allocations and to escalate department disputes to the 
ministerial level. DoF also had the option of embarrassing departments by 
releasing the comparative rankings it prepared concerning departments’ ap-
proaches to the planning and conduct of evaluations. The sermons included 
persistent advocacy by the secretary and senior executives of DoF, as well as 
explicit evaluation support from some powerful ministers. 
Another success factor was cultural change within DoF. Its budget ana-
lysts were capable, tough-minded, and very conservative. Thus it was a chal-
lenge to change their mindset from focusing on detailed line item costs to 
focusing on high-level policy concerned with the performance of govern-
ment programs. This required strong leadership and advocacy by successive 
DoF secretaries. Staff  turnover was also required, with more emphasis on 
research and policy skills and less emphasis on accounting skills. Evaluation 
experience became one of the selection criteria in the annual recruitment 
rounds for section heads in DoF.
The availability of evaluation ﬁ ndings helped DoF and line departments 
improve the quality of their policy advice to ministers: advice became more 
evidence-based. It became understood that the budget process was a “mar-
ketplace of ideas,” where evaluation ﬁ ndings could provide a competitive ad-
vantage. As the government’s chief microeconomic adviser recently stated: 
Policy decisions will typically be inﬂ uenced by much more than objective 
 evidence, or rational analysis. Values, interests, personalities—in short, 
 democracy—determine what actually happens. But evidence and analysis can 
nevertheless play a useful, even decisive, role in informing policy makers’ judg-
ments. Importantly, they can also condition the political environment in which 
those judgments need to be made. Without evidence, policy makers must fall 
back on intuition, ideology, or conventional wisdom—or, at best, theory alone. 
(Banks 2009, 3)
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Of course, having plentiful M&E information and having good quality 
policy advice are not suffi  cient. If governments are not inﬂ uenced by this 
information and advice, then there might be little point in creating an M&E 
system. But a powerful success factor in Australia was having reformist min-
isters who were not only receptive to M&E information, but who actively 
demanded it—as seen in a number of Cabinet policy and budget debates 
where evaluation ﬁ ndings were explicitly discussed by ministers. 
The M&E system was not perfect, and it ran into several obstacles. One 
obstacle was the lack of available training in advanced evaluation techniques, 
as well as a shortage of trained evaluators in departments and agencies. 
These entities often responded to formal evaluation requirements by relying 
on their operational program managers and their staff  to be responsible for 
conducting the evaluations. However, the staff  usually possessed few evalu-
ation skills and also lacked experience in outsourcing evaluations. On the 
other hand, this devolutionary approach helped ensure that the evaluations 
drew on the staff  program expertise and that there was a high level of owner-
ship of the evaluation ﬁ ndings—both of these may be diffi  cult to achieve with 
externally conducted evaluations. 
Some departments successfully addressed the need for more advanced 
skills and experience by setting up a central evaluation unit to provide advice 
on methodology and training in research and evaluation and participate in 
evaluation steering committees. Although the national audit offi  ce and DoF 
both advocated such central units as examples of good practice, most line 
departments chose not to follow this approach. Therefore the lack of evalu-
ation skills resulted in a reduction in the quality of some evaluations—the 
national audit offi  ce found that over one-third of a sample of evaluation re-
ports suff ered from methodological weaknesses of one kind or another. Of 
course, if line departments relied on poor quality evaluations in the new 
policy proposals that their ministers sent to the Cabinet, DoF would cer-
tainly advise the Cabinet that the evaluation was unreliable.
Extent of Utilization of the M&E System
Clear evidence indicates that evaluations were used intensively in the bud-
get process during the 1987–96 period. DoF conducted several surveys on 
the extent to which evaluation ﬁ ndings inﬂ uenced budget proposals pre-
pared by line department offi  cials for submission to the Cabinet. The survey 
participants were DoF offi  cers, who carefully analyzed all new policy pro-
posals and who typically attended all Cabinet meetings concerned with bud-
get issues. Because of their involvement, these DoF offi  cers had ﬁ rst-hand 
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knowledge of the inﬂ uence of evaluation ﬁ ndings on the budget proposals of 
line ministers and on the meetings of Cabinet ministers who made the ﬁ nal 
decisions on budget allocations. The close familiarity of DoF offi  cers with 
these proposals and with any evaluations or reviews on which they were 
drawn, and also their participation in Cabinet budget meetings, gave them 
an insider’s perspective on the inﬂ uence of evaluation ﬁ ndings. 
In the 1990–91 budget, some US$230 million of new policy proposals sub-
mitted by line ministers were judged to have been directly or indirectly inﬂ u-
enced by the ﬁ ndings of an evaluation. By 1994–95, the last year for which 
estimates were available, this had risen to US$2.3 billion. Measured in dollar 
terms, the proportion of new policy proposals inﬂ uenced by evaluation ﬁ nd-
ings rose from 23 to 77 percent over that period; and for most of these, the 
inﬂ uence of evaluation was judged by DoF offi  cers to be both direct and ma-
jor. These results indicate that line department staff  and ministers felt that it 
was important to use evaluation ﬁ ndings to strengthen their new policy pro-
posals. Ministers often expressed that it was valuable to them to have evalu-
ation ﬁ ndings available for their Cabinet debates. Overall, it was very helpful 
to have had the active support of key Cabinet ministers to encourage portfo-
lios to plan and conduct high-quality evaluations. This support was also re-
ﬂ ected by the many Cabinet decisions that called for evaluations of speciﬁ c 
programs or issues.
Evaluations can have a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on the “savings options”4 put 
forward by DoF or by portfolios for Cabinet consideration in the budget pro-
cess. In 1994–95, about US$500 million of savings options—or 65 percent of 
the total—were inﬂ uenced by evaluation ﬁ ndings, and this inﬂ uence was 
usually judged to be major. This emphasis on evaluation ﬁ ndings was en-
couraged by the nature of the budgetary system in the Australian govern-
ment. Australia had a well-functioning policy decision-making mechanism 
that made the costs of competing policies transparent and encouraged de-
bate and consultation among stakeholders within government. 
DoF offi  cers were also surveyed for their opinions on the extent to which 
evaluation ﬁ ndings had inﬂ uenced the Cabinet’s ﬁ nal decisions—separate 
from the inﬂ uence of evaluation on the proposals drafted by offi  cials and 
submitted by sector ministers to the Cabinet—in the 1993–94 and 1994–95 
budgets. While the evidence is mixed, it indicates that evaluation ﬁ ndings 
played a substantive role. In 1994–95, evaluation ﬁ ndings were assessed to 
have inﬂ uenced the Cabinet’s decision in 68 percent of the US$3.74 billion of 
proposals considered (new policy proposals plus savings options). The cor-
responding proportion for the 1993–94 budget, however, was only 19 percent 
of proposals. One important reason for this diff erence was the substantial 
revision of labor market, industry, regional, and aboriginal policies in the 
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1994–95 budget—the major policy review on which these decisions were 
based had been heavily inﬂ uenced by a number of evaluations commissioned 
speciﬁ cally to help guide the policy review.
The observation of the Auditor-General is worth noting: 
In my view, the success of evaluation at the federal level of government . . . was 
largely due to its full integration into the budget processes. Where there was 
a resource commitment, some form of evaluation was necessary to provide 
 justiﬁ cation for virtually all budget bids. (Barrett 2001, 13)
It is interesting to speculate on whether the returns to M&E declined over 
the decade in which the evaluation strategy was in existence. When the eval-
uation strategy was created in 1987, there would have been a number of un-
derperforming programs, and subsequent evaluations could be expected to 
have revealed their poor effi  ciency, eff ectiveness, or appropriateness. This 
would usually have led to the programs being improved (especially if they 
were an important government priority) or else cut or even abolished. But 
by the time the strategy was abolished in 1997, most programs would have 
been evaluated more than once, and it might be expected that the marginal 
returns to M&E would have declined. However, the heavy reliance on M&E 
information in the 1994–95 budget does not lend support to this possibility. 
Because there is no information on the changing returns to M&E over time, 
this issue cannot be investigated further.
A survey conducted in 1997 by the national audit offi  ce found that evalu-
ation ﬁ ndings were highly utilized by line departments for ongoing opera-
tions and internal management. The survey also found that the impact or 
use of evaluation ﬁ ndings by line departments was most signiﬁ cant for im-
provements in operational effi  ciency and, to a lesser extent, for resource al-
location decisions and the design of service quality improvements to beneﬁ t 
clients. This high level of utilization was a strength of the Australian evalu-
ation system: evaluation was essentially a collaborative eff ort involving DoF, 
other central departments, and line departments. Although responsibility 
for evaluation was largely devolved to line departments, the involvement of 
the central departments in the planning and oversight of major evaluations 
helped achieve broad ownership of the evaluations themselves and of their 
ﬁ ndings.
The Sustainability of the M&E System
While the future sustainability of any existing M&E system can be diffi  cult to 
predict, that question has been answered for the M&E system created in Aus-
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tralia in 1987: it was abolished in 1997 following the change in government in 
1996. By far the most signiﬁ cant component of the M&E system was evalua-
tion, and the evaluation strategy that DoF had centrally managed was abol-
ished. There had been considerable opposition on the part of line depart-
ment secretaries to the creation of the evaluation strategy in 1987, mainly on 
the grounds that it was an intrusion into their areas of responsibility. How-
ever, once the strategy was established, there was little opposition during the 
following decade. This changed with the change in government in 1996. The 
new conservative government distrusted the public service, which it down-
sized by 20 percent over three years, and it also wanted to signiﬁ cantly sim-
plify public administration. Line departments took this opportunity to high-
light the burden of planning and conducting evaluations. These arguments 
immediately found a receptive audience with the new government, which 
had decided to devolve many central functions to line departments and agen-
cies, thus freeing them from most central controls and requirements. Evalu-
ation was only one of many central requirements that were abolished or sig-
niﬁ cantly weakened; while evaluation was offi  cially encouraged, the decision 
to conduct evaluations was essentially left to line department secretaries. 
The government placed much more emphasis on the collection and report-
ing of performance information, mainly for accountability purposes. How-
ever, there was little central oversight of this information by DoF, and no real 
attempt at quality control, with the result that the published performance 
information was severely criticized by a number of parliamentary commit-
tees, the national audit offi  ce, senior offi  cials, academics, and others.
Other devolved functions included the setting of pay and conditions for 
public servants (individual employment contracts were also introduced) and 
responsibility for ﬁ nancial estimates. DoF was downsized considerably, 
most of its policy analysis areas were abolished, and its responsibility for 
maintaining and overseeing the ﬁ nancial estimates of line entities—a tradi-
tional core function of any central budget agency—was removed. At the same 
time, the new government decided to rely heavily on sources outside the 
civil service for advice on policy issues, such as business consulting ﬁ rms in 
the private sector.
Instead of the evaluation strategy, the new government created a new 
Outcomes and Outputs Framework that required all departments and min-
isters to specify the government outcomes (that is, objectives) toward which 
they were working, and also to specify the departmental outputs, such as 
service delivery for speciﬁ c target groups, that would be produced to help 
achieve these outcomes. By 2004, departments and agencies collectively had 
199 outcomes and usually between one and 10 outputs each. These outcomes 
and outputs (including their quantity, quality, and costs) were required to be 
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reported to the Parliament in each department’s annual report and in their 
budget documentation. However, this framework suff ered from a number 
of fundamental conceptual and implementation diffi  culties (discussed by 
Mackay 2011a, b), including:
• Poor speciﬁ cation of outcomes, using only broad, aspirational terms.
• Poor logical links between many outputs and outcomes.
• Lack of reporting on unmet targets, or on areas where performance was 
poor.
• Diff erent speciﬁ cations of outputs and outcomes by diff erent depart-
ments, making it very diffi  cult to make comparisons.
• Continuing changes in deﬁ nitions over time, making it very diffi  cult to 
conduct time series comparisons.
This performance framework is widely judged to have been a failure, and 
it was abolished by a later government in 2009.
Although the M&E system was abolished in 1997, it had been hoped that 
an evaluation culture would take hold within the departments and agencies, 
and that these entities would have been more than willing to continue to 
conduct evaluations for their own purposes—to aid their own policy devel-
opment, prioritization of activities, ongoing program management, and for 
accountability purposes. By 2003, six years after the deregulation of evalua-
tion, some departments still devoted considerable priority to evaluation, and 
some could be considered good practice in a number of respects, including 
the departments of family and community services, employment, and 
health.5 However, even these departments tended to conduct evaluation 
less frequently, to address only particular issues on a selective basis. It is not 
clear whether any departments continued to conduct evaluations as regu-
larly or as systematically as they did under the previous evaluation strategy. 
There has been no analysis of the reasons why these islands of good practice 
evaluation persisted after the ending of the government’s evaluation strat-
egy. However, one likely reason includes the personal commitment of some 
key individuals in these departments—that is, champions of M&E. Another 
reason could be the corporate culture and mindset of professional staff  in the 
areas of health and education, whose professional training emphasized the 
value of research, evaluation, monitoring, and statistics. The reality that 
most departments and agencies appear to engage in little evaluation activity 
would suggest that a wholly devolutionary approach to evaluation is insuf-
ﬁ cient—both for purposes of internal management and to support evidence-
based decision making. 
It is important to speculate on possible reasons why a broader evaluation 
culture did not persist. One reason may be that many departmental secretar-
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ies and their ministers are naturally disinclined to conduct evaluations. 
While positive evaluation ﬁ ndings are always welcome, adverse ﬁ ndings can 
pose signiﬁ cant political and reputational risks. Another important risk fac-
tor was the departure of key reform champions—not just reformist minis-
ters, but also the leading champions of M&E in the central departments, who 
were either advised to retire or were moved to less inﬂ uential positions. It is 
well known from other countries that the existence of such champions is a 
key factor for the creation and sustainability of a successful M&E system.
The main factor that led to the dismantling of the M&E system was the 
change in government in 1996. The new government believed the civil ser-
vice to be caught up in red tape and inherently less effi  cient than the private 
sector. The new government also changed the entire policy process by: rely-
ing less on the civil service and much more on non-government sources of 
advice; substantially weakening the role of DoF, which had been the main 
guardian of ﬁ scal rectitude; concentrating policy and budget decision mak-
ing in the Prime Minister’s Offi  ce; making many expenditure decisions after 
the end of the formal budget process; and basing many government deci-
sions on ideological considerations, with relatively little attention to hard 
evidence such as M&E information. This approach can perhaps be regarded 
as the antithesis of evidence-based decision making. It was considerably fa-
cilitated by the economic good fortune that Australia enjoyed as a result of 
booming exports (largely due to a very strong resource sector), and espe-
cially by the continuing high levels of budget surplus. Thus, just as diffi  cult 
macroeconomic circumstances can provide a powerful motivator for public 
sector reform and for greater eff ort to be devoted to getting the most value 
from government spending, abundant prosperity can have the opposite ef-
fect by undermining these reforms. 
The Australian M&E system endured for a decade, and it achieved a con-
siderable level of utilization during this period. However, based on the deﬁ -
nition of a “successful” M&E system presented in Chapters 1 and 2—which 
includes the concept of sustainability—its eventual abolition means that it 
cannot be regarded as having been wholly successful. The demise of the sys-
tem was not due to a careful consideration of its beneﬁ ts and costs—most 
objective observers would judge the system to have a high beneﬁ t/cost ratio. 
Rather, the system was abolished for what were essentially ideological rea-
sons, and government decision making came to rely much less on hard evi-
dence about value for money from government spending.
A new government elected in 2007 has taken a number of initiatives that 
collectively are likely to increase the supply of and demand for monitoring 
information and evaluation ﬁ ndings. The initiatives include a fresh approach 
to monitoring that replaces the Outcomes and Outputs Framework and rein-
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troduces program budgeting. There is also a renewed focus on evaluation 
and review, with substantive interest from DoF in creating a whole-of-
government system that avoids the weaknesses of the earlier evaluation sys-
tem. More emphasis is also being placed on developing the policy skills of 
the civil service in the context of government decision-making processes, 
which will provide greater scope for policy advice. Only time will tell if the 
current eff orts to reinvigorate monitoring and evaluation in the Australian 
government are successful.
Notes
1. Note that this evaluation strategy related to the federal government’s own 
spending, not to the services provided by lower levels of government.
2. See www.pc.gov.au/gsp.
3. Coverage currently relates to US$136 billion in annual expenditures, or 13 
percent of GDP.
4. Savings options are areas of government expenditures that could be reduced or 
abolished entirely.
5. It is interesting to note that these were the same departments that had created 
specialist evaluation units during the period of the formal evaluation strategy.
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The Canadian M&E System
Robert Lahey
CHAPTER 15
Performance measurement, monitoring, and evaluation have long been a 
part of the infrastructure within the federal government in Canada. With 
over 30 years of formalized evaluation experience in most large federal de-
partments and agencies, many “lessons” can be gained from this experience, 
not the least of which is the recognition that the monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) system itself is not static. The Canadian government has a formalized 
evaluation policy, standards, and guidelines and these have been modiﬁ ed on 
three occasions over the past three decades. Changes have usually come 
about due to a public sector reform initiative, such as the introduction of a 
results orientation to government management, a political issue that may 
have generated a demand for greater accountability and transparency in gov-
ernment, or a change in emphasis on where and how M&E information 
should be used in government. This chapter provides an overview of the 
 Canadian M&E model, examining its deﬁ ning elements and identifying key 
lessons learned. 
For their comments, the author thanks Richard Allen (Consultant, Public Sector Governance), 
Philipp Krause (Consultant, Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit [PRMPR]), Keith Mackay (Con-
sultant, PRMPR), as well as Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (Senior Economist, PRMPR), and Jaime 
Saavedra (Director, PRMPR). The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author.
212 Building Better Policies
Evaluation in public sector management in Canada dates back to 1969, 
with the initiation of formalized and centralized evaluation practices. The 
centrally-led approach was replaced in 1977 with the ﬁ rst government-wide 
Evaluation Policy that established the model upon which the practice of 
evaluation still functions in the government. The introduction of evaluation 
was inspired by the notion of “letting the managers manage”; that is, allow-
ing deputy ministers1 of federal government departments to assume greater 
responsibility but also be accountable for the performance of their programs 
and the prudent use of public funds. The model is based on a strong central 
management board that oversees and holds deputies accountable. One of the 
mechanisms to do this is performance evaluation.
Main Characteristics of the 
Canadian M&E System
The structure of the Canadian M&E system is characterized by three deﬁ n-
ing elements:
1.  Internal evaluation units in most federal departments, with central 
leadership
The Canadian M&E system distinguishes itself from many other countries 
by its “departmental delivery–central leadership” structure, where rule-
setting is done by the central agency, the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), 
and evaluations are conducted by internal evaluation units established in 
each federal department. 
To assist in rule-setting, capacity building, and oversight of the system, a 
Centre of Excellence for Evaluation (CEE) was established within TBS. As 
results-based monitoring and reporting became increasingly popular start-
ing in the 1990s, relevant policy areas were established in TBS to provide 
guidance to departmental managers and oversight in these areas. This cen-
tral leadership structure guides departments and agencies with performance 
measurement and reporting aspects of results-based management and, 
 system-wide, the results orientation of government.
2.  An emphasis on both monitoring and evaluation as tools of 
“performance measurement”
The Canadian M&E system relies on both ongoing performance monitoring 
and the conduct of planned evaluations as tools to measure program and 
policy performance. Both are recognized as key tools to support good gover-
nance, accountability, and results-based management. 
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Within individual government departments and agencies, the deputy 
head has some ﬂ exibility in resourcing these tools to be appropriate to the 
size and needs of their organization. The expectation is that both tools are 
used in managing a department and helping a deputy achieve the organiza-
tional goals for which they are being held accountable. It falls upon individ-
ual program managers to put in place the necessary results-based monitor-
ing systems and upon the internal evaluation unit to plan for and carry out 
evaluations that generally provide deeper understanding of program perfor-
mance. Considerable time and eff ort has been expended by the central 
agency to provide appropriate guidance to both technical experts and pro-
gram mangers across government.
3.  A well-deﬁ ned foundation setting the rules and expectations 
for performance measurement and evaluation—policy, standards, 
and guidelines
The requirements and standards of practice for both monitoring and evalu-
ation have been built into administrative policies of government, developed 
by the central agency, and rolled out for all government departments and 
agencies to adhere to. The formalized policies and guidelines help clarify the 
government’s expectations and the roles and responsibilities of all key play-
ers in the M&E system. It also reinforces the use of oversight mechanisms 
to monitor the health and use of M&E across government. Embedded as 
they are in administrative policies, these policies and guidelines have been 
adjusted and improved as more experience has been gained with the M&E 
system. 
Roles and Responsibilities of the Key Players
The Canadian M&E system has two key focal points for the delivery and 
use of M&E information: the TBS that sets the rules and individual govern-
ment departments that measure the performance of their programs and 
policies. 
Centre of Excellence for Evaluation—the government’s evaluation 
policy center
While the TBS plays a strong role in both the practice of evaluation as well as 
performance monitoring within departments, the CEE within TBS acts as 
the government’s evaluation policy center. This unit, which currently em-
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ploys 14 staff , plays a variety of roles in support of the evaluation function 
across the system: 
• Community development to assist in capacity building, including: devel-
opment of competency proﬁ les for evaluators, a community development 
strategy, an internship program, and evaluation tools. 
• Leadership and “champion” for evaluation by establishing evaluation net-
works and providing guidance related to M&E practices, including main-
taining an up-to-date Web site.
• Operational oversight and quality control via monitoring standards 
and quality of evaluation practices in individual departments and 
system-wide. 
• Facilitating the use of evaluation results by linking departmental evalua-
tions with TBS program analysts to help ensure that results information 
is used in program funding decisions and the broader Expenditure Man-
agement System.
• Government-wide evaluation, which is a feature of the new 2009 evalua-
tion policy.
TBS policy centers for performance monitoring and reporting
TBS provides formal guidance and support to departments in developing 
department and program-level performance measurement frameworks and 
ongoing performance monitoring systems. Additionally, TBS oversees an-
nual performance reporting, including reviewing every departmental per-
formance report required by all federal departments and agencies before 
sending it to Parliament. 
Another important player in the M&E system is the Offi  ce of the Auditor 
General (OAG), which periodically monitors and reports to Parliament on 
the functioning of various aspects of the M&E system. 
Organization of M&E in a government department
All major government departments and agencies are required to dedicate 
resources for evaluation, at a capacity appropriate to the size and needs of 
the organization. In addition, each department must put in place a senior-
level evaluation committee chaired by the deputy minister, annual and 
multi-year planning for evaluation, a departmental evaluation policy reﬂ ec-
tive of the government’s policy, and the mechanisms needed for delivering 
credible evaluation products. TBS/CEE monitors departments on all of 
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these aspects, including the quality and use of evaluation, and reﬂ ects this in 
an annual assessment of each deputy minister. 
A critical part of the evaluation infrastructure in a department is the in-
ternal evaluation unit, led by the “head of evaluation.” This position plays a 
pivotal role in ensuring that the government’s policy requirements as well as 
the priorities of the deputy minister are reﬂ ected in departmental evaluation 
work. To help ensure independence, the position generally reports to the 
deputy minister or at least has unencumbered access to the most senior of-
ﬁ cial in the department.
Deputy ministers are also required by TBS policy to develop a corporate 
performance framework (the so-called Management Resources and Re-
sults Structure—MRRS) that links all departmental programs to expected 
outcomes. This articulation of program architecture serves as the basis for 
performance monitoring and reporting, and its development is watched 
closely by TBS to ensure adherence to the MRRS policy. Performance 
monitoring is an ongoing responsibility of individual program managers, 
though evaluation specialists often support the development of monitor-
ing systems. In theory, ongoing performance monitoring provides much of 
the data needed for program evaluation; in practice, however, this does not 
always happen.
Scale and cost of Canada’s M&E system
Virtually all large departments and agencies (37) have a stand-alone evalua-
tion unit, as do most mid-size agencies, resulting in some 550 evaluation pro-
fessionals currently working in the Canadian federal public service. 
Given the ﬂ exibility allowed by the government’s policy, departmental 
evaluation units range in size from one individual up to 60 evaluators, with 
contract budgets for hiring external consultants ranging anywhere from 
zero to over $8 million. The average size is now in the order of 12 profession-
als. The salary for internal evaluators has historically represented some 25 
percent of all funds spent on evaluation in a department, though this number 
is likely rising as a result of the 2009 evaluation policy. 
Spending on evaluation government-wide has risen substantially over the 
2000s. It was $32 million in 2005–06 (still below the estimated resource 
need of $55 million), but it has continued to rise sharply, most recently in 
response to the greater demands put on departments by the 2009 evaluation 
policy. 
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How Is the M&E System Used?
Many uses and users for M&E information
M&E is not viewed as an end in itself. The intent of M&E in the Canadian 
system is to provide results information that will serve a variety of needs and 
users at diff erent levels throughout the system—at an operational or pro-
gram level, at an individual department, at a government-wide level, and in a 
legislative context. In broad terms, much of this need has been driven by 
various public sector reforms and, most recently, the government’s manage-
ment agenda, Results for Canadians, as well as its eff orts around renewal of 
the Expenditure Management System. As such, M&E is seen and used as 
both a management/learning vehicle as well as a means to support account-
ability in the design and delivery of government policies, programs, services, 
and the use of public funds. 
Informing decision making with M&E information
In the mid-2000s, the CEE reported that some 230 evaluations were being 
completed a year. Historically, the prime focus for a large proportion of these 
evaluations was for internal management purposes, largely program im-
provement, and to support performance accountability to external audi-
ences such as Parliament, parliamentary committees, or TBS. Increasingly 
over the past decade, however, a government-imposed requirement to evalu-
ate all “grant and contribution” programs prior to their funding renewal has 
resulted in more evaluations being used to assess program eff ectiveness, 
with the information being used by TBS analysts and Treasury Board minis-
ters in decisions around future program funding. The formal requirement to 
table an eff ectiveness evaluation at the time of discussions around funding 
renewal has helped institutionalize the use of evaluation information in pro-
gram funding decision making. Currently, federal departments and agencies 
are on track to evaluate all grant and contribution programs over a ﬁ ve-year 
cycle, representing coverage of some $43.8 billion, or 40 percent of all gov-
ernment direct program spending. In all cases, the M&E information gets 
used by the TBS program analyst as part of the decision making on future 
funding and program renewal.
The 2009 evaluation policy is bringing M&E closer to funding decisions 
on all direct government program spending (some $112.3 billion in 2010–11). 
This is happening as part of a broader government-wide expenditure man-
agement requirement faced by all deputy heads to carry out a strategic ex-
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penditure review every four years to ensure value for money, eff ectiveness, 
effi  ciency, and alignment with government roles and priorities of all pro-
grams. Deputy heads are using M&E information drawn from formalized 
evaluations and other sources to make these determinations. Faced with fro-
zen budgets across government, the M&E information is becoming even 
more important as an input to budget planning and decision making regard-
ing the need to change, improve, or replace programs. 
Reporting and accountability to Parliament
On a corporate level, M&E information is a required input to a number of 
important documents that regularly inform ministers or Parliament on gov-
ernment and program performance: submissions to Treasury Board minis-
ters, memoranda to Cabinet, departmental performance reports tabled in 
Parliament each year, and reports to parliamentary committees. Since the 
OAG’s mandate does not include assessing eff ectiveness of government pro-
grams (OAG audits focus on issues of effi  ciency and economy), departmental 
evaluations and results reporting in the above documents represent an im-
portant use of M&E information in general and evaluation in particular in 
keeping elected offi  cials abreast of government performance and how well 
programs are meeting their objectives.
Incentives to Help Promote and Drive the Use of 
the M&E System
Formal requirements for using M&E information in government
A number of centrally-driven administrative policies introduced over the 
1990s and 2000s have served as key “drivers” for M&E. Some have had a di-
rect impact on building M&E capacity in departments, including the evalua-
tion policy (most recently renewed in 2009), Management Resources and 
Results Structure Policy (2005), the Federal Accountability Act (2005), and 
the Policy on Transfer Payments (updated in 2008). Others serve broader 
needs but have also generated demand for systematic and credible perfor-
mance information. These include the government’s management agenda 
Results for Canadians (2000), government requirements for departments to 
annually report to Parliament via the report on plans and priorities and the 
departmental performance reports, the Results-based Management and Ac-
countability Frameworks Policy (2000), the Management Accountability 
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Framework annual assessment of departmental performance (2003), and 
the strategic expenditure reviews (2007) and Expenditure Management 
System (2007).
While these have all served to drive the development of M&E in Canada 
in one way or another over the last ﬁ fteen years, they do not represent a mas-
ter plan for M&E. Rather, they reﬂ ect the government’s long-term commit-
ment to build a results orientation into public sector management and a rec-
ognition that performance M&E are critical tools to make this happen. 
Checks and balances to support the independence and neutrality 
of the evaluator
An internal evaluation function could potentially be criticized for not having 
the necessary independence to “speak truth to power.” To deal with this 
challenge, the Canadian model has put in place infrastructure and oversight 
mechanisms aimed at ensuring that internal evaluations of departmental 
programs or policies are credible and objective. Some of these elements are 
at the level of the individual department while others are enforced centrally. 
All are intended to reinforce the independence and neutrality of the evalua-
tion process and the reporting on the ﬁ ndings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the evaluation study. A listing of some of the main checks and 
balances is provided in Box 15.1. 
The 2009 revision to the evaluation policy dropped the word “indepen-
dence,” replacing it with “neutral,” deﬁ ned as “an attribute required of the 
evaluation function and evaluators that is characterized by impartiality in 
behavior and process.” The rationale for this change was in part to ensure 
that evaluators would not operate at arm’s length from key stakeholders (as 
an internal auditor might, to maintain independence). It formally recog-
nized that stakeholders, including managers whose programs are being eval-
uated, need to be involved in the conduct of the evaluation, during both de-
sign and implementation. 
A strong set of oversight mechanisms to reinforce credibility and 
quality control
Oversight mechanisms in the system serve as a “challenge” function and, in 
the process, provide quality control and help reinforce the credibility of the 
system. Oversight in the Canadian model is implemented at three levels: 
(i) an individual evaluation study; (ii) at an organizational level; and, (iii) at a 
whole-of-government level.
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The oversight role is carried out by both the OAG and the TBS/CEE. 
This oversight role provides an additional incentive to help drive a well-
performing M&E system in departments and across the system.
At an operational level, TBS monitors departmental M&E initiatives at 
various points—planning, implementation, and reporting phases. The CEE 
• Deputy head of a government department 
is required by the government’s evaluation 
policy to establish an internal evaluation 
function that is both “robust” and “neutral.”
• The policy requires that the head of evalua-
tion has “direct and unencumbered access” 
to the deputy head of the individual depart-
ment or agency, to help ensure indepen-
dence/neutrality/impartiality in the conduct 
and use of evaluation results.
• The government’s Directive on the Evaluation 
Function outlines the principle that “heads of 
evaluation, as primary departmental experts 
in evaluation, have fi nal decision-making au-
thority on technical issues, subject to the 
decision-making authority of deputy heads.”
• Each department has a senior-level depart-
mental evaluation committee in place that 
plays a variety of roles regarding evalua-
tion planning, conduct, and follow-up, includ-
ing assessing the performance of internal 
evaluation.
• The head of evaluation is encouraged by the 
government’s policy to make use of advisory 
committees, peer review or, as appropriate, 
external review panels (independent ex-
perts, for example) for the planning and con-
duct of individual evaluation studies. 
• The government’s evaluation policy stresses 
the “neutrality” of both the evaluation func-
tion and the evaluator (“impartiality in behav-
ior and process”). This is specifi cally defi ned 
in the policy document.
• Standards for evaluation identify four broad 
requirements intended to ensure that evalu-
ations produce results that are credible, neu-
tral, timely, and produced in a professional 
and ethical manner.
• Operational oversight is provided through 
ongoing monitoring by the TBS/CEE. 
• The performance of each department and 
deputy head is formally assessed each year 
by TBS through the Management Account-
ability Framework process, which includes 
assessing M&E in the department.
• The OAG carries out an oversight role 
through periodic audits of the implementa-
tion of the government’s evaluation policy 
and the quality of performance reporting. As 
an independent body reporting directly to 
Parliament, OAG reports represent a public 
disclosure of information that reinforces 
both independence and transparency. 
BOX 15.1
Checks and Balances to Support the Independence and Neutrality of 
Internal Evaluation
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for example, monitors evaluation planning and conduct in all departments, 
including coverage and quality of individual studies. Performance measure-
ment and monitoring in general is monitored by the TBS, both at the time of 
the development and approval of a department’s MRRS, the basis for its cor-
porate performance reporting, and annually during the review of depart-
mental performance reports, submitted to TBS by each department prior to 
their tabling in Parliament.
Additionally, since 2003, TBS assesses each department/deputy head an-
nually against a number of criteria (including the use of results and perfor-
mance information). This is the annual Management Accountability Frame-
work process that is linked to compensation received by deputy heads. This 
formalized framework is an important way to provide a vehicle for a dia-
logue between the central agency and senior departmental offi  cials that 
could point to areas where improvements may be needed.
At a whole-of-government level, the OAG conducts periodic performance 
audits that monitor the eff ectiveness of M&E implementation across the full 
system. This could include a system-wide audit of the implementation of the 
government’s evaluation policy or the quality of results measurement and 
reporting. Results of these audits are reported directly to Parliament and 
generally receive high media exposure, particularly if the ﬁ ndings point to 
issues with the eff ectiveness of government policies and/or need for change. 
Such audits highlight the importance and role of M&E in public sector man-
agement and catch the attention of legislators, both at the time of reporting 
and in follow-up discussions that may take place in the Public Accounts 
Committee. The independence of the OAG and the transparency of its public 
reporting to Parliament are key elements for the external auditor.
The Sustainability of the M&E System
One of the deﬁ ning characteristics of a successful M&E system is its sustain-
ability. The longevity of the Canadian model, with over 30 years embedded 
in the federal public sector, has likely been inﬂ uenced by four factors dis-
cussed below.
Flexibility and willingness to learn and adjust
Flexibility and avoiding a “one size ﬁ ts all” approach has been a hallmark of 
the M&E model in Canada. Along with this ﬂ exibility has been recognition 
of the need to learn and adjust as required and a willingness to pilot new re-
quirements and adjust as needed before the cross-government roll-out. This 
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approach was used to introduce the concept of corporate performance re-
ports, with several adjustments to the guidelines and directives introduced 
through the late 1990s and early 2000s.
The fact that the government has had four versions of its evaluation pol-
icy over the past 34 years is a testament to a willingness to move from the 
status quo. This has been made easier by the fact that the government-wide 
requirements for evaluation are largely based on administrative policies 
rather than embedded in legislation.
Transparency as an underlying value of the M&E system
To be eff ective, there needs to be an enabling environment for M&E, both in 
organizations and across the whole system. This rests in part on a willing-
ness to carry out performance M&E of government programs in full public 
view. 
In Canada, transparency is a critical dimension underlying the govern-
ment’s M&E system. The 2009 evaluation policy makes offi  cials accountable 
for “ensuring that complete, approved evaluation reports along with man-
agement responses and action plans are made easily available to Canadians 
in a timely manner.” Public disclosure laws have played an important role in 
increasing accessibility of M&E studies to the general public, including the 
media. Additionally, OAG reports have increased public focus on perfor-
mance and results of government programs. Added to this is the increasing 
access to and use of departmental and central agency Web sites where M&E 
information is made accessible to the general public. 
An ongoing commitment to capacity building
An adequate supply of trained human resources (HR) with the needed skill 
sets is critical for sustainability of an M&E system. HR capacity development 
is an ongoing issue for the Canadian system, given the large number of pro-
fessional evaluators working in government (currently over 550). 
Several sources have traditionally been relied on for HR training and de-
velopment, including community development initiatives led by the CEE as 
well as workshops, seminars, and professional development and networking 
opportunities generated by professional associations and the private sector. 
Recently, a network of universities across Canada started off ering evaluation 
certiﬁ cate programs, providing more in-depth training needed to work as an 
evaluation practitioner.
Substantial eff orts have been made over the last three years to establish a 
recognized set of competencies for evaluators, and with this, an accredita-
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tion program. The Canadian Evaluation Society recently introduced the 
“Credentialed Evaluator” designation, as a means to deﬁ ne, recognize, and 
promote the practice of ethical, high quality, and competent evaluation. The 
CEE is also working to address the issue of further professionalizing 
evaluation. 
A central commitment to accountability and good 
management practices
The origins for the Canadian M&E system were linked to a desire to 
strengthen good governance and accountability. The broad set of govern-
ment initiatives put in place is a testament to this central commitment that 
has been sustained through various changes of government over the past 30 
years. This strong support for M&E can be summed up in the words of the 
Auditor General recently speaking before the Public Accounts Committee: 
“The evaluation of eff ectiveness is absolutely critical to making good deci-
sions about program spending so that we can know whether programs are 
actually getting the results that were intended . . . this is even more critical 
in the current economic times we are going through, because government 
does have to make diffi  cult choices, and it should be making those decisions 
based on good information.”
Lessons Learned from 30 Years of 
M&E Development in Canada
1. Lesson Learned: Drivers for M&E
M&E should not be considered as an end in itself. Potentially, there are many 
“drivers” for M&E that may be political, operational, be associated with a 
major reform agenda, and/or brought on by ﬁ scal measures. Whatever the 
case, it is important to understand who the key audiences are for M&E infor-
mation, what their needs are, and what questions need to be answered. Some 
lessons relating to the drivers for M&E from the Canadian experience are 
provided in Box 15.2. 
2. Lessons Learned: Implementing the M&E system
Implementation of M&E is long-term and iterative—and not costless. As 
such, senior level commitment and “champions” at both senior and opera-
tional levels are important elements to ensure sustainability through the 
long period of development and implementation. Eventually, the goal is to 
move M&E beyond the point of being a “special project” to a point where it 
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is a normal part of doing business and the management practices of the orga-
nization. Box 15.3 off ers some lessons on “implementing the M&E system” 
from the Canadian experience. 
3. Lesson Learned: Building M&E capacity
In considering training needs, it is important to consider not simply tech-
nical training but also M&E training and orientation for non-technical 
offi  cials (that is, the users of M&E information). Additionally, building 
 capacity needs to address an oft-ignored area—data development and es-
tablishing credible databases. The national statistics offi  ce (in Canada, 
Statistics Canada) should play a central role in data development, data 
warehousing, oversight, and quality control associated with data capture 
and public  surveying. Key lessons regarding M&E capacity building are 
outlined in Box 15.4. 
1.1 Building and using M&E capacity requires 
more than resources and technical skills—it re-
quires a political will and sustained commit-
ment. Central leadership and a plan are very 
important.
1.2 M&E information is not an end in itself—it 
needs to be linked to particular management 
and decision-making needs, particularly in the 
context of public sector reforms or government 
agendas. 
1.3 To be effective, it is important to build both 
a capacity to do evaluation and gather perfor-
mance information, plus a capacity to use M&E 
information within organizations and across the 
system. A supply of good evaluations is not 
enough—a reasonable demand for evaluation is 
key.
1.4 The capacity to use M&E information relies 
on the incentives in the system for managers to 
demand such information and actually use it as 
part of their normal operations. This could take 
the forms of sanctions for not complying, or re-
wards for meeting requirements.
1.5 Internal infrastructure on its own is likely 
insuffi cient to sustain an M&E system. A num-
ber of formal requirements associated with its 
use, at both a departmental and central level, 
and in the context of both management and 
 accountability, will force program and senior 
managers to take the time and effort to invest 
in M&E development.
1.6 Managing the expectations about the role 
of evaluation is important in avoiding unrealis-
tic expectations. Evaluation can and should in-
form decision making, but it is generally only 
one of many sources of information. Ques-
tions about the performance of government 
programs generally do not have simple yes/no 
answers.
BOX 15.2
Some Lessons Concerning Drivers for M&E
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2.1 There needs to be suffi cient communica-
tion and for information-sharing across organi-
zations about the role of M&E and how it can 
help management so as to link the demand for 
and supply of M&E information; that is, to en-
sure that what gets produced is what is needed, 
and delivered in a timely way.
2.2 A formal policy document is a useful basis 
for clarifying roles, responsibilities, and ac-
countabilities of key players—deputy heads, 
evaluation specialists, program managers, and 
central agency offi cials.
2.3 The distinction between the “M” and the 
“E” need to be clarifi ed, including what each 
contributes to results-based management and 
what each requires re capacity building.
2.4 A central agency champion for evaluation 
in government can play a key role in the M&E 
system. In Canada, the CEE serves as the pol-
icy center for evaluation, provides guidance, 
leads and promotes capacity development, and 
provides oversight to help ensure quality 
control.
2.5 In developing the M&E system in Canada, a 
number of requirements have been phased in 
by the central agency, under the general philoso-
phy of “try, adapt, learn, and adjust.” This allows 
for a period of learning and an ease of adjust-
ment if needed, and recognizes that building an 
M&E system is long-term and iterative.
2.6 In establishing internal evaluation units in 
departments and agencies, some fl exibility is 
important to take account of the unique circum-
stances associated with each organization. 
Recognizing that one size does not fi t all, dep-
uty heads in Canada are given some fl exibility in 
implementing the government’s evaluation pol-
icy, though all are equally accountable for the 
performance of their individual organization.
2.7 Oversight by the national audit offi ce is im-
portant in giving broad and public exposure of 
how well the M&E system is being imple-
mented and whether adjustments are needed.
2.8 It is important from the outset to think in 
terms of years, not months, to getting to a ma-
ture M&E system.
BOX 15.3
Some Lessons Concerning Implementing an M&E System
Note
1.  In the Canadian system, the deputy minister of a government department 
(or deputy head of an agency) is the most senior non-elected offi  cial in charge of 
and accountable for the department and its programs. They report to a minister, 
an elected politician.
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Further Reading
A more detailed description and discussion of the Canadian M&E system can be 
found in Robert Lahey, “The Canadian M&E System: Lessons Learned from 30 Years 
of Development,” ECD Working Paper Series 23, Independent Evaluation Group, 
World Bank: November 2010. In particular, details can be obtained on the following:
• The key policies and procedures supporting the M&E system in Canada.
• The roles and responsibilities of key players within the M&E system
• Performance of the Canadian M&E system and assessments by the OAG.
3.1 Building an adequate supply of human re-
source capacity is critical for the sustainability of 
the M&E system. Additionally, “growing” evalu-
ators requires far more technically-oriented 
M&E training and development than can usually 
be obtained via one or two workshops.
3.2 Both formal training and on-the-job experi-
ence are important in developing evaluators. 
Two key competencies for evaluators have 
been determined to be: cognitive capacity and 
communication skills.
3.3 Developing communication skills for evalua-
tors is important to help ensure that the mes-
sage of evaluation resonates with stakeholders. 
“Speaking truth to power” and knowing how to 
navigate the political landscape are both critical.
3.4 Building a results culture within organiza-
tions requires program and senior managers to 
have enough understanding that they trust and 
will use M&E information. This likely requires a 
less technical form of training/orientation on 
M&E and results-based management. 
3.5 There are no quick fi xes in building an M&E 
system—investment in training and systems 
development is long-term. A mix of both formal 
training (given by the public sector, private sec-
tor, universities, and/or professional associa-
tions) and job assignment and mentoring pro-
grams is likely needed as a cost-effective 
approach. 
3.6 In introducing an M&E system, champions 
and advocates are important to help sustain 
commitment over the long term. Identifying 
good practices and learning from others can 
help avoid fatigue of the change process.
3.7 Evaluation professionals have the technical 
skills to advise and guide program managers on 
the development of appropriate results-based 
performance monitoring systems, starting with 
the performance measurement framework and 
identifi cation of relevant indicators and mea-
surement strategies. 
3.8 Ongoing performance monitoring (the “M”) 
and the conduct of periodic evaluation studies 
(the “E”) should be complementary functions 
that together form the basis for an appropriate 
and cost-effective performance measurement 
strategy. 
3.9 Data quality is critical for the credibility of 
an M&E system and likely requires implemen-
tation of a long-term strategy to develop suffi -
cient data to populate results indicators. Key 
support can come from the national statistics 
offi ce and offi cials responsible for IM/IT.
BOX 15.4
Some Lessons Concerning Building M&E Capacity
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